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Abstract
The recognition heuristic (RH) is one of the most prominent models of inferential
decision making, but also one of the simplest. Its basic premise is straightforward:
Whenever a decision maker is evaluating two objects according to a given criterion
(e.g., population size), one object being recognized and the other not, recognition
by itself is used to make an inference, ignoring all further knowledge one might
have about the recognized object (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999). Surprisingly, this
simple strategy can be quite accurate. This accuracy stems from an exploitation
of the environmental structure. In fact, for objects in many domains (e.g., world
cities) there is a correlation between recognition and the corresponding criterion
value (e.g., population size). For example, if a city name is recognized and an-
other one is not, the former city is likely to be more populous than the latter one.
Goldstein and Gigerenzer assumed this to be the case because recognition judgments
are positively correlated with the criterion. However, Erdfelder, Ku¨pper-Tetzel, and
Mattern (2011) questioned whether it makes sense to rely on the recognition cue
regardless of the memory strength associated with a certain recognition judgment.
Specifically, they proposed that memory strength, and not recognition judgments
per se, should influence reliance on recognition. Erdfelder et al. therefore proposed
to extend the RH to the memory state heuristic (MSH) by incorporating the no-
tions of a well-supported recognition memory model, the two-high-threshold model
(Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988), into the theory. The MSH assumes that three orderly
defined memory states can underlie recognition judgments - recognition certainty,
uncertainty, and rejection certainty - and that, when comparing two objects, people
should infer that the one in a higher memory state scores higher on the given crite-
rion. Moreover, it predicts that the higher the distance between memory states of
the objects under comparison, the higher should be the preference for objects in a
higher state. This implies that the MSH should be used more often when the objects
under comparison are in recognition certainty and rejection certainty, respectively,
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than when they are in recognition certainty and uncertainty, or uncertainty and
rejection certainty. It follows that, unlike the RH, the MSH’s spectrum of predic-
tions goes beyond so-called recognition pairs (pairs where one object is judged as
recognized and the other as unrecognized), and cover any combination of objects in
different memory-states.
Erdfelder et al. (2011) tested qualitative predictions of the MSH for recognition
pairs, but some questions were not addressed by them. The present thesis describes
a research program developed to overcome that gap and test some of the predictions
that stem from the core assumptions of the MSH. The first manuscript tested qual-
itative predictions of the MSH which complement the work developed by Erdfelder
et al. (2011). By relying on a simple assumption - that the uncertainty memory
state is associated with longer recognition or rejection latencies than the certainty
memory states - we tested the MSH predictions for three types of pairs: recogni-
tion pairs (one object is recognized and the other is not), knowledge pairs (both
objects are recognized) and guessing pairs (none of the objects is recognized). In a
second manuscript, we relied on a formal model to test the MSH against the RH
and knowledge integration accounts. We found evidence in favor of the MSH across
16 published data sets. Finally, in a third manuscript, we developed and success-
fully tested a new paradigm and formal model of the MSH, which incorporates its
predictions for all possible combinations of memory states.
In sum, the present thesis describes converging support for the MSH. From qual-
itative predictions to tests of a formal implementation of the MSH, I show how
memory states predict reliance on recognition and are correlated with the criterion
value. Therefore, I conclude that the inspiring but nevertheless simplistic RH theory
as originally proposed by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999) must be abandoned in
favor of an account that gives a more fine-grained characterization of the underlying
mnemonic processes involved in inferential decision making.
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Manuscripts
This thesis is based on three manuscripts which have been published or are currently
submitted for publication in peer-reviewed journals. The manuscripts are listed
below and appended to this thesis in the order in which they will be discussed.
1. Castela, M., & Erdfelder, E. (2016). Further evidence for the memory state
heuristic: Recognition latency predictions for binary inferences. Manuscript
submitted for publication.
2. Castela, M., Kellen, D., Erdfelder, E., & Hilbig, B. E. (2014). The impact of
subjective recognition experiences on recognition heuristic use: A multi-
nomial processing tree approach. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 21,
1131-1138.
3. Castela, M., Erdfelder, E. (in press). The Memory State Heuristic: A formal
model based on repeated recognition judgments. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition.
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Introduction & Theoretical
Background
It is hard to deny that there is something remarkable about the feeling of recogni-
tion. Despite the frequency and easiness with which it occurs, recognition seems to
carry along a considerable amount of information with it. We recognize people that
we have seen or met before (even if only once), brands or products that we have
encountered or were exposed to somehow, names of books we may or not have read
before, etc. Along with all those feelings of recognition, some information can be
inferred. Anyone who ever watched a program like ”Who wants to be a Millionaire”
will probably relate to the feeling of thinking you know the correct answer, while
at the same time not being able to retrieve any argument for it other than the fact
that the option sounds familiar. We find ourselves compelled to produce a response
on the basis of familiarity alone. But can those inferences be accurate?
Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999; see also Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996) thought
so. Based on the remarkable human ability to distinguish between what we have or
have not experienced before, they proposed a decision strategy that exploits that
simple distinction - the recognition heuristic (RH). The heuristic is defined within
the context of inferring which of two objects scores higher on a given criterion as
follows: ”If one of two objects is recognized and the other is not, then infer that
the recognized object has the higher value” (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, p. 41).
Importantly, they clearly stated that, in this context, what they mean by recognition
involves a division between the previously experienced and the novel. While this
distinction is sensible, it ignores important aspects, such as the degree of familiarity
of recognized items. Goldstein and Gigerenzer assumed the RH would ignore such
information, since once one object is recognized and another one is not, an inference
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can be made on the grounds of recognition alone. However, differences in the degree
of familiarity between recognized objects can be very marked, which brings up the
question: Do different degrees of familiarity impact reliance on recognition as a
single cue? This thesis explores this important question by testing an extension of
the RH which assumes that the memory states underlying recognition judgments,
and not the judgments per se, correlate with the criterion value and can be used
to make inferences. This extension has been introduced by Erdfelder et al. (2011)
and named the memory state heuristic (MSH). However, they only tested a few
qualitative predictions derived from a verbal model of the MSH. In this thesis I
extend these initial tests to cover the full spectrum of predictions of the MSH, test it
against competing models, and ultimately develop and test a formal implementation
of it. Before introducing the MSH, in the next section I will address the RH in more
detail by bringing it into context and discussing the major findings around it.
1.1 The Recognition Heuristic
According to a classical view of human reasoning, inferences are rational by virtue of
the use of the laws of probability and statistics. In turn, deviations from those laws
are perceived as errors (e.g., Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman,
1974). However, given that most decisions are made under limited time and cogni-
tive resources, is it reasonable to expect judgments under uncertainty to perfectly
follow those laws? Gigerenzer and Goldstein revived Herbert Simon’s notions of
bounded rationality and satisficing (a combination of sufficing and satisfying) argu-
ing that accurate inferential strategies can deviate from classical norms of rational
inference. Briefly, these two concepts can be summarized by the idea that organisms
are bounded by limited external and internal resources (e.g., time, available infor-
mation, processing speed, memory, etc) and therefore will accept “good enough”
solutions rather than always try to optimize (e.g., Simon, 1956). It is in fact one
of Simon’s quotes that best describes Gigerenzer and Goldstein’s understanding of
human reasoning: “Human rational behavior is shaped by a scissors whose two
blades are the structure of task environments and the computation capabilities of
the actor” (Simon, 1990, p., 7).
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Gigerenzer and Goldstein’s (1996; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, 2002) approach
to human reasoning aimed at demonstrating how the use of heuristics can lead to
accurate inferences through the exploitation of the structures of the environment.
In other words, they intended to show that heuristics are ecologically rational, such
that they can adaptively explore the structure of the environment, leading to good
inferences with minimal effort. Hence, the fast and frugal heuristics program was
born. This program describes a metaphorical adaptive toolbox, that is, a set of
adaptive heuristics which can be used to make accurate inferences. One of the most
studied examples within the adaptive toolbox is the RH. As described above, the
RH relies on a single cue, recognition, to make inferences. It is therefore proposed
to function as a one-reason decision making process, since it bases judgments on
recognition alone, ignoring all further cues.
1.1.1 Ecological Rationality of the RH
The ecological rationality of the RH depends on three concepts: ecological correla-
tion, surrogate correlation and recognition validity (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999).
If one were asked to estimate which of two cities is larger, the fact that one rec-
ognizes one city but not the other would be a good indicator that the recognized
city is larger. This occurs because in that domain recognition positively correlates
with the size of cities, meaning that recognition validity (proportion of recognition
pairs for which the recognized option is the correct one) is high. That correlation
occurs through the interaction with mediators. For example, the fact that larger
cities are more likely to be mentioned in TV, which corresponds to the ecological
correlation. This, in turn, creates a surrogate correlation: the number of times the
city is mentioned in TV will positively correlate with the probability that that city
is recognized. Some preconditions are necessary for the RH to be a good strategy
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011). First, it is only a good strategy for domains where
recognition is a valid cue. Second, recognition should be natural, learned from the
interaction with the environment, and not manipulated in the laboratory. Finally,
the RH is a model for inferences from memory, not from givens, meaning that other
cues should not be made readily available. These three preconditions determine
what should be the ideal paradigm for studying the RH. In what follows, I describe
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that paradigm, which I adhered to (sometimes with necessary extensions) in all
studies reported in this thesis.
1.1.2 Paradigm and Measurement of RH-use
The typical paradigm for investigating the RH involves a comparison task (usually a
two-alternative forced choice task) where items from a certain domain are compared
regarding a given criterion. Additionally, a recognition test is performed where
all items must be judged as recognized or not. This paradigm has been applied
in many domains from the length of rivers or size of islands (e.g., Hilbig & Pohl,
2008) to the success of celebrities or musicians (Michalkiewicz & Erdfelder, 2015),
among many others. However, the most vastly used domain is the population size
of cities, and the paradigm is in these cases referred to as the city-size task. For
example, in the domain of World cities, a typical trial in the comparison task would
be “Delhi - Foshan”. Following the RH, if a given participant recognized Delhi
but not Foshan, he or she should infer that Delhi has a larger population. In
this case, “Delhi - Foshan” would be a so-called recognition pair, a pair where one
object is recognized and the other is not. Additionally, there will be pairs where
both objects are recognized, so-called knowledge pairs, and pairs where both objects
are not recognized, so-called guessing pairs. Importantly, only recognition pairs are
appropriate for use of the RH, since the heuristic cannot be applied to the other
cases.
The measurement of RH-use was initially done by relying on adherence rates,
that is, the proportion of times the recognized option is chosen in recognition pairs.
However, this is an inherently biased measure, since by simply looking into choice
patterns it is not possible to discriminate between use of the RH or reliance on other
strategies, like knowledge-use or even guessing (e.g., Hilbig, 2010). In other words,
this means that the fact that the recognized option is chosen in a recognition pair
does not imply that recognition alone motivated that choice (e.g., Hilbig, Erdfelder,
& Pohl, 2010; Hilbig & Pohl, 2008).
Different measures have been proposed to improve the estimation of the RH (see
Hilbig & Pohl, 2008; Pachur, Mata, & Schooler, 2009), but one of them stands out
(Hilbig, 2010) and has proven very fruitful in the last years (e.g., Castela, Kellen,
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Erdfelder, & Hilbig, 2014; Hilbig, Michalkiewicz, Castela, Pohl, & Erdfelder, 2015;
Horn, Pachur, & Mata, 2015; Michalkiewicz & Erdfelder, 2015; Schwikert & Curran,
2014), the r-model. The r-model was proposed by Hilbig et al. (2010) to estimate
RH-use. It belongs to the class of multinomial processing tree models (Batchelder
& Riefer, 1999; Erdfelder et al., 2009), which postulate a set of latent discrete
states as the basis for observable categorical responses. Each latent state is associ-
ated with a parameter, which represents the probability of its occurrence. Multi-
nomial processing tree models can be represented by a tree structure, with each
branch representing the sequence of presupposed processes that should lead to a
specific response category. In the last decades, they have become an increasingly
attractive tool for psychologists, and have been successfully applied in a variety
of domains, including recognition memory (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988), preference
construction (Erdfelder, Castela, Michalkiewicz, & Heck, 2015), consensus analysis
(Romney, Weller, & Batchelder, 1986), and attitude measurement (Conrey, Sher-
man, Gawronski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005), among others (see Erdfelder et al.,
2009, for a comprehensive review of many applications).
The r-model has three trees and four parameters. Each tree corresponds to a
type of pair, namely knowledge, recognition and guessing pairs (see Figure 1.1).
In both the knowledge and guessing trees, a single parameter accounts for accuracy,
the b parameter and the g parameter, respectively. In the recognition tree, the
probability of using the RH-use is estimated through parameter r. Additionally,
parameter a accounts for recognition validity (the proportion of times that choosing
the recognized object in recognition pairs leads to a correct inference). Therefore,
when using the RH, if the recognized object is the one scoring higher on the criterion,
the inference will be correct with probability r · a, if it is not, it will be wrong with
probability r · (1 − a). Whenever the RH is not used, accuracy will depend on the
validity of knowledge b (or other judgment strategy taking place).
The RH has inspired a lot of research in the last decades. Along with demon-
strations of its impressive ability to make fast and frugal yet accurate inferences in a
vast diversity of domains (e.g., Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, 2002; Pachur & Her-
twig, 2006; Richter & Spa¨th, 2006; Scheibehenne & Bro¨der, 2007; Serwe & Frings,
2006), it also led to a wave of criticism. Certainly, the most challenged aspect of the
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Figure 1.1: Graphical representation of the r-model: Parameter r denotes the proba-
bility of applying the recognition heuristic as originally proposed, that is, by ignoring
any knowledge beyond recognition. a = recognition validity (probability of the rec-
ognized object representing the correct choice in a recognition case); b = probability
of valid knowledge; g = probability of a correct guess; rec. = recognized; R =
recognized; U = unrecognized.
RH was its noncompensatory nature (e.g., Bro¨der & Eichler, 2006; Hilbig & Pohl,
2008, 2009; Newell & Fernandez, 2006; Richter & Spa¨th, 2006). In different ways,
the assumption that further knowledge is ignored whenever recognition is diagnostic
for inferences has been questioned time and time again. At times, the criticism has
been so harsh as to question the RH altogether due to an inability to find evidence
for its main premises (Newell & Fernandez, 2006). But what if a simple extension of
the RH that replaces recognition judgments with memory strength could (1) accom-
modate all those challenging findings, (2) and extend the spectrum of predictions?
Erdfelder et al.’s (2011) memory state heuristic (MSH) offers a promising start.
In the next section, I will address the role of recognition memory in the RH
literature and describe the MSH in detail. Then, I will demonstrate how the MSH
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redefines the literature by reviewing several findings which can be reinterpreted
through its lenses. Finally, in the Summary of Manuscripts section I will put forward
the building blocks of my thesis by describing a complete research program to test
the MSH which addresses the questions left unanswered by Erdfelder et al. (2011).
1.2 The Memory State Heuristic
1.2.1 Recognition Memory in the RH literature
One important yet largely overlooked aspect regarding the RH is the nature of the
recognition process underlying the recognition judgments on which the RH operates.
While the basis of the RH is a memory process, Goldstein and Gigerenzer (1999,
2002) assumed that the heuristic operates only on the output of that process, i.e.,
the recognition judgments, and that the process itself may be ignored. As outlined
above, this assumption is rather questionable, especially in as much as it implies
that differences in familiarity between recognized objects are inconsequential for
reliance on the RH. This simplification has been often questioned (e.g., Dougherty,
Franco-Watkins, & Thomas, 2008; Erdfelder et al., 2011; Hilbig & Pohl, 2008) and
explicit calls for theory integration have been made (e.g., Pachur, Todd, Gigerenzer,
Schooler, & Goldstein, 2011; Pohl, 2011; Tomlinson, Marewski, & Dougherty, 2011).
The few attempts done so far to link theories of recognition memory with the RH
have demonstrated that this exercise helps not only to understand RH-use better,
but also to draw new predictions (Pachur et al., 2011).
Schooler and Hertwig (2005), for instance, have integrated the RH within the
ACT-R cognitive architecture (Anderson, Bothell, Lebiere, & Matessa, 1998), which
involves a model of memory. The advantage of implementing the RH within the
ACT-R is that it enables a direct assessment of how differences in memory can affect
it. Specifically, they have shown that a moderate level of forgetting is beneficial
for the heuristic, as it creates partial ignorance. However, they have relied on an
all-or-none notion of recognition, aligned with Goldstein and Gigerenzer’s (2002)
definition. Therefore, while they take a step towards theory integration, they do
not improve on the simplified understanding of the recognition memory process
associated with the RH.
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Pachur and Hertwig (2006) also linked recognition memory theories with the RH.
They investigated whether the well documented distinction between familiarity and
recollection (e.g., Kelley & Jacoby, 2000) is relevant for the RH. Specifically, they
assumed that recognition processes relevant for use of the RH only regard familiarity,
while retrieval of other cues implies recollection. Since familiarity is known to enter
the mental stage earlier than information which needs to be recollected, they aimed
at demonstrating the retrieval primacy of recognition within the context of the RH.
In fact, they found evidence that recognition-based inferences are faster than choices
inconsistent with recognition. Moreover, that RH-use increases with time pressure,
which they interpreted as support for the retrieval primacy of recognition.
Schwikert and Curran (2014) also used the distinction between familiarity and
recollection to investigate the RH further. By using event-related potentials, they
found evidence suggesting that mostly familiarity processes are involved in RH-
use. These two related approaches represent another attempt to link theories of
recognition memory with the RH, but again, they do not tackle the question of
whether different levels of familiarity (or memory strength), will be associated with
a differential use of recognition as a single cue.
Furthermore, Pleskac (2007) has relied on signal detection theory in order to
demonstrate that the accuracy of memory affects the validity of the RH. Specifically,
he has shown that with the increase of false alarms (recognizing an item that has
not been experienced before) and misses (failing to recognize an item that has been
experienced before) the accuracy of the RH decreases. Pleskac’s work points out
the important fact that memory is not perfect and, by implication, if recognition
judgments per se are the base for inferences, the ecological rationality of the RH can
be compromised by memory errors (see also Erdfelder et al., 2011).
Dougherty et al. (2008) have also pointed out that the all-or-none treatment
of recognition adopted by Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996) violates known aspects
of recognition memory, namely the fact that recognition is based on a continuous
underlying memory variable. While Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, and Goldstein (2008)
countered that argument by clarifying that the RH is not a model of memory pro-
cesses but of how inferences are made from the output of those processes, and that
the notion of binary recognition judgments is well integrated with the recognition
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memory literature, the point remains of whether something can be learned from a
deeper consideration of the memory processes. Dougherty et al. (2008) implemented
both the RH and a familiarity-based model in a simulation. The familiarity-based
model compares items regarding their echo intensity, which corresponds to the sum
of activation levels of all traces present in memory for that item (see Hintzman,
1988, for more details). Whenever two objects differed in their echo intensity, the
model chose the one with a higher one. This means that not only recognition pairs
can be compared in terms of recognition, but all pairs for which echo intensity dif-
fers. Through this simulation, they demonstrated that a familiarity-based model
can explain results observed for the RH.
All the studies described above have contributed to decreasing the unfortunate
distance between the recognition memory literature and the RH. Certainly, un-
derstanding the role of forgetting in RH-use (Schooler & Hertwig, 2005) and how
familiarity (versus recollection) seems to be the driving memory process behind the
heuristic (Schwikert & Curran, 2014), allowing it to drive fast inferences (Pachur
& Hertwig, 2006), helps us realize the relevance of the memory processes involved.
Moreover, the added value of considering the memory processes more carefully is well
demonstrated by the fact that the accuracy of the heuristic is affected by memory
errors, which are themselves a function of mnemonic (e.g., sensitivity) and decision
making processes (e.g., response bias; Pleskac, 2007). Finally, the work of Dougherty
et al. (2008) demonstrates that the spectrum of application of an heuristic relying on
recognition does not need to be limited to comparisons between one object judged
as recognized and another judged as unrecognized. Nevertheless, an important step
is missing. The RH theory and its notion that binary judgments determine reliance
on recognition should be replaced by a framework that considers the memory pro-
cesses as the relevant information on which inferences are based. In the next section
I describe such an approach.
1.2.2 Threshold Models of Recognition Memory and the
RH
Erdfelder et al. (2011) developed a framework with provides “(...) a formal link be-
tween (1) the memory strengths of choice option names - a latent variable which is
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affected by environmental frequency and previous processing - and (2) binary recog-
nition judgments for choice option names - an empirical variable which is assumed
to affect decision behavior” (Erdfelder et al., 2011, p. 8). While there are different
ways to link memory processes with recognition-based inferences, Erdfelder et al.
focused on a rather straightforward extension of the RH. Specifically, they proposed
to extend the RH to the MSH, a framework which assumes that three memory states
can underlie the binary recognition judgments. The central idea of this framework
is that those memory states, and not recognition judgments per se, will influence
reliance on recognition.
The MSH is based on the two-high-threshold model (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988),
a well-supported model of recognition memory (e.g., Bro¨der, Kellen, Schu¨tz, &
Rohrmeier, 2013; Kellen & Klauer, 2015). The two-high-threshold model assumes
that recognition judgments are determined by three underlying memory states,
namely recognition certainty, uncertainty and rejection certainty. The two-high
threshold model is a multinomial processing tree model (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999;
Erdfelder et al., 2009) with two trees, one for items experienced before, and another
for non-experienced items (see Figure 1.2). An object that has been experienced
before will enter the recognition certainty state with probability r if the memory
strength associated with that object exceeds the high threshold. Whenever that
happens, a yes recognition judgment will be given. If the memory strength asso-
ciated with that object lies below the high threshold (1 − r), the object will be in
uncertainty, and a second process of guessing will occur. In this case, with probabil-
ity g a correct yes judgment will be given, and with probability 1−g an incorrect no
judgment will be given. In the tree for new items, the logic is analogous. Whenever
the memory strength of a new object lies below the rejection threshold (with proba-
bility d), the object will be in rejection certainty and a correct no judgment will be
given. If the memory strength lies above the rejection threshold (with probability
1−d), the object will be in uncertainty and, again, a guessing process will determine
whether a correct no judgment (with probability 1−g) or an incorrect yes judgment
(with probability g) will be given.
Building up on the two-high-threshold model, the MSH operates under two as-
sumptions: Whenever comparing two objects in different memory states, (1) there
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Figure 1.2: Graphical representation of the two-high-threshold model. Parameter
r denotes the probability of old objects exceeding the recognition thresholds. Pa-
rameter d denotes the probability of new objects exceeding the rejection threshold.
Parameter g denotes the conditional probability of guessing yes in the uncertainty
state.
is a preference for the object in a higher state; (2) the larger the distance between
the memory states of the objects under comparison, the larger is the probability of
following the MSH. From these two assumptions it is possible to derive predictions
for any combination of memory-states that involves two different ones. Whenever
the objects in a pair are in the same state, the MSH cannot be applied. For those
cases, inferences may rely on knowledge (if available), guessing processes, or other
inferential strategies.
Erdfelder et al. (2011) tested some of the predictions of the MSH by relying on a
serial processing interpretation of the two-high-threshold model that assumes that
each cognitive stage involved in a given branch is processed sequentially (Batchelder
& Riefer, 1999; Heck & Erdfelder, in press). It follows that the number of cognitive
processing stages on each branch influences its total processing time. In the case
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of the two-high-threshold model, this leads to the prediction that the response time
distributions associated with the uncertainty state are stochastically larger than the
ones associated with the certainty states, given the additional processing stage of
guessing in the former (Heck & Erdfelder, in press). Following from this, predic-
tions can be drawn regarding recognition latencies and decision times. Specifically,
Erdfelder et al. tested the following predictions:
1. RH accordance rates increase with decreasing recognition and rejection laten-
cies, and these effects are additive.
2. Decision latencies in recognition pairs increase with both the recognition la-
tency of the recognized object and the rejection latency of the unrecognized
object, and these effects are additive.
3. Response bias manipulations (aimed at selectively affecting the guessing proba-
bility) in the recognition test affect recognition judgments but not performance
in the comparison task.
Besides finding support for all of these hypotheses, Erdfelder et al. demonstrated
how the MSH framework allows a new interpretation of previous findings which had
challenged the RH. In the next session, I will describe those findings under the light
of the MSH.
1.2.3 Old findings, New explanations
Stating that recognition judgments alone determine inferences for recognition pairs
in domains where recognition is valid is certainly a bold assumption underlying the
RH. Unsurprisingly, it has been shown that other factors also play a role. Specifi-
cally, it has been shown that (1) the preference for the recognized object is stronger
for objects recognized faster (Hertwig, Herzog, Schooler, & Reimer, 2008; Marewski,
Gaissmaier, Schooler, Goldstein, & Gigerenzer, 2010; Newell & Fernandez, 2006);
(2) recognition pairs for which recognition leads to a correct inference are chosen
more often than recognition pairs for which recognition leads to an incorrect infer-
ence (Hilbig & Pohl, 2008); (3) recognition pairs for which there is further knowledge
about the recognized object are preferred over recognition pairs for which the rec-
ognized object is merely recognized (Hilbig & Pohl, 2008; Hilbig, Pohl, & Bro¨der,
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2009; Marewski et al., 2010; Newell & Fernandez, 2006; Pohl, 2006). These findings
seem to suggest that fluency and further cue knowledge are also taken into account
when making inferences about recognition pairs. But what if the MSH would be
sufficient to explain all of these? Erdfelder et al. (2011) convincingly demonstrated
that this is the case, since the MSH clearly predicts the findings described. First,
recognition accordance rates should decrease with recognition latencies (as stated
in the first prediction listed in section 1.2.2), because objects recognized faster are
more likely to be in recognition certainty than objects recognized slower.
Second, accordance rates should be larger for recognition pairs when RH-consistent
decisions are correct because the MSH should be more valid and followed more of-
ten whenever the recognition pair originates from certainty memory states. In other
words, different combinations of memory states can underlie a recognition pair, but
according to the MSH, these different combinations should be treated differently.
Specifically, recognition pairs that originate from recognition and rejection certainty
states should lead to higher accordance rates and, in turn, to more correct inferences.
This is in line with Hilbig and Pohl (2008).
Finally, the higher accordance rates for recognition pairs when there is further
knowledge about the recognized object versus when the recognized object is merely
recognized invite the explanation that further knowledge is being used. But this too
can be explained by the MSH under a very reasonable assumption. Specifically, this
requires only the assumption that recognized objects for which further knowledge is
present are more likely to originate from a recognition certainty memory-state than
objects which are merely recognized. From this assumption it follows directly that
the MSH predicts the observed result, since accordance rates should be higher when
the recognized object is in the certainty state than when it is in the uncertainty
state.
Besides these findings regarding the differential treatment of different recognition
pairs, Erdfelder et al. (2011) also showed that the MSH can explain results involving
knowledge pairs. The RH, on the other hand, only makes predictions for recognition
pairs. However, another heuristic has been put forward to describe how fast and
frugal inferences can be made in knowledge pairs - the fluency heuristic (Hertwig et
al., 2008; Schooler & Hertwig, 2005; see also Pohl, Erdfelder, Michalkiewicz, Castela,
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& Hilbig, in press). The fluency heuristic is defined as follows: “If two objects, a and
b, are recognized, and one of two objects is more fluently retrieved, then infer that
this object has the higher value with respect to the criterion” (Hertwig et al., 2008, p.
1192). In fact, Hertwig et al. showed that, in line with the fluency heuristic, there is
a preference for the object recognized faster in knowledge pairs. However, the MSH
also makes this prediction, since the object recognized faster in a knowledge pair is
more likely to be in a recognition certainty memory-state. It follows that, while the
RH and the fluency heuristic could be invoked together to explain observations in
recognition and knowledge pairs, the MSH alone predicts all those observations.
In sum, the MSH can explain several intriguing results regarding recognition
cases and also knowledge cases under a single decision heuristic. Furthermore, it can
also make predictions for guessing cases. As long as objects are in different memory
states, the MSH predicts a preference for the one in a higher state. Moreover,
it predicts that this preference should be higher whenever the distance between
the memory state of the objects under comparison is maximal (one object in the
recognition certainty state and the other in rejection certainty). If the objects are in
adjacent memory states (recognition certainty and uncertainty or uncertainty and
rejection certainty) the preference for the one in a higher state should be less marked.
Although Erdfelder et al. (2011) already provided evidence for some of the MSH
predictions and showed how it allows a new interpretation of previously intriguing
results, important predictions were left untested. Moreover, the MSH was only
developed as a verbal model. The present thesis describes the execution of a research
program aimed at addressing those questions and ultimately testing the MSH by
implementing it in a formal model. This research program is developed in three
manuscripts, which will be summarized in the next section.
The Memory State Heuristic 18
Summary of Manuscripts
In this section I summarize the three manuscripts on which this thesis is based. The
focus will be on the main research question and the contribution to the literature.
For the sake of brevity, I will not address most details, including the method and
an exhaustive description of all results, since these can be found in the manuscripts
appended. After these summaries, I will draw some overall conclusions clarifying
the connection between all manuscripts and the general contribution of this thesis.
Finally, I will discuss limitations of my work and possible future directions.
2.1 On the relation between recognition latencies
and inference strategies
Castela, M., & Erdfelder, E. (2016). Further evidence for the memory state heuristic:
Recognition latency predictions for binary inferences. Manuscript submitted for
publication.
As discussed above, Erdfelder et al. (2011) tested core predictions of the MSH by
assessing how RH accordance rates are affected by recognition latencies. The ratio-
nale behind this lies on the assumption (derived from a serial interpretation of the
two-high-threshold model) that certainty memory-states are associated with shorter
recognition and rejection latencies than the uncertainty memory-state (Erdfelder et
al., 2011; Heck & Erdfelder, in press). Specifically, they showed that accordance
rates decrease with increasing recognition and rejection latencies, and that those
effects are additive. Also, that decision latencies for recognition pairs increase with
the recognition and rejection latencies of the recognized and the unrecognized ob-
jects, respectively, and that, again, those effects are additive. However, they did not
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address the predictions for knowledge and guessing cases. Moreover, they relied on
accordance rates to test the predictions for recognition cases, but better methods
for estimating RH-use are available.
We conducted two studies that complemented Erdfelder et al. (2011). In our first
study, we tested the MSH predictions regarding the effect of recognition latencies
on inferences for knowledge and guessing pairs. These predictions follow the same
logic as the predictions for recognition cases, as they too stem from the two core
assumptions of the MSH: 1) If objects are in different memory states, there should
be a preference for the one in the higher state; 2) this preference should increase with
the distance between the states. Therefore, assuming the association between longer
recognition or rejection latencies and the uncertainty state, in knowledge pairs there
should be a preference for the faster recognized object, and in guessing pairs there
should be a preference for the object rejected more slowly.
Regarding the size of the effect, it is important to note that for recognition pairs
there are four possible memory-state combinations underlying the yes−no recogni-
tion judgements (recognition certainty and rejection certainty, recognition certainty
and uncertainty, uncertainty and rejection certainty, uncertainty and uncertainty).
These cover all possible distances between memory-states, from maximal distance
to same state cases. However, for both knowledge and guessing pairs, only three
memory-state combinations are possible (certainty and certainty, certainty and un-
certainty, uncertainty and uncertainty). Therefore, the highest distance that can
underlie a knowledge or guessing pair is the case of adjacent memory-states. This
leads to the prediction that the preference for the object in a higher state in knowl-
edge and guessing cases should be weaker than what was observed for recognition
cases, where a maximal memory-state distance can occur. Accordingly, we observed
a consistent, although not large, preference for objects that are likely to be in a
higher memory state, both for knowledge and guessing cases (see Figure 2.1).
In a second study, we addressed recognition cases, but using a superior method
for estimating RH-use than Erdfelder et al. (2011). When investigating the associ-
ation between latencies and RH-use, Erdfelder et al. relied on RH accordance rates.
This necessarily leads to a bias in the estimation of RH-use, since accordance rates
cannot disentangle between the choice of the recognized object due to use of the
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Figure 2.1: Proportion of choices of the fastest or slowest recognized or unrecognized
object for knowelde and guessing cases, respectively, for all 14 reanalyzed datasets.
Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
RH or due to reliance on further knowledge or any other strategy. Therefore, we
wanted to replicate their finding using the r-model (Hilbig et al., 2010). Specifically,
we aimed at showing that shorter recognition and rejection latencies are associated
with higher r estimates. To test this, we fitted the r-model to four subsets of our
data sets. Each subset contained only objects in one of the four quartiles of the
individual recognition and rejection latency distributions. When fitting the r-model
to the data split into the four subsets, we obtained four different r parameters, and
could then test our prediction that r should be higher in the subsets which contained
objects with faster recognition and rejection latencies. This could be described as
an order restriction such that the r parameters decrease from r1 to r4, with 1 cor-
responding to the first quartile of the distributions (only the fastest recognized and
unrecognized objects are included) and 4 the last quartile (only the slowest recog-
nized and unrecognized objects are included). In short, we found support for our
hypothesis (see Figure 2.2).
In sum, this first manuscript consolidated the support Erdfelder et al. (2011)
found for the MSH by extending the tests of the MSH’s latency predictions to
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Figure 2.2: r probability estimates in all four quartiles of recognition and rejection
latency distributions for all reanalyzed datasets and for Experiment 2. Error bars
represent standard errors.
knowledge and guessing cases, and finding converging support for its core prediction
regarding recognition cases with a superior method for assessing RH-use.
2.2 Competitive testing of the MSH
Castela, M., Kellen, D., Erdfelder, E., & Hilbig, B. E. (2014). The impact of subjec-
tive recognition experiences on recognition heuristic use: A multinomial processing
tree approach. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 21, 1131-1138.
The goal of the second manuscript was to test the MSH against both the RH and
an account which assumes knowledge integration. This was possible by compar-
ing RH-use for two types of recognition pairs, which differ regarding the subjective
experience associated with the recognized object. Specifically, we compared recog-
nition pairs for which the recognized object was said to be merely recognized (mR)
or recognized along with further knowledge (R+). Comparing RH-use for these two
types of pairs was ideal because the RH, the knowledge integration account and the
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MSH all make different predictions. According to the RH, RH-use should not differ
between the two types of pairs, because once an object is recognized, the availability
of further knowledge is inconsequential. In contrast, knowledge integration accounts
predict that RH-use should be lower for pairs involving a R+ object than pairs in-
volving a mR object, because if knowledge is available it should be integrated into
the decision, leading to a decrease in reliance on the RH. Finally, the MSH predicts
the opposite pattern, that is, it predicts that RH-use will be larger in pairs involv-
ing a R+ object than pairs involving a mR object. This prediction follows from the
reasonable assumption that objects for which further knowledge is available (R+)
are more likely to originate from a recognition certainty memory-state than objects
that are merely recognized (Erdfelder et al., 2011).
In order to test these three predictions, we relied on a simple extension of the
r-model, the r*-model. This extension is straightforward, and essentially involves
duplicating the tree for recognition pairs in the original r-model, such that there is
one tree for recognition pairs involving a R+ object and another for recognition pairs
involving a mR object1. In this way, we can separately estimate RH-use for both
types of pairs. Importantly, this allows us to represent the three different accounts
through different parameter restrictions. These can be summarized as follows:
RH r1 = r2
knowledge-integration r1 < r2
MSH r1 > r2
where r1 is the estimate of RH-use for recognition pairs involving a R
+ object and
r2 the estimate of RH-use for recognition pairs involving a mR object.
In sum, through the reanalysis of 16 published data sets, we consistently found
that RH-use was higher for recognition pairs involving a R+ object compared to
pairs involving a mR object. These results strongly supported the MSH, and could
not be accommodated by the other two accounts.
1For the sake of simplicity, I omit here the extension regarding the knowledge tree. However,
all details can be found in Castela et al. (2014)
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2.3 Developing and testing a formal model of the
MSH
Castela, M., & Erdfelder, E. (in press). The memory state heuristic: A formal
model based on repeated recognition judgments. Journal of Experimental Psychol-
ogy: Learning, Memory, and Cognition.
The first two manuscripts accumulated significant amount of evidence in favor of
the MSH. First, the predictions of the MSH appear to hold not only for recognition
pairs, but also for knowledge and guessing pairs. Second, when critically tested
against the RH and knowledge integration accounts, the MSH came out as the best
model. However, both manuscripts are limited by the fact that they do not measure
MSH-use directly, but must rely on assumptions (association between latencies and
memory-states in the first manuscript, and association between availability of further
knowledge and memory-states in the second manuscript) to test it. As stated in
Castela et al. (2014, p. 1137), “Despite the plausibility of [these] assumption[s],
future efforts should be placed on implementing a complete model that associates
choice predictions to latent memory states that are themselves estimated from the
data”. This is precisely what we aimed at in the last manuscript.
The biggest challenge associated with developing a formal model of the MSH
derives from the fact that the heuristic acts on natural recognition, that is, it ex-
ploits the memory strength associated with experiencing different objects through
mediators like newspapers, TV or the internet. Therefore, a crucial variable is miss-
ing: We do not know which objects were experienced before or not (Erdfelder et al.,
2011; Pleskac, 2007). It follows that there is no obvious way to categorize an item
as a hit or false alarm (or a correct rejection or a miss). Without the experience
variable, the estimation of the memory states is far beyond straightforward. To solve
this problem we relied on a proxy which allows for a good (although not perfect)
estimation of memory-states - the consistency of recognition judgments. This proxy
is associated with a simple extension of the r-model, only involving the addition of
two extra recognition tests. Furthermore, its association with memory-states can be
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derived from the two-high-threshold model. If an object is in a certainty memory
state, the recognition judgment can only be yes in the case of recognition and no in
the case of rejection. Consequentially, any inconsistent judgment should be associ-
ated with the uncertainty memory state. On the other hand, consistent judgments
are likely to be associated with certainty memory-states, although it is possible that
they occur through consistent guesses.
We developed a MSH model (called latent-states MSH model) by using the con-
sistency of recognition judgments to model the probability of an object being in a
certain memory state, and relied on the r-model to model the adequate decision
strategy for each combination of memory states. As can be seen in Figure 2.3, for
inconsistent judgments we directly assume that the objects are in the uncertainty
state. For consistent judgments we take into account the possibility of consistent
guesses, and therefore directly model the probability that consistent recognition
judgments are associated with certainty (h and l) or uncertainty (1 − h and 1 − l)
memory states. This is done for the two objects in a pair, and once the memory-state
combination is established, the appropriate decision strategy is modeled. Here, a
distinction between pairs of objects in the same memory state versus different mem-
ory states is useful. If objects are in the same memory state, the decision strategy
modeled corresponds to either the knowledge tree of the r-model (when both ob-
jects are in recognition certainty) or the guessing tree (when both objects are in
uncertainty or both objects are in rejection certainty). If objects are in different
memory states, the recognition tree of the r-model is used, with different parame-
ters for different combinations of memory states. Specifically, there is a distinction
between pairs of objects in (1) recognition certainty and rejection certainty (REC
- REJ), (2) recognition certainty and uncertainty (REC-UNC) and (3) uncertainty
and rejection certainty (UNC-REJ). This permits the estimation of MSH-use for
those different types of pairs, which allows the test of the MSH core predictions:
There is a preference for objects in a higher state, and this preference is stronger
the larger the distance between the memory states of the objects under comparison.
Within our model, this can be tested with a set of parameter restrictions involv-
ing the r parameter for the three types of pairs. Specifically, the core prediction
of the MSH corresponds to the following restrictions, rREC−REJ > rREC−UNC and
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Figure 2.3: Abstract representation of the latent-states MSH model, denoting how
the filter parameters determine the memory-state combination under comparison
and, consequently, the appropriate decision process. h, probability that consis-
tent recognition judgments originate from recognition certainty; l, probability that
consistent rejection judgments originate from rejection certainty; 111, consistently
recognized objects; 000, consistently rejected objects; REC, recognition certainty;
UNC, uncertainty; REJ, rejection certainty. The full model can be found in Ap-
pendix A of the corresonding manuscript.
rREC−REJ > rUNC−REJ . Additionally, the same pattern should be observed for
memory-state validity. We found support for this in two Experiments (see Figure
2.4).
Additionally, we tested an approximate MSH model which ignores the possibility
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Figure 2.4: Estimates of the three r and a parameters for Experiment 1 and 2.
Solid lines represent the estimates from the latent-states MSH model while dashed
lines represent estimates from the approximate MSH model. Error bars represent
bootstrapped standard errors of the parameter estimates.
of consistent guesses. In other words, it assumes that our proxy is a perfect indicator
of the memory states, and so the same way that inconsistent judgments indicate
a memory state of uncertainty, consistent judgments indicate a memory sate of
certainty. Despite the inherent error of the approximate model, it performed quite
well, and led to the same conclusions obtained with the latent-states MSH model.
Because this model has less parameters (h and l are fixed to 1) it is not so vulnerable
to sampling error and therefore more adequate for hypotheses testing. The fact that
both models fit the data nicely and that we find convergent results is ideal since
it allows us to not blindly rely on the assumption of the approximate model but,
at the same time, be able to assert that our hypotheses hold with a version of the
model not so vulnerable to sampling error.
In addition to using our models to test the core predictions of the MSH in
Experiment 1 and 2, in Experiment 2 we further tested whether choice consistency
is in line with the predictions of the MSH. In order to do so, we repeated through
the three sessions not only the recognition test but also the comparison task. If,
for simplicity, we assume that participants always resort to one of three strategies,
namely, MSH-use, knowledge-use and guessing, we can predict that (1) consistency
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should be highest when the distance between the memory-states of the objects under
comparison is maximal, (2) consistency should be lower when objects are in adjacent
memory-states, and (3) lowest when they are in the same state. However, within the
adjacent and same-state cases, (4) consistency should be higher when knowledge is
likely to be available, and lower when plain guessing is involved. We found support
for all these hypotheses.
Finally, we also validated critical parameters of our model, specifically, the filter
parameters h and l, and the r parameters. The former have to be validated since
they are newly developed. The latter are ”borrowed” from the r-model and have
been validated before (see Hilbig et al., 2010). However, due to their critical role,
and because there are three instead of a single r parameter, we validated them too.
With a cross-validation study we showed that the filter parameters, consistent with
what they are meant to measure, are larger when we consider two repetitions of the
recognition test versus a single one. Moreover, in a third experiment we compared
the r parameters between two conditions: One where memory-states were valid and
another where memory-states validity was very low. Since MSH-use should decrease
with memory-state validity, we predicted that all r parameter estimates should be
smaller in the latter condition. Accordingly, this is what we observed.
In sum, in this last paper we addressed the ultimate goal of this research pro-
gram - developing and testing a formal model of the MSH. This model has the main
advantage of incorporating all the possible memory state combinations and formal-
izing the MSH predictions for all of them. It therefore allows us to test the MSH
without requiring further assumptions.
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General Discussion & Outlook
In the three manuscripts summarized above I report the results from my research
program aimed at testing the MSH. The work described in this thesis succeed in
testing the MSH in three different ways. First, in Castela and Erdfelder (2016)
we started where Erdfelder et al. (2011) left off by showing how the recognition
and rejection latency predictions of the MSH find support beyond recognition cases.
Specifically, we have shown that in knowledge cases there is a preference for choosing
the object recognized faster, while in guessing cases there is a preference for choosing
the object rejected slower. Both these results are in line with the MSH hypothesis
that there should be a preference for the object in a higher memory-state. Addi-
tionally, we also tested this prediction for recognition cases, but instead of using
accordance rates like Erdfelder et al., we relied on the r-model (Hilbig et al., 2010).
In this way, we added support for the latency prediction regarding recognition cases
with a measure of RH-use that does not suffer from the biases of accordance rates.
Second, in Castela et al. (2014) we pitted the MSH against the RH and accounts
assuming knowledge integration by using a formal model which consists of a sim-
ple extension of the r-model. To do so, we relied on information beyond binary
recognition judgments, namely the distinction between two subjectively different
experiences of recognition, recognition with further knowledge and mere recogni-
tion. Consistently only with the MSH and not with the other two accounts, we
found that RH-use is higher for recognition pairs involving a recognized object with
further knowledge than for recognition pairs involving a merely recognized object.
This further hinted at the superiority of the MSH as an account able to explain and
predict many findings in the literature.
Finally, in Castela and Erdfelder (in press) we extended the RH paradigm in
order to test a formal model of the MSH. This model captures all possible combi-
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nations of memory-states and holds the MSH predictions for all of them. In two
experiments, the model fit the data well, and allowed us to test the MSH core pre-
dictions, namely, that MSH-use differs between the three possible combinations of
different memory-states. Consistently with the MSH, we observed that MSH-use
is higher when the difference in memory-states is maximal, and that it decreases
for adjacent memory-states combinations. In Experiment 2 we additionally tested
choice consistency predictions of the MSH, thereby accumulating more support for
it. Finally, we validated core parameters of the latent-states MSH model through a
cross-validation method and a third experiment, finding support for the role of the
filter parameters and the psychological meaning of all three MSH-use parameters.
In sum, in this third manuscript, Erdfelder et al.’s (2011) call for the development
of a formal model of the MSH incorporating all of its predictions has been answered,
with successful results.
Taken together, the three manuscripts gather a considerable amount of converg-
ing evidence for the MSH. By using different proxies, including recognition and
rejection latencies, subjective recognition experiences, and consistency of recogni-
tion judgments, and by relying on increasingly sophisticated methods, evidence for
the advantages of considering the underlying recognition process when investigating
recognition-based inferences has been put forward. Therefore, I believe the three
manuscripts nicely complement each other and together consist of a well-founded
research program. In the following, I will discuss a few points which have so far not
been addressed, and possible limitations and future directions of my work.
The goal of this thesis is to demonstrate that the RH should be extended to a
framework which considers the recognition process itself, and not just the output
of that process, i.e., recognition judgments. However, it is important to note that
the MSH is not only a rather straightforward extension of the RH, but also that
it reduces to it under ideal conditions (Erdfelder et al., 2011). Put simply, as the
threshold parameters in the two-high-threshold model approach 1, the uncertainty
state does not occur, and therefore the predictions of the MSH are the same as that
of the RH. Importantly, though, I want to stress that this does not imply that for
those cases the MSH should be used at all times and by all participants. In this
thesis, I support a probabilistic version of the RH and the MSH. This implies that
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when two objects are in different certainty states (recognition certainty and rejection
certainty) reliance on recognition should be highest, but it does not imply that it
is the only strategy used at all times. In all three manuscripts involved in this the-
sis that probabilistic interpretation has been tested by checking whether for those
recognition cases more likely to contain only objects in certainty states reliance on
recognition occurs every time, or whether other strategies (like knowledge-use) still
take place. Accordingly, in all three manuscripts there was evidence for this prob-
abilistic version, suggesting that people rely a lot on recognition-based inferences
under ideal conditions, but other strategies can also take place.
The choice to test the MSH, such a simple extension of the RH, is justified as
it allows one to draw simple predictions and is more testable than other options.
However, this is one possibility among several, and therefore worth questioning. Ul-
timately, the MSH is based on the two-high-threshold model, which, despite being a
very prominent model in the recognition memory literature, is by no means the only
possible model on which to develop such an approach. One of its fiercest competi-
tors, signal detection models (Kellen & Klauer, in press; Macmillan & Creelman,
2004), would be another option. Briefly, signal detection models assume there is a
continuous memory strength variable described by two normal distributions, one for
old items and one for new items. The degree of overlap between those distributions
corresponds to the ability to discriminate between old and new items. Recogni-
tion judgments are in turn determined by the placement of a criterion. If memory
strength surpasses it, an item will be judged as “old”, otherwise it is judged as “new”
(Kellen & Klauer, in press). I wish at this point to clarify that the current work does
not dismiss the possibility that signal detection models are more appropriate than
the two-high-threshold model. Additionally, while predictions were drawn from the
latter, the findings accumulated do not rule out the former.
The essential distinction between signal detection and the two-high-threshold as
models of recognition memory is that the former assumes that recognition judgments
reflect a direct mapping of graded memory representations while the latter proposes
that recognition judgments are mediated by a discrete-state representation (Kellen
& Klauer, 2015). How would that impact the predictions for use of recognition
as a cue in inferences? Perhaps the most evident implication is that, within a
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signal detection framework, any difference in memory strength could be explored,
regardless of the memory-state. That is, while the MSH predicts that recognition
can only be exploited when objects are in different memory-states, a signal-detection
based framework would predict that recognition can always be used since there
should be a preference for the object associated with a higher memory strength.
It would certainly be interesting to pit these two models against each other in the
context of recognition-based inferences. To do so, one could design inventive scenar-
ios where the predictions of each model collapse and the two can thereby be critically
tested. If memory-states and the underlying memory strength were observable vari-
ables, a simple way to approach this would be to test whether within the same
memory-state there is a preference for objects with a higher memory strength. Un-
fortunately, accessing those latent variables is rather challenging. Another, slightly
more straightforward approach, would only require knowledge about the experience
variable. If it were known which objects were experienced before and which were
not, a simple way to test signal detection-based inference models against the MSH
would be to assess whether there is a preference for false alarms over misses. While
a signal detection account would predict such preference (because false alarms will
be necessarily associated with a higher memory strength than misses), the MSH pre-
dicts that there should be no preference for one over the other, since both objects
necessarily originate from the uncertainty state.
However, as repeated throughout this thesis, one does not have access to the
experience variable, complicating any attempt to model the recognition process.
Moreover, while with the two-high-threshold model we used consistency as a proxy
and could make predictions in a relatively straightforward way, it is hard to think
either of what would be a signal detection model prediction for consistency, or
which other proxy could be used. For these reasons, while I do not at all dismiss
the possibility that signal detection models are more appropriate than the two-
high-threshold as a model of recognition memory in this context, I believe that the
two-high-threshold model does a better job in terms of eliciting testable predictions,
therefore being the more useful model to advance knowledge in this area and allow
a proof of concept regarding the possibility of incorporating recognition memory
models in recognition-based inferences.
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Besides the arguable option discussed above, and specific limitations of each
manuscript which are respectively discussed in each of them, one important limi-
tation of this thesis has so far not been addressed. In all formal modeling analysis
present in the three manuscripts we relied on aggregation across participants. How-
ever, for aggregation in multinomial processing tree models to be unproblematic,
there must be homogeneity between participants. In turn, if this assumption is vi-
olated, parameter estimates might be biased, and standard errors and confidence
intervals underestimated (see Michalkiewicz, 2016, for a detailed account of why
this might be a problem for the r-model). For these reasons, it would be an impor-
tant next step to try to extend the current MSH model to a hierarchical version,
in order to ensure that individual differences are not distorting our analysis. While
I find this to be a crucial development, let me clarify why it has not been done so
far. It is important to note that, as it is, the latent-states MSH is already a rather
complex model which, as discussed in detail in Castela and Erdfelder (in press), is
vulnerable to sampling error and not always ideal for hypotheses-testing. Given the
challenges surrounding the modeling of latent memory-states, it appeared essential
to first establish this possibility, before turning to another big challenge. However,
now that the model has been established and tested, an important future direction
would be to see how individual differences can be adequately taken into account.
Other potentially interesting routes to take in the future regard the way to
estimate the underlying memory strength or memory states. One possibility would
be to control the experience variable. To do this, we could have participants learn
the material in the laboratory and thereby control which objects were effectively
experienced before or not (see Bro¨der & Eichler, 2006; Newell & Shanks, 2004, for
a similar approach). An obvious criticism to such approach is that one would no
longer be dealing with natural recognition, and therefore the domain may not be
adequate for the application of strategies like the RH or the MSH (Gigerenzer &
Goldstein, 2011; Pachur, Bro¨der, & Marewski, 2008). Nevertheless, there might
be some merit to this approach. If it would work, it would at least allow one
to establish that the memory-strength-based inferences extend to experimentally
induced recognition settings. However, if it does not work, that finding cannot
be extrapolated to natural recognition settings. Another possibility would be to
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look for a middle ground by designing an experiment which holds a learning period
spanning a reasonable amount of time. In such an experiment, participants could be
exposed to the material in a somewhat natural way, by, for example, reading news
pieces involving the target objects at different points in time. While this would
certainly be an effortful procedure, it might be worthwhile to consider, since it has
the benefit of simulating a natural learning experience while at the same time giving
the experimenter control over which objects are experienced and which are not.
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Conclusion
The research program developed in my thesis has addressed a largely overlooked
aspect of the RH literature: The influence of recognition memory processes under-
lying recognition judgments on recognition-based inferences. Through testing and
ultimately developing a formal model of the MSH, I have shown that, indeed, recog-
nition judgments are a poor approximation of what determines recognition-based
inferences. In turn, considering the memory-states underlying those judgments is
worthwhile, as it presents a new and interesting pattern of results: Different levels
of memory strength are associated with different validity and use of recognition as
a cue. Ignoring those differences is ignoring a large chunk of the story. While that
story may never be finished, I hope my work will inspire further developments, and
that new and exciting chapters will follow.
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Abstract
According to the recognition heuristic (RH) theory, for decision domains where
recognition is a valid predictor of a choice criterion, recognition can be used to make
inferences whenever one object is recognized and the other is not, irrespective of
further knowledge. Erdfelder, Ku¨pper-Tetzel, and Mattern (2011) questioned whether
the recognition judgment itself affects decisions or rather the memory strength
underlying it. Specifically, they proposed to extend the RH to the memory state
heuristic (MSH), which assumes a third memory state of uncertainty. They tested
several qualitative predictions of the MSH, but left some questions unanswered that
we address in two studies. First, we show that in knowledge pairs (both objects
recognized) and guessing pairs (none of the objects recognized), the object that is
more likely to be in a higher memory state is chosen. Second, we used a better
measure of RH-use to show that reliance on recognition increases with the proportion
of objects in certainty states. In sum, our two studies nicely complement the work of
Erdfelder et al. by lending additional evidence to the MSH.
Keywords: recognition heuristic; memory-state heuristic; threshold models;
multinomial processing tree models
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The recognition heuristic (RH) is a fast and frugal decision strategy proposing that,
for binary decisions, if one object is recognized and the other is not, one should infer
that the recognized object scores higher on the criterion under consideration
(Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). This simple decision rule has gained a lot of
attention, and there is a large body of research dedicated to it (see Gigerenzer &
Goldstein, 2011; Pachur, Todd, Gigerenzer, Schooler, & Goldstein, 2011, for reviews).
However, one key concept of the RH seems to be often neglected: recognition. While
literally at the core of the heuristic, not so much research has been dedicated to
understanding the role of recognition in use of the RH. However, there are some
exceptions (e.g., Erdfelder et al., 2011; Pachur & Hertwig, 2006; Pleskac, 2007).
Notably, Erdfelder et al. proposed a framework that extends the RH by
accommodating the role of recognition memory. In this paper, we aim at generalizing
their work by providing further tests of their framework. First, we will describe the
RH theory in more detail. Then, we will discuss how recognition memory has been
understood in the RH theory so far. Afterwards we will describe the contribution of
Erdfelder et al. to linking recognition memory and the RH, along with the evidence
they accumulated. Finally, we will introduce two new studies that complement the
evidence presented by Erdfelder et al. (2011).
The RH theory
To better understand how recognition memory has been (or can be) integrated in the
RH, it is first essential to describe more precisely how the heuristic has been
proposed. To simplify that process, we will refer to the most prominent paradigm
associated with the RH as an illustrative example. This is the city size paradigm,
which involves a pairwise comparison task where people must infer which of two cities
has a larger population, and a recognition task, where for all cities involved people
must judge whether they have heard of them before or not. With the data from the
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recognition task, all pairs in the comparison task can be categorized into three types:
knowledge pairs (both objects are recognized), recognition pairs (one object is
recognized and the other is not), and guessing pairs (none of the objects is
recognized). The RH applies only to recognition pairs, for the obvious reason that it
cannot discriminate between objects in the other two types of pairs. Importantly,
Gigerenzer and Goldstein (2011) specified additional preconditions for use of the RH.
First, there should be a strong correlation between recognition and the decision
criterion. In our example, recognition should be strongly correlated to the size of a
city (which, indeed, it is). Additionally, further cues should not be readily available.
This means that, for example, when comparing the sizes of Berlin and Mannheim, the
information that Berlin is the capital of Germany, or that it has an international
airport, should not be presented to the participant simultaneously (whereas, of
course, it could be retrieved from memory). Finally, they asserted that the RH
applies only to natural recognition, that is, artificially inducing recognition in the
laboratory (by, for example, presenting the objects several times) should not
necessarily lead to use of the RH.
This relates to the notion of how recognition comes to be a valid cue, that is,
its ecological rationality. Here, three concepts are important: recognition validity,
ecological correlation and surrogate correlation (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999).
Going back to our cities example, the ecological correlation – the correlation between
the city size and the frequency of occurence of the city in natural encounters – is
exemplified by the fact that larger cities are more likely to be mentioned in the
Internet, TV, newspapers, or other type of mediator. This, in turn, affects the
surrogate correlation, which is the correlation between the number of times a city is
mentioned and the recognition of the name of that city. Naturally, cities that are
mentioned more often will have a higher probability of being remembered. Finally,
recognition validity is defined as the strength of the relationship between recognition
and the criterion (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999).
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Recognition memory in the RH theory
Now with a clearer understanding of how and under which conditions the RH was
proposed to apply, we can address the question of how recognition memory plays a
role in the heuristic. In its original definition, the RH was not related to recognition
memory, but only to recognition judgments. Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002)
assumed that the RH works on the output of the recognition process, and that the
process itself can be disregarded. In other words, they claimed the RH operates on
yes or no recognition judgments, and whatever underlies that judgment can be
ignored for the purpose of investigating the heuristic. This also implies that the
frequency with which an object has been encountered does not affect use of the RH,
but merely the final all-or-none process of remembering any encounter or not. As
stated by Pachur et al. (2011, p. 4), “the recognition heuristic does not distinguish
between objects one has encountered 10 times and those encountered 60 times (as
long as both are recognized or unrecognized)”. Erdfelder et al. (2011, p. 8)
challenged this view by stating that “Showing that the RH is an ecologically rational
and well-adapted choice strategy obviously requires a formal theoretical link between
(1) the memory strengths of choice option names - a latent variable which is affected
by environmental frequency and previous processing - and (2) binary recognition
judgments for choice option names - an empirical variable which is assumed to affect
decision behavior”.
Following from this understanding of a necessary link between memory
strength and recognition judgments, Erdfelder et al. (2011) proposed to integrate a
model of recognition memory with the RH theory. To do so, they relied on one of the
most well-supported models of recognition memory available - the two-high-threshold
(2HT) model (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988). Besides being one of the most successful
models of recognition memory, the 2HT model has the added advantage of being
easily combinable with the RH (Erdfelder et al., 2011).
The 2HT model belongs to the class of multinomial processing tree models
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(Batchelder & Riefer, 1999; Erdfelder et al., 2009). Like other multinomial processing
tree models, the 2HT model is based on the assumption that observed categorical
responses are a result of a defined set of discrete states and that the probability of
such states being entered depends on the probability of certain cognitive processes
occurring or not. The basic premise of the 2HT model is that there are three possible
memory states underlying recognition judgments - recognition certainty, uncertainty,
and rejection certainty. The probability of those states being entered depends on the
probability of two thresholds being exceeded (see Figure 1). Specifically, for objects
experienced before, if the memory strength exceeds the first threshold with
probability r, the object will be in the recognition certainty state and a yes
recognition judgment will be given. If, with complementary probability 1− r, the
memory strength lies below this threshold, the object will be in the uncertainty state,
and the recognition judgment will depend on a second process of guessing, resulting
in a yes judgment with probability g and a no judgment with probability 1− g. For
objects not experienced before, if the memory strength lies below the second
threshold with probability d, the object will be in the rejection certainty state and a
no recognition judgment will be given. With complementary probability 1− d, if the
memory strength lies above this second threshold, the object will be in the
uncertainty state and, again, the recognition judgment will depend on guessing.
To combine this model with the RH theory, Erdfelder et al. (2011) suggested
a new framework - the memory state heuristic (MSH). The MSH is a straightforward
extension of the RH, which mainly replaces recognition judgments by memory
strengths. That is, it assumes that memory strengths, and not recognition judgments
per se, are correlated with the criterion. This simple extension enriches both the
predictions that can be drawn and the explanatory scope of the heuristic. Whereas
the RH has predictions for recognition pairs only, the MSH has predictions for any
pair that involves objects in different memory states. These predictions can be
summarized by two simple premises: (1) if objects are in different memory states,
there should be a preference for the object in a higher state; (2) the larger the
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discrepancy between the memory states of objects in a pair, the higher should be the
probability of choosing the object in a higher state. By implication, the probability of
choosing the object in a higher memory state should be larger for pairs of one object
in the recognition certainty state and the other in the rejection certainty state, than
for pairs where the objects are in recognition certainty and uncertainty or uncertainty
and rejection certainty. Based on these two principles, Erdfelder et al. managed to
both explain previous results that challenged the RH and also draw and test new
predictions. To do so, they relied on the fact that multinomial processing tree models
like the 2HT model can be interpreted as probabilistic serial processing models
(Batchelder & Riefer, 1999; Heck & Erdfelder, in press). By implication, the number
of cognitive processing stages in a given branch of the model will influence its total
processing time. Specifically, in the case of the 2HT model, whenever an object
reaches the memory state of uncertainty and a second cognitive stage is required -
guessing - the response time distribution should be stochastically larger than when an
object reaches one of the two certainty memory states (Heck & Erdfelder, in press).
Following from this interpretation of the 2HT model, a clear prediction can be made:
“The larger the recognition judgment latencies, the more likely it is that the
judgment originates from guessing and the less likely it is that it originates from
memory certainty” (Erdfelder et al., 2011, p. 13).
As mentioned, the MSH offers a simple explanation for previous results that
challenged the RH. One example is that, in recognition pairs, recognized objects for
which participants claim to have further knowledge are chosen more often than
recognized objects that participants claim to merely recognize the name of (e.g.,
Pohl, 2006). This has been explained by assuming that people are relying on further
knowledge, thereby challenging the RH. However, the same result is predicted by the
MSH if one makes the reasonable assumption that objects for which participants
claim to have further knowledge are more likely to have originated from recognition
certainty than objects that are merely recognized. Castela, Kellen, Erdfelder, and
Hilbig (2014) tested the three accounts (RH, use of further knowledge, and MSH) and
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found support for the MSH.
Along with this, Erdfelder et al. (2011) described other examples of how the
MSH can accommodate previously problematic results. But most importantly, they
directly tested seven predictions of the MSH, focused on RH accordance rates
(proportion of times the recognized object is chosen in recognition pairs) and decision
latencies, both as a function of recognition and rejection latencies. The first three
predictions, which state that RH accordance rates should increase with decreasing
recognition and rejection latencies, and that their effect is additive, were supported in
their study. Additionally, they tested whether the decision latency in recognition
pairs increases with both the recognition latency of the recognized object and the
rejection latency of the unrecognized object, and if their effect is additive. These
further three predictions were also supported by their data. Finally, they found
support for their seventh prediction, which stated that response bias manipulations
(aimed at selectively affecting the guessing probability) in the recognition test should
affect recognition judgments but not performance in the comparison task. Since the
RH theory assumes that recognition judgments per se influence decisions, it would
predict that a bias manipulation will also affect choices. The MSH, in turn, predicts
the observed result, since memory-states and not recognition judgments should
influence decisions, that is, since biasing the guessing probability does not alter the
memory-states distribution, choices should be left unaffected.
The focus of Erdfelder et al. (2011) has been on testing predictions for
recognition pairs, but as explained before, the MSH also makes predictions for
guessing and knowledge pairs, as long as the objects under comparison are in
different memory states. This will be the focus of our first study. As for recognition
pairs, the predictions follow from the basic premise of the MSH: If objects are in
different memory states, there should be a preference for the one in a higher state.
Therefore, in this study we will test two predictions:
1. In knowledge pairs there should be a preference for the object recognized faster
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(as this one is more likely in the memory certainty state)
2. In guessing pairs, there should be a preference for the object recognized slower
(since this one is more likely in the uncertainty state, which is the highest
possible state for unrecognized objects).
However, as outlined above, the MSH also predicts that the preference for the object
in a higher state should be strongest the highest the discrepancy between the states.
While in recognition pairs the maximal memory state distance can be observed (one
object in recognition certainty and the other in rejection certainty), in both
knowledge and guessing pairs this can never occur, since objects will either be in the
same state or in adjacent states (recognition certainty and uncertainty or rejection
certainty and uncertainty, respectively). For this reason, as already noted by
Erdfelder et al., we expect weaker effects of recognition latency differences than those
found for recognition cases. Additionally, we will also test whether the effect is
stronger when the difference in latencies is higher, therefore increasing the probability
of the objects being in adjacent states versus in the same state.
We should note at this point that the prediction regarding knowledge cases
has already been tested in a different context. Actually, this prediction of the MSH
overlaps with what is called the fluency heuristic (Hertwig, Herzog, Schooler, &
Reimer, 2008; Schooler & Hertwig, 2005), which states that, in knowledge cases, the
fastest retrieved option should be chosen. Its premise is that the fluency with which
an object is retrieved from memory (approximated by the latency of the recognition
judgment) can be used as a single cue and determine inferences. They measured the
accordance rate of the fluency heuristic by computing, for each participant, how
many times the object retrieved faster is chosen in knowledge pairs (pairs with
differences in recognition latency smaller than 100 ms were excluded)1, and found
that it is higher than the individual baseline accordance. Furthermore, they observed
1The threshold of 100 ms was shown to be sufficient for discriminating between recognition latencies
(Hertwig et al., 2008).
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that accordance rates increase with the difference in latencies between objects. While
the fluency heuristic can accommodate these results, it is very limited: it only applies
to knowledge pairs, and within those, to pairs where the fluency difference is larger
than 100ms. The MSH, on the other hand, also predicts these results, and does so
while being able to predict much more about the data - predictions for guessing and
recognition cases. It is, therefore, a far more parsimonious framework (Erdfelder et
al., 2011). Moreover, the MSH predicts that the preference for the faster recognized
object should be weak at best, simply because the memory-state discrepancy for
knowledge pairs can only be small (i.e., recognition certainty and uncertainty) or even
nonexistent (i.e., when both objects are in the same state). The fluency heuristic, in
contrast, fails to provide an explanation for the smaller preferences in knowledge
pairs compared to recognition pairs (see Pohl, Erdfelder, Michalkiewicz, Castela, &
Hilbig, in press).
While the prediction for knowledge pairs seems straightforward and has
already been tested in another context, it should be emphasized that the prediction
for guessing cases is completely new, and surprising in the sense that it leads to the
expectation of a preference for less fluent objects. To the best of our knowledge, no
framework other than the MSH makes or can accommodate such prediction.
Besides these predictions for knowledge and guessing cases, in a second study
we wanted to test a further prediction of the MSH. Erdfelder et al. (2011) already
showed that larger recognition and rejection latencies are associated with smaller RH
accordance rates. However, we wanted to test this in a more refined way using a
better measure of RH-use. Although the RH accordance rates used by Erdfelder et al.
provide an approximation of RH-use, they are a biased measure because counting the
number of times choices are in line with recognition does not take into account what
led to that choice. An option might have been chosen because it was recognized, or
because other information, which points in the same direction, was used. For
example, when comparing supposed population sizes of Berlin and Mannheim, a
non-european person might chose Berlin because she recognizes it and does not
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recognize Mannheim, or because she knows Berlin is the capital of Germany, and
therefore likely to be a large city. For this reason, Hilbig, Erdfelder, and Pohl (2010)
developed a multinomial processing tree model which estimates RH-use in a more
sophisticated way. The r-model (see Figure 2) consists of three trees, which
correspond to the three types of pairs. For knowledge and guessing pairs, the trees
have only a single parameter that accounts for the accuracy for knowledge and
guessing pairs, respectively. For recognition pairs, on the other hand, the model
considers the possibility that a recognized option is chosen through use of further
knowledge, and provides in this way an unbiased estimate of RH-use (which
corresponds to parameter r in the model; see Hilbig et al. (2010, for additional details
about the r-model)). By using this model, we can assess in a more precise way how
recognition and rejection latencies are associated with reliance on recognition alone.
Additionally, we can test whether in the more extreme cases, when the latencies are
very short (so that both objects are most likely in recognition and rejection certainty
states), people always rely on memory-states only, or whether even then other
processes such as integration of further knowledge can take place.
MSH predictions for guessing and knowledge cases: A
reanalysis of published data
We first tested whether choices for guessing and knowledge cases are in accordance
with the MSH prediction that there is a preference for the object in a higher state.
Specifically, as outlined above, we used recognition and rejection latencies as proxies
for underlying memory states. Therefore, we predicted that in knowledge pairs there
is a preference for the object with a shorter recognition latency (and therefore a
higher probability of being in a recognition certainty state) while in guessing pairs
there is a preference for the object with the longest rejection latency (and therefore a
higher probability of being in the uncertainty state).
We first reanalyzed the data of 14 published datasets from our lab (see Table
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1), in order to look for preliminary evidence for our hypotheses. As shown in Figure
3, we observed that for all 14 datasets the proportion of choosing the object
recognized faster in knowledge cases was significantly larger than .5 (smallest
t(21) = 2.78, all p < .01). Regarding guessing cases, in 12 of the 14 datasets the
proportion of choosing the object recognized slower was significantly larger than .5
(smallest significant t(63) = 2.08, p = .02). Clearly, these results are in line with our
expectations. However, the studies included in the reanalysis were not conducted
with our hypotheses in mind. In order to collect further evidence, we designed a new
experiment specifically tailored to our hypotheses. With this new experiment, we
primarily aimed at optimizing the proportion of knowledge and guessing cases in
order to achieve more powerful tests of the MSH predictions for these cases.
Moreover, we were also interested in generalizing the results across different decision
domains beyond city-size comparisons.
Experiment 1
Material and Procedure
The paradigm we used resembles the city-size paradigm outlined in the Introduction
but actually involves different types of decisions. This paradigm includes two tasks:
(1) a recognition test, where objects are presented and participants must judge
whether they have seen them before or not; (2) a comparison task, where participants
see pairs of the objects and must infer which scores higher on a given criterion. Since
the objects are paired exhaustively, the relative proportion of knowledge, recognition
and guessing cases will depend on the proportion of objects recognized. Therefore, in
order to optimize the proportion of knowledge and guessing cases, it is important to
include in the experiment a condition for which the proportion of recognized objects
across participants is larger than .50 (resulting in many knowledge cases) and a
different condition in which the proportion of recognized objects is clearly less than
.50 (resulting in many guessing cases). A third condition should involve a recognition
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rate of about .50, resulting in (almost) equal frequencies of knowledge and guessing
cases. Moreover, since we also wanted to generalize our findings across different
domains, we made use of different types of objects and inference criteria in the three
conditions. Specifically, all participants were presented with objects from three
domains: largest world cities (with over 3 million inhabitants; see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of cities proper by population), most successful
celebrities (100 most successful celebrities according to the Forbes list of 2015; see
www.forbes.com) and longest rivers in the world (over 1900 km long; see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of rivers by length). According to pre-tests
conducted in our lab, we know that for the domain of world cities normally 50% of
the objects are recognized. We included this domain for generalizability, and also
because it is one of the most often used domain in the study of the RH and should
serve as benchmark. For the domain of celebrities, normally 65% of the objects are
recognized. Therefore, this domain is ideal to test the hypothesis regarding knowledge
cases. Finally, the rivers domain is ideal for testing the hypothesis regarding guessing
cases, since usually 35% of the objects are recognized. The experiment included three
blocks, each consisting of the recognition test and the comparison task for each
domain. The order of blocks was randomized for all participants. In each block, the
recognition test always preceded the comparison task. In the recognition test
participants saw all 20 objects (randomly selected from each domain, but the same
for all participants) and had to decide whether they have heard of them before or not.
Objects were presented one at a time, in random order, and a 500 ms interstimulus
fixation-cross followed each response. Response times were recorded along with the
recognition judgments. After each recognition test, a comparison task followed. In
the comparison task, participants saw 190 pairs, consisting of the exhaustive pairing
of the 20 objects, and had to infer which one scored higher on the criterion. Each
pair was presented at a time, in random order, and a 500 ms interstimulus
fixation-cross followed each response. Response times were recorded along with the
responses. For the world cities, the criterion was city-size; for celebrities, the criterion
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was how successful they were; and for the rivers, the criterion was their length.
Participants
We recruited 75 students (50 women) from the University of Mannheim aged between
19 and 46 (M = 22.00, SD = 5.04). Participation was compensated monetarily as a
function of performance in the comparison task. Every participant received at least
two euros, and they could earn up to 7.70. They gained one cent for each correct
answer, and lost one cent for each wrong one.
Results
One participant had to be removed from the analysis for all domains, because he
indicated that he did not recognize any object in any domain. Furthermore, one
participant was removed from the guessing analysis of the cities domain because he
recognized 19 out of the 20 cities, therefore having no guessing pairs. Finally, two
additional participants were removed from the knowledge analysis of the rivers
domain because they only recognized one river and therefore had no knowledge pairs.
For the remaining participants, the proportion of recognized items was on average .68
for celebrities, .58 for the world cities, and .36 for rivers. This was in line with the
pre-tests, although a bit higher than what we expected for the world cities domain.
Since our hypotheses refer to the preference for the object recognized fastest
in knowledge pairs, and the one judged unrecognized slowest in guessing pairs, we
first calculated per participant the proportion of times their choices were in line with
those hypotheses (accordance rate). We then performed one-sample t-tests to assess
whether the mean accordance rates were larger than .50. As can be seen in Table 2,
we found support for both hypotheses in all three domains assessed.
In addition to testing whether there would be an above chance preference for
the items more likely to be in a higher state, we also wanted to assess whether this
preference would increase with an increasing difference in recognition latencies (i.e.,
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latencies of yes judgments) or rejection latencies (i.e., latencies of no judgments)
between objects in a pair (and therefore an increasingly higher probability of being in
adjacent states). To do so, we ran a multilevel logistic regression2 with Accordance as
a dependent variable. Accordance is essentially a binary variable which takes the
value one if choices are in line with our hypotheses, and zero when they are not.
Specifically, for knowledge pairs, Accordance will be one whenever the fastest
recognized object is chosen, and zero otherwise. Conversely, for guessing pairs,
Accordance will be one whenever the slowest unrecognized object is chosen, and zero
otherwise. As predictors, we included both the main effects and the interactions of
the RT difference (difference in recognition or rejection latencies between the objects
in a pair) with Case (knowledge or guessing) and with Domain (celebrities, cities or
rivers). Additionally, the model includes a random intercept for each participant and
a random slope for each participant regarding the effect of RT difference. Our
hypothesis would be that RT difference has a positive effect on Accordance for both
cases and in all domains. We find support for our hypothesis. As can be seen in
Table 3, RT difference has a significant positive effect on Accordance. Additionally,
there are no differences in Accordance between the domains3. Moreover, while the
effect is present for both knowledge and guessing cases (see Figure 4), we find that it
is significantly stronger for knowledge cases. While this was not directly predicted, it
does not compromise our findings. This will be addressed in more detail in the
Discussion section.
2The model was estimated using the glmer function of the lme4 package (Bates, Ma¨chler, Bolker,
& Walker, 2015) in R (R Core Team, 2015).
3Adding the interaction of Domain and RT difference does not change the overall pattern of results
and the interaction is not significant. Therefore, we opted to present the results of a model without
the interaction, so that we can observe the main effect of RT difference for all domains and not only
for the reference level of the Domain variable.
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The influence of removing items with longer
recognition/rejection judgment latencies on RH-use:
A reanalysis of published data
As mentioned above, in our second study we wanted to test the MSH predictions
regarding recognition latencies. This had been already successfully tested by
Erdfelder et al. (2011), but by relying on accordance rates. Since we now have access
to a better (less biased) method to estimate RH-use – the r parameter of the r-model
(Hilbig et al., 2010) –, we can test these predictions in a more precise way.
Specifically, we can test if there is an increase in r when we sequentially remove items
with longer recognition and rejection latencies and fit the r-model to those subsets of
data. The rationale behind this is that by removing those “slow” items we reduce the
subset mostly to objects in recognition certainty and rejection certainty states. While
doing so, we artificially create the perfect preconditions for relying uniquely on
recognition, which should lead to higher r estimates. Additionally, we would like to
test if r = 1 in the most extreme cases, when only the items with shorter recognition
and rejection latencies are involved. To address these questions, we first reanalyzed
the data for the 14 published datasets that were also used in our previous study.
For each data set, we first identified for each participant which items where
in the first, second, third or fourth quartile of their individual recognition and
rejection latency distributions. In a second step, we created (at the aggregate level)4
four subsets of pairs that consisted only of objects with latencies in each of the
quartiles of the latency distributions5. Next, we fitted the r-model simultaneously to
these four disjoint subsets of data by replicating the r-model trees four times, that is,
4While we do the analysis at the aggregate level, it is individual recognition and rejection latency
distributions that are considered when assigning the data categories to each subset.
5This procedure heavily restricted the amount of available data, since for each subset of data,
only pairs where both objects are in the respective quartile of the recognition or rejection latency
distributions can be analyzed.
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for each subset of pairs. By implication, we ended up with four r estimates. At the
level of parameters, our hypothesis can be described as an order restriction such that
the r parameters decrease from r1 to r4, with the index 1 corresponding to the first
quartile of the distributions (only the fastest recognized and unrecognized objects are
included) and 4 the last quartile of the distributions (only the slowest recognized and
unrecognized objects are included).
All model-based analyses were performed with MPTinR (Singmann &
Kellen, 2013) in R (R Core Team, 2015). We first fitted the model without any
restrictions; this baseline model fits the data well for 9 of the 14 datasets (see Table
4). To test our hypothesis, we excluded the 5 datasets that were associated with
misfit6. In order to evaluate our order restriction we need two tests. First, we test the
order restriction, r1 ≥ r2 ≥ r3 ≥ r4, against the baseline model (with no restriction on
the four r parameters). Second, we test the model with order restrictions,
r1 ≥ r2 ≥ r3 ≥ r4, against a model imposing equality restrictions, r1 = r2 = r3 = r4.
If the order restriction corresponds to the most suitable version of the model, the first
test should fail to reach statistical significance, while the second test should lead to
statistically significant results.
Since our hypothesis involves an order restriction between four parameters,
the sampling distribution of the likelihood-ratio test statistic ∆G2 does not follow a
chi-square distribution with the appropriate degrees of freedom. Given the challenge
involved in determining the appropriate distribution, we opted for using a double
bootstrap method (Van De Schoot, Hoijtink, & Dekovic´, 2010) to compute p-values.
For example, when we want to test the order restrictions, r1 ≥ r2 ≥ r3 ≥ r4, against
the baseline model, the double bootstrap consists of the following steps: (1) a
6In most cases, misfit in the r-model is associated with its inherent restriction in the b parameters,
implying that that knowledge validity is the same for knowledge and recognition pairs (Hilbig et al.,
2010). Removing this constraint eliminated misfit for 4 out of the 5 datasets, but because the model
with two b parameters is saturated, we refrained from including these datasets in the subsequent
analysis.
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non-parametric bootstrap sample is obtained from a given data set (2) the model
imposing the null hypothesis, r1 ≥ r2 ≥ r3 ≥ r4, is fitted to that data set; (3) those
parameter estimates are used to obtain a parametric bootstrap sample (4) both
models being tested (model imposing the order restriction r1 ≥ r2 ≥ r3 ≥ r4 and the
baseline model) are fitted to that sample and the difference in fit is calculated; (5)
steps 1 to 4 are repeated many times (we repeated it 1000 times). We then compute
the p-value by assessing how many times the difference in fit obtained with the
bootstrapped samples is equal or more extreme than the difference in fit obtained
with the original data set, and reject the null hypothesis if this proportion is smaller
than .05. Additionally, we also compare the models through the model selection
measure FIA (Fisher Information Approximation), which takes complexity into
account7.
The results are shown in Table 5 and Figure 5. We find a clear support for
the order-restricted model both with the goodness-of-fit test and the FIA comparison.
In all except one data set (data set 14) the order restriction did not lead to significant
misfit, while the equality restriction did. Accordingly, FIA was for all data sets
smaller for the order restricted model than for the baseline or the equality restricted
model. Only for Data Set 14, in line with the results from the goodness-of-fit test, the
difference in FIA between the baseline and the order restricted model is not sufficient
to support the former.
Additionally, to test whether r approaches one for the subset including only
the items recognized and rejected fastest, we tested the following restriction:
r1 = .99
8. In all 9 datasets, this restriction led to a significant increase in misfit
7When using FIA to compare two models, a difference larger than 1.1 is considered to be substantial
evidence in favor of the model with smaller FIA (see Kellen, Klauer, & Bro¨der, 2013). For comparisons
in terms of FIA we additionally made sure that the sample-size of all data sets involved was above
the lower-bound recommended by Heck, Moshagen, and Erdfelder (2014).
8We tested r1 = .99 instead of r1 = 1 because the latter restriction predicts zero frequencies for
some categories of the model and therefore a unique observation in one of those categories would lead
to severe misfit. A rejection of such model would therefore be trivial.
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(smallest ∆G2(1) = 14.55, p < .001, smallest ∆FIA = 6.11) suggesting that even
under the ideal conditions for use of memory state information alone, people still
sometimes rely on other strategies, like use of further knowledge.
While these results lend support to our hypothesis, the reanalyses are not
ideal because when creating the subsets of pairs we necessarily limit the data points
available for analysis (see Table 5). Therefore, we conducted Experiment 2 that, by
being designed specifically to test our hypothesis, allows us to test them with greater
power.
Experiment 2
Participants
We recruited 52 students (35 women) from the University of Mannheim aged between
18 and 45 (M = 22.38, SD = 5.49). Participation was rewarded either with a
monetary compensation (2 euros) or with study participation credits. Additionally,
for each correct response in the comparison task, participants gained 2.5 cents, and
for each incorrect response they lost 2.5 cents.
Material and Procedure
The experiment consisted of the city-size paradigm, involving two tasks. First,
participants had a recognition task, where they saw 60 city names and had to
indicate whether they recognize them or not. Naturally, response times were recorded
along with the recognition judgments. The 60 cities were a random selection from the
largest world cities (with over 3 million inhabitants; see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of cities proper by population). After the
recognition task, cities were paired according to their recognition and rejection
latencies, with the fastest being paired together, and so on. Specifically, there were
four subsamples of pairs, created according to the corresponding four bins of
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recognition and rejection latencies. Whenever the number of recognized or rejected
objects was not divisible by four, it was randomly defined which bin(s) would have
one object more than the other(s). After the pairs were created (the number of pairs
varied between participants, being either 420, 421 or 422), participants saw them and
had to decide for each pair which city was more populous.
Results
Before fitting the model, we removed one participant because he recognized only one
of the 60 cities, while the remaining participants recognized on average 57% of the
objects. With the data from the remaining 51 participants, we determined the
frequencies for each category of the model, separately for the four bins of data. Then,
we fitted the r-model to the four bins of data. The model performed very well in
describing the data (G2(4) = 7.44, p = .11, F IA = 65.49). We repeated the same
analysis that we performed with the published data sets, with the goal of testing our
order hypothesis on the parameters r1 to r4. As can be seen in Table 5 and Figure 5,
we again find support for our hypothesis. Additionally, we again tested whether
adding the equality restriction r1 = .99 leads to a significant increase in misfit. We
observed a very extreme increase in misfit with this restriction
(∆G2(1) = 1806.84, p < .001,∆FIA = 899.78), which again supports the notion that
even under ideal conditions for reliance on memory states alone, other strategies than
mere reliance on memory strength take place.
Discussion
When they introduced the MSH, Erdfelder et al. (2011) contributed to the RH
literature by providing an extension of the heuristic which parsimoniously links it
with the recognition memory literature. The MSH not only explains a lot of
previously problematic results but also provides a set of new predictions. While
Erdfelder et al. tested many of these predictions in their original paper, some were
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left untested. Our aim was to address this gap by (1) testing the MSH predictions for
guessing and knowledge cases and (2) provide further evidence for a crucial prediction
regarding recognition cases. We addressed both these issues in two studies by
reanalyzing previously published data sets and conducting two new experiments. In
this way, we found strong converging evidence in line with the MSH.
In our first study, by relying on recognition and rejection latencies as a proxy
for memory states – under the assumption that longer latencies are associated with
the uncertainty memory state while shorter latencies are associated with certainty
memory states – we found evidence for the MSH prediction that for knowledge and
guessing cases people also have a preference for objects that are likely to be in a
higher memory state. While for knowledge cases this is not a new prediction – as it
can be alternatively explained by the fluency heuristic (Hertwig et al., 2008) – , the
prediction regarding guessing cases cannot be accounted by any other framework we
are aware of. Furthermore, that latter prediction appears quite counterintuitive, since
objects recognized slower should be preferred in guessing cases. Nevertheless, we
found evidence for this in all data sets we analyzed.
It is also worth noting that the MSH not only predicts the preference effects,
but also predicts they should be smaller than the corresponding effects in recognition
cases. This is due to the fact that, in knowledge and guessing pairs, the objects can
only be either in the same memory state or in adjacent memory states. Therefore, the
preference for the object in a higher state should be less marked than in cases where
the distance between states is maximal (pairs of one object in recognition certainty
and one object in rejection certainty), a combination that can only occur for
recognition pairs. We thus believe the MSH presents itself as the most parsimonious
framework for understanding how recognition is used in binary inferences, clearly
outperforming other approaches, like the RH and the fluency heuristic, in its
explanatory power and predictive reach. While for recognition cases this had already
been shown (see Erdfelder et al., 2011), our results extend the support of the MSH to
knowledge and guessing cases, thereby closing a gap that was left open.
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One result worth noting is the fact that the effect of latencies was stronger
for knowledge cases than for guessing cases. While we had not predicted this
explicitly, it fits nicely with previous results. Specifically, Castela and Erdfelder (in
press) have implemented the MSH in a formal model that accommodates all memory
state combinations, and observed that MSH-use is higher for recognition pairs if one
object is in recognition certainty and one object in the uncertainty state than for
recognition pairs with one object in uncertainty and one object in the rejection
certainty state. Since these are the memory state combinations that can underlie
adjacent state cases within knowledge and guessing pairs, respectively, our result
seems to be exactly in line with was found in Castela and Erdfelder – a stronger
tendency to use the MSH in the former cases. Given the converging evidence
concerning this effect, future studies should focus on testing possible explanations for
it. One such explanation, already suggested by Castela and Erdfelder, is that the
distance in memory strength between the recognition certainty and uncertainty
memory states might be larger than the corresponding difference between the
uncertainty and rejection certainty memory states. This would suggest that a simple
ordinal description of the states might be insufficient.
With our second study we aimed at further testing the effect of recognition
and rejection latencies in choices for recognition pairs. While this is a conceptual
replication of the test carried out by Erdfelder et al. (2011), we relied on a different
measure of RH-use, which we believe is far mode adequate. Erdfelder et al. relied on
accordance rates to the RH, which, as explained above, are a severely confounded
measure since people might choose the recognized option for reasons other than the
fact that they are applying the RH, namely because they rely on further knowledge.
For this reason, Hilbig et al. (2010) proposed the r-model, and specifically the r
parameter of the model, as a better measure of RH-use. The main advantage is that
the r-model disentangles choices of the recognized option in recognition pairs that
originate from use of the RH from the ones steaming from use of further knowledge.
Making use of this superior measurement tool, we investigated the MSH prediction
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that RH-use should increase the shorter the recognition and rejection latencies of
objects in a pair. We found support for this hypothesis by reanalyzing 9 data sets
and, in addition, with a new experiment tailored exactly to this test. Furthermore,
we tested whether in the most extreme cases, that is, when the recognition and
rejection latencies were shortest and therefore the probabilities that both objects are
in recognition and rejection certainty states were highest, MSH-use would be the only
strategy used. Our results suggested that this is not the case, therefore indicating
that even under perfect conditions for relying on memory strength, people will
sometimes resort to other inference strategies and integrate further knowledge.
In sum, with our work we tried to answer some questions left open by
Erdfelder et al. (2011), thereby accumulating further support for the MSH. We
believe we achieved this goal in two different ways: First, by finding support for its
predictions for guessing and knowledge cases and in this way showing how it can
parsimoniously explain a much larger chunk of data than the RH or the fluency
heuristic; second, by finding converging support for its main prediction while using a
more sophisticated measure of MSH use than the one employed by Erdfelder et al.
(2011). Finally, our results also show that while the MSH appears to be a more useful
framework than the RH, it should not be understood in a deterministic way, since
even when the objects are (likely to be) in the two extreme memory states –
recognition certainty and rejection certainty – people sometimes resort to strategies
other than choosing the option in a higher memory-state.
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Table 2: Results of one-sample t-test testing if the mean of individual proportion of
choices in Accordance with our hypotheses is higher than .50. For knowledge cases,
Accordance means choosing the fastest recognized object, while for guessing cases Ac-
cordance means choosing the slowest unrecognized object.
Knowledge Cases Guessing Cases
Accordance t df p Accordance t df p
World Cities (size) .60 8.28 73 < .001∗ .55 2.85 72 < .01∗
Celebrities (success) .60 7.78 73 < .001∗ .55 2.13 73 .02∗
Rivers (length) .67 9.35 71 < .001∗ .54 3.53 73 .001∗
Note: *significant at the .05 α level.
Further evidence for the memory state heuristic 29
Table 3: Summary of fixed effects results in multivel logistic regression showing how
the difference in latencies between two objects in a pair (RT difference) predicts the
Accordance. Accordance is defined as choosing the fastest recognized object in knowledge
cases, and the slowest recognized object in guessing cases.
Predictor Coefficient SE z value p
Intercept 0.10 0.04 2.23 .03∗
RT difference 0.24 0.08 3.06 < .01∗
Case (Knowledge vs. Guessing) 0.14 0.04 3.28 < .01∗
Domain Celebrities (vs. Cities) 0.01 0.03 0.39 .70
Domain Rivers (vs. Cities) .02 0.04 0.67 .50
RT difference x Case Knowledge (vs. Guessing) 0.48 0.07 6.59 < .001∗
Note: For discrete predictors, information in parentheses clarifies the levels of the pre-
dictor which are being compared. The RT difference is scaled in seconds. *significant
at the .05 α level.
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Table 4: Goodness-of-fit statistics, corresponding degrees of freedom and p-values for
all reanalyzed data sets and Experiment 2.
Data Set G2 df p-value
1 10.35 4 .03∗
2 3.87 4 .42
3 10.58 4 .03∗
4 9.22 4 .06
5 2.51 4 .64
6 0.50 4 .97
7 10.85 4 .03∗
8 2.74 4 .60
9 4.53 4 .34
10 9.97 4 .04∗
11 4.62 4 .33
12 12.03 4 .02∗
13 5.22 4 .27
14 0.79 4 .94
Exp 2 7.44 4 .11
Note: * indicates that the baseline model does not fit the data well, leading to statis-
cally significant misfit.
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the two-high-threshold model. Parameter r
denotes the probability of old objects exceeding the recognition thresholds. Parameter
d denotes the probability of new objects exceeding the rejection threshold. Parameter
g denotes the conditional probability of guessing yes in the uncertainty state.
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Figure 2: Graphical representation of the r-model: Parameter r denotes the proba-
bility of applying the recognition heuristic as originally proposed, that is, by ignoring
any knowledge beyond recognition. a = recognition validity (probability of the rec-
ognized object representing the correct choice in a recognition case); b = probability
of valid knowledge; g = probability of a correct guess; rec. = recognized; unrec. =
unrecognized.
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Figure 3: Proportion of choices of the fastest or slowest recognized or unrecognized
object for knowledge and guessing cases, respectively, for all 14 reanalyzed datasets.
Error bars represent standard error of the mean.
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Figure 4: Marginal effect of RT difference on Accordance for guessing and knowledge
cases. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Abstract The recognition heuristic (RH) theory states that, in
comparative judgments (e.g., Which of two cities has more
inhabitants?), individuals infer that recognized objects score
higher on the criterion (e.g., population) than unrecognized
objects. Indeed, it has often been shown that recognized
options are judged to outscore unrecognized ones (e.g., rec-
ognized cities are judged as larger than unrecognized ones),
although different accounts of this general finding have been
proposed. According to the RH theory, this pattern occurs
because the binary recognition judgment determines the in-
ference and no other information will reverse this. An alter-
native account posits that recognized objects are chosen be-
cause knowledge beyond mere recognition typically points to
the recognized object. A third account can be derived from the
memory-state heuristic framework. According to this frame-
work, underlying memory states of objects (rather than rec-
ognition judgments) determine the extent of RH use: When
two objects are compared, the one associated with a “higher”
memory state is preferred, and reliance on recognition in-
creases with the “distance” between their memory states.
The three accounts make different predictions about the im-
pact of subjective recognition experiences—whether an object
is merely recognized or recognized with further knowledge—
on RH use. We estimated RH use for different recognition
experiences across 16 published data sets, using a multinomial
processing tree model. Results supported the memory-state
heuristic in showing that RH use increases when recognition
is accompanied by further knowledge.
Keywords Recognition heuristic .Memory-state heuristic .
Recognitionmemory . Decisionmaking .Multinomial
processing treemodels
The recognition heuristic (RH) for comparative judgments is
among the simplest heuristics proposed by Goldstein and
Gigerenzer (2002) within their program of the “adaptive tool-
box”—metaphorically standing for decision makers’ repertoire
of judgment and choice strategies. For pairwise comparisons,
the RH can be stated as follows: “If one of two objects is
recognized and the other is not, then infer that the recognized
object has the higher value with respect to the criterion”
(Goldstein&Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 76). For the RH to be applied,
the following preconditions have been proposed: (1) recognition
is a valid cue strongly correlated with the criterion; (2) further
cues are not openly available; (3) recognition stems from natural
encounters in the world (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011).
The typical paradigm for investigating the RH consists of a
comparison task in which participants see pairs of objects and
must infer, for each pair, which object has a higher value on a
criterion dimension. The most common example is the city-
size task in which participants decide which of two cities has
the larger population. Additionally, participants engage in a
recognition task for each object. That is, they state for each
object whether they recognize it or not. On the basis of this
information, three types of object pairs can be defined: recog-
nition pairs (one object is recognized and the other is not),
knowledge pairs (both objects are recognized), and guessing
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pairs (neither of the objects is recognized). In some experi-
ments, the recognition task additionally asks participants to
state whether they merely recognized the name of the object or
whether they have further knowledge about it (e.g., Hilbig &
Pohl, 2009). However, despite this distinction of recognition
experiences, participants’ judgments are usually simply ana-
lyzed as recognized versus unrecognized (some exceptions are
Hilbig & Pohl, 2009; Hilbig, Pohl, & Bröder, 2009).
Several studies showed that recognized objects are chosen
more often than unrecognized ones in recognition pairs (for
reviews, see Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011; Pachur, Todd,
Gigerenzer, Schooler, &Goldstein, 2011). However, choosing
the recognized object does not necessarily involve use of the
RH. Whereas the latter implies that recognition alone deter-
mined the choice, the former can occur either from consider-
ation of recognition alone or in combination with further
knowledge about the recognized object (which will typically
be in line with the recognition cue). In this sense, different
accounts have been proposed for the observable tendency to
choose the recognized object. According to the original RH
theory, the recognized object is chosen more often because “if
one object is recognized and the other one is not, then the
inference is determined; no other information about the rec-
ognized object is searched for and, therefore, no other infor-
mation can reverse the choice determined by recognition”
(Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 82). We will refer to this
account as the invariance account.
An alternative account, which we will designate as the
inhibition account, presumes that the recognition cue can be
overruled by further knowledge. Specifically, the recognized
object is chosen more often not for being recognized per se, but
because further information about this object leads to the same
choice. This account is corroborated by several studies showing
that further knowledge affects choices in recognition pairs (e.g.,
Bröder & Eichler, 2006; Hilbig & Richter, 2011; Newell &
Fernandez, 2006). For example, people are more likely to infer
that a recognized city is more populous than an unrecognized
one if they know that the recognized city has a major league
soccer team (Newell & Fernandez, 2006). Naturally, further
knowledge can also result in the choice of the unrecognized
object when the available information indicates that the recog-
nized object is small. Nevertheless, since nothing is known
(and little can be inferred) about unrecognized objects, knowl-
edge will typically support choice of recognized objects.
A third account is given by the memory-state heuristic
(MSH; Erdfelder, Küpper-Tetzel, & Mattern, 2011). The
MSH presumes that individuals tend to choose the object that
reaches a “higher” memory state—that is, a higher level of
memory strength. Because criterion values are typically
strongly correlated with memory strengths (Erdfelder et al.,
2011), MSH use will often result in correct inferences. In line
with the two-high-thresholdmodel of recognition (e.g., Kellen,
Klauer, & Bröder, 2013), the MSH assumes that objects are in
one of three memory states: recognition certainty, uncertainty,
or rejection certainty. Objects with memory strengths exceed-
ing a recognition threshold are in the recognition certainty state
and are judged as recognized. If the memory strength falls
below this recognition threshold but is still larger than a
rejection threshold, an object is in the uncertainty state, and
the recognition judgment is determined by guessing. Finally, if
the memory strength falls below the rejection threshold, an
object is in the rejection certainty state and is judged as
unrecognized. According to the MSH, reliance on recognition
should increase with the “distance” between memory states of
the to-be-compared objects. Specifically, if one object is in the
recognition certainty state and the other in the rejection cer-
tainty state, reliance on recognition should be highest.
Beyond binary recognition judgments: New predictions
As was previously mentioned, the majority of studies investi-
gating the RH have relied on binary recognition judgments,
ignoring the reported subjective recognition experiences.
However, when distinguishing between nonrecognition (U),
mere recognition (mR), and recognition with further knowl-
edge (R+) judgments, it can be seen that the different accounts
make distinct predictions.
According to the invariance account, RH use should not vary
with the composition of the recognition pairs (i.e., pairs judged
R+–U vs.mR–U), because only the binary recognition judgment
determines choices and the distinction between R+ and mR
should not matter. In contrast, the inhibition account predicts
that RH use will be less frequent for R+–U pairs than for mR–U
pairs, since the availability of knowledge should lead to integra-
tion of this knowledge and, by implication, decrease reliance on
the RH. The MSH account makes the opposite prediction; that
is, RH use should be more frequent for R+–U than for mR–U
pairs, because it is more likely that the recognized object in the
former pair is in the recognition certainty state than that the
recognized object in the latter pair is. Note that this prediction
assumes only that reported recognition experiences (R+ vs. mR)
and underlying memory states (recognition certainty vs. uncer-
tainty) are positively correlated. It does not require that all R+
objects be in the recognition certainty state. To derive the MSH
prediction, it suffices to assume that R+ objects more likely
originate from recognition certainty than mR objects do.
TheMSH account makes an interesting additional prediction.
Specifically, the availability of further knowledge should be used
as a cue in R+–mR knowledge pairs as well, leading to the R+
object being judged as having a higher criterion value (e.g., being
judged as the more populous city). Again, this prediction
emerges from the fact that R+ objects are more likely in a
recognition certainty state than mR objects. The other two ac-
counts make no such prediction, since they predict that choices
for knowledge pairs will be based on retrieved knowledge only.
1132 Psychon Bull Rev (2014) 21:1131–1138
Finally, predictions regarding the ecological validity of the
different recognition experiences can also bemade. According
to the MSH account, objects in the recognition certainty state
should have higher criterion values than objects in the uncer-
tainty state (Erdfelder et al., 2011). Thus, the MSH predicts
that the probability of the recognized object having the larger
criterion value should be greater for R+–U than for mR–U
pairs. The invariance account predicts no such difference,
because R+ and mR objects are treated as equivalent if com-
pared with unrecognized objects.
The evaluation of the above-described predictions requires
the ability to disentangle the relative contributions of RH use
and reliance on further knowledge. The r-model proposed by
Hilbig, Erdfelder, and Pohl (2010) provides such a measure of
RH use (via parameter r), while also taking into account the
contribution of further knowledge. However, this model does
not distinguish between different types of recognition experi-
ences. In the next section, we first present the r-model and then
propose an extension, the r*-model, that incorporates different
recognition experiences.
From the r-model to the r*-model
The r-model belongs to the class of multinomial processing tree
models (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999; Erdfelder et al., 2009). This
class of models assumes that the observed categorical responses
are produced by a set of discrete mental states. The probability
of each state being entered is determined by the probability of
certain cognitive processes taking place or not. The models
provide estimates for the probability of each of these processes
taking place, producing a characterization of categorical data in
terms of latent cognitive processes. Multinomial processing tree
models are usually depicted as trees, with each branching pre-
senting the occurrence (or not) of cognitive processes and the
terminal nodes representing the observed categorical responses.
The r-model (Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2010) models data
from a two-alternative forced choice comparison task and a
yes–no recognition task. The recognition judgments are used
to categorize the pairs into knowledge, recognition, or guess-
ing cases, defining the three trees of the model (see Fig. 1).
They lead to eight outcome categories that are described by
four parameters: r, the probability of applying the recognition
heuristic; a, the probability of recognition being a valid cue; b,
the probability of valid knowledge; and g, the probability of a
correct guess. While both the knowledge and guessing trees
are defined by a single parameter that accounts for accuracy (b
and g, respectively), the recognition tree is slightly more
complex. If the RH is used (with probability r), accuracy
depends on recognition validity; with probability a, the infer-
encewill be correct; andwith probability 1−a, it will be false.1
If further knowledge or any other judgment strategy is used,
1 The a parameter represents the proportion of recognition cases in which
the recognized object has the larger criterion value. This parameter could
be placedwithout loss of generality at the root of the tree or even removed
implicitly via the use of two trees (for pairs in which the recognized item
has the smaller or larger criterion value, respectively). We find the present
parametrization the most convenient one for several (pragmatic) reasons.
Both objects 
recognized
1 Correct 
choice
2 False
choice
valid 
knowledge
invalid 
knowledge
b
1-b
Neither object 
recognized
3 Correct 
choice
4 False 
choice
valid 
guess
invalid 
guess
g
1-g
5 Choice of rec. 
(correct)
6 Choice of rec.
(false)
7 Choice of 
unrec. (false)
6 Choice of rec.
(false)
RH used
rec. object
larger
knowledge 
considered
r
1-r
1-a
valid 
knowledge
invalid 
knowledge
5 Choice of rec. 
(correct)
8 Choice of 
unrec. (correct)
a
1-a
1-a
a 
b
1-b
a
One object 
recognized
rec. object 
smaller
rec. object
larger
rec. object 
smaller
rec. object
larger
rec. object 
smaller
Fig. 1 Parameter r denotes the probability of applying the recognition
heuristic as originally proposed—that is, by ignoring any knowledge
beyond recognition. a = recognition validity (probability of the
recognized object representing the correct choice when paired with an
unrecognized object); b = probability of valid knowledge; g = probability
of a correct guess; rec. = R = recognized; unrec. = U = unrecognized
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the RH is not applied (with probability 1−r), and accuracy
depends on (knowledge) validity. With probability b, the
answer is correct, and with probability 1 – b, it is false.
Again, the choice of either the recognized or the unrec-
ognized object will depend on the recognition validity
(but see footnote 1).
To investigate whether use of the RH varies between rec-
ognition pairs in which the recognized object is judged as
either R+ ormR, we extended the r-model to the r*-model (see
Fig. 2). The r*-model consists of six trees with 18 outcome
categories in total. Because the category probabilities must
sum up to one for each tree, only 12 of the 18 probabilities are
free to vary. These category probabilities are represented by
10 parameters, resulting in a testable model with 12−10=2
degrees of freedom. The r*-model comprises three trees for
knowledge cases, two trees for recognition cases, and one
guessing tree. The three knowledge trees refer to (1) R+–R+
pairs, (2) R+–mR pairs, and (3) mR–mR pairs. It could be
argued that this is not a knowledge tree, since, according to
the participant’s judgments, there is no knowledge available.
Nevertheless, we refer to the parameter that accounts for
accuracy in these pairs as a knowledge parameter, but more
for reasons of consistency and simplicity than due to a strong
claim about the availability of valid knowledge for these
cases. The two recognition trees correspond to simple dupli-
cations of the original recognition tree in the r-model (each
with its own set of r and b parameters), accounting both for
R+–U andmR–U pairs. Finally, as in the r-model, the guessing
tree includes pairs of two unrecognized objects (U–U).
As can be seen in Fig. 2, in the R+–mR knowledge tree, we
assume that the distinction between merely recognized objects
(mR) and recognized objects with further knowledge (R+) can
be used as a simple cue. In other words, irrespective of the
retrieved knowledge, the R+ object would be preferred over
themR object (as measured by parameter k). If participants use
this strategy (as predicted by the MSH), a correct answer
depends on the R+ cue’s validity (as measured by parameter
c)—that is, on the proportion of times the object with the
higher criterion value is the one judged as R+. However, if
this strategy is not used, participants rely on the knowledge
they possess, and a correct answer will depend on the validity
of knowledge (as measured by parameter b2). Choice of the R
+
or the mR object will again depend on parameter c.
Model-based hypothesis testing
The hypotheses discussed previously can be represented by
parameter restrictions in the r*-model:
invariance account : r1 ¼ r2; a1 ¼ a2;
inhibition account : r1 < r2;
MSH : r1 > r2; a1 > a2:
In addition to these restrictions, the MSH predicts that
people use the strategy modeled by parameter k. Therefore,
the MSH predicts that the restriction k=0 should produce
gross misfits.
The suitability of the different parameter restrictions can be
compared by evaluating the relative performance of the models
instantiating them. A model selection analysis will allow us to
assess which hypotheses are corroborated by the data and
which are rejected. Model selection requires a weighting be-
tween the ability of eachmodel to account for the observed data
and the ability of each model to account for data in general
(model complexity or flexibility), since more flexible models
provide a better fit to data a priori. The goal is to find the model
with the best trade-off between fit and flexibility (see
Vandekerckhove, Matzke, & Wagenmakers, in press).
One prominent approach in model selection is based on the
minimum description length principle (MDL; Kellen et al.,
2013). According to the MDL approach, both models
and data are understood as codes that can be com-
pressed. The goal of MDL is to assess models in terms
of their ability to compress data. The greater the com-
pression, the better the account of the underlying regu-
larities that are present in the data. One of the indices
emerging from the MDL principle is the Fisher infor-
mation approximation (FIA), which combines a model’s
goodness of fit with model flexibility penalties:
ð1Þ
The first summand of FIA corresponds to the (minus) max-
imum log-likelihood of observed data x in a particular experi-
ment, quantifying modelℳ’s fit, and the second and third
summands correspond to the model penalties. The second
summand takes the number of parameters p and sample size
N into account. The third summand accounts for the flexibility
of the model due to its functional form by integrating over the
determinant of the expected Fisher informationmatrix I(θ). FIA
differences larger than 1.1 already represent substantial evi-
dence in favor of the winning model (Kellen et al., 2013).
Analysis of data sets
The r*-model requires responses discriminating between
objects that were unrecognized, merely recognized, and
recognized with further knowledge. Sixteen previously pub-
lished data sets fulfilled this requirement (Hilbig, Erdfelder,
& Pohl, 2010, 2011, 2012; Hilbig & Pohl, 2008, 2009;
Hilbig et al., 2009; Hilbig, Scholl, & Pohl, 2010). The
choice task used in all data sets was the city-size task.
Table 1 provides a description of each data set (additional
details can be found in the Supplemental Material).
FIA values and parameter estimates were calculated using
the MPTinR package (Singmann & Kellen, 2013).
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choice
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1-g
Fig. 2 Tree representation of the r*-model. R+, object recognized with
further knowledge; mR, object merely recognized; U, object unrecog-
nized; b1, b2, and b3, knowledge validity parameters; k, probability of
using the further knowledge cue; c, validity of choosing the R+ object
(probability that it represents the correct choice) in R+–mR pairs; r1,
probability of applying the recognition heuristic (RH) in pairs for which
the recognized object received an R+ judgment; a1, recognition validity
(probability of the recognized object representing the correct choice) in
pairs for which the recognized object received an R+ judgment; r2,
probability of applying the RH in pairs for which the recognized object
received an mR judgment; a2, recognition validity (probability of the
recognized object representing the correct choice) in pairs for which the
recognized object received an mR judgment; g, probability of a valid
guess
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Following Hilbig, Erdfelder, Pohl (2010), the baseline re-
strictions b1=b4 and b3=b5 were imposed on the model.
The baseline model performed well in describing the data
(see Table 2). For 12 of the 16 data sets, it fitted the data
according to the standardG2 goodness-of-fit test using α = .05
as a criterion of significance. For 4 of the 16 data sets (data sets
5, 13, 15, and 16), there was misfit at this level of significance.
However, these misfits did not exceed the critical G2 values
obtained in compromise power analysis (i.e., balancing of
type I and type II error probabilities) given an effect size of
ω=0.1 under H1 (see Erdfelder, 1984; Faul, Erdfelder, Lang,
& Buchner, 2007).
Table 1 Data sets
Data Set Origin Materials N
1 Hilbig & Pohl, 2009, Experiment 1 20 largest Swiss cities 4,560
2 Hilbig & Pohl, 2009, Experiment 2 17 random world cities 9,969∗
3 Hilbig & Pohl, 2009, Experiment 3 14 largest Swiss cities 6,188
4 Hilbig & Pohl, 2008, Experiment 5 11 random world cities 5,776∗
5 Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2011 14 Polish and 14 Austrian cities 12,012
6 Hilbig, Pohl, & Bröder, 2009 14 largest Belgian cities 7,358∗
7 Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2010 (6a) 17 random world cities 2,312
8 Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2010 (6b) 17 random world cities 2,584
9 Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2010 (7a) 14 largest Italian cities 1,183
10 Hilbig, Scholl, & Pohl, 2010, Experiment 1a 16 largest Canadian cities 1,320
11 Hilbig, Scholl, & Pohl, 2010, Experiment 1b 16 largest Canadian cities 960
12 Hilbig, Scholl, & Pohl, 2010, Experiment 2a 16 largest Canadian cities 2,400
13 Hilbig, Scholl, & Pohl, 2010, Experiment 2b 16 largest Canadian cities 2,040
14 Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2012, Experiment 1a 18 random world cities 3,672
15 Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2012, Experiment 1b 18 random world cities 3,213
16 Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2012, Experiment 1c 18 random World cities 3,672
Note. The sample size corresponds to the aggregate level: total number of trials multiplied by number of participants. For the data sets marked with an *,
the total N does not match what was reported in the published articles. This is due to missing values in variables required for the analysis.
Table 2 Model fit and maximum likelihood parameter estimates
Data Set G2 p-value b1 b2 b3 k c g r1 r2 a1 a2
1 4.85 .09 .75 (.02) .85 (.02) .68 (.02) .37 (.05) .80 (.02) .52 (.02) .77 (.03) .63 (.03) .93 (.01) .79 (.01)
2 2.44 .30 .70 (.01) .73 (.02) .62 (.02) .46 (.03) .70 (.01) .54 (.01) .73 (.01) .45 (.03) .82 (.01) .74 (.01)
3 3.67 .16 .74 (.01) .78 (.02) .64 (.02) .42 (.03) .70 (.01) .56 (.02) .84 (.02) .67 (.02) .82 (.01) .73 (.01)
4 0.94 .62 .65 (.01) .67 (.03) .52 (.02) .60 (.02) .48 (.02) .53 (.02) .70 (.02) .49 (.03) .57 (.01) .62 (.01)
5 8.00 .02 .66 (.02) .69 (.02) .63 (.01) .50 (.02) .65 (.01) .53 (.01) .82 (.01) .70 (.02) .86 (.01) .81 (.01)
6 5.08 .08 .69 (.02) .71 (.04) .64 (.02) .61 (.04) .78 (.02) .57 (.01) .82 (.02) .52 (.02) .94 (.01) .78 (.01)
7 3.82 .15 .64 (.03) .84 (.04) .66 (.03) .50 (.06) .72 (.03) .52 (.02) .74 (.03) .63 (.04) .79 (.02) .70 (.02)
8 1.34 .51 .63 (.02) .63 (.04) .61 (.04) .50 (.05) .58 (.03) .51 (.02) .84 (.02) .75 (.04) .79 (.01) .77 (.02)
9 0.99 .61 .71 (.04) .81 (.05) .53 (.05) .41 (.11) .86 (.03) .50 (.03) .75 (.05) .57 (.06) .94 (.01) .69 (.03)
10 1.42 .49 .52 (.08) .65 (.09) .51 (.04) .64 (.08) .67 (.04) .59 (.02) .98 (.01) .67 (.04) .82 (.02) .74 (.02)
11 0.03 .98 .58 (.06) .72 (.10) .58 (.04) .67 (.09) .75 (.04) .54 (.03) .95 (.02) .50 (.06) .82 (.02) .70 (.03)
12 2.38 .30 .62 (.03) .67 (.04) .56 (.03) .40 (.06) .62 (.03) .53 (.02) .77 (.03) .52 (.04) .80 (.02) .68 (.02)
13 6.09 .05 .63 (.03) .84 (.05) .62 (.04) .60 (.07) .75 (.03) .53 (.02) .85 (.02) .56 (.05) .78 (.02) .68 (.02)
14 3.17 .20 .66 (.01) .74 (.03) .67 (.02) .30 (.04) .56 (.02) .45 (.02) .56 (.03) .42 (.04) .59 (.02) .59 (.02)
15 6.48 .04 .68 (.01) .75 (.03) .64 (.03) .39 (.04) .55 (.02) .50 (.02) .58 (.03) .41 (.05) .64 (.01) .57 (.03)
16 8.07 .02 .64 (.02) .62 (.03) .64 (.02) .13 (.05) .53 (.02) .46 (.02) .69 (.02) .63 (.03) .57 (.02) .56 (.02)
Mean 3.67 – .66 .73 .61 .47 .67 .52 .77 .57 .78 .70
Note. Standard errors in parentheses
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The results reported in Table 3 show that for the majority of
the data sets (12 out of 16), the FIA metric prefers the model
imposing the full set of MSH restrictions, r1>r2 and a1>a2,
and provides support for k>0. These results are corroborated
by the parameter estimates obtained with the unrestricted
model, which are almost invariably consistent with these
parameter restrictions (see Table 2).2
Three data sets (4, 7, and 14) were better accounted for by a
model imposing the restrictions r1>r2 and a1=a2. This departs
from theMSH only in terms of the latter’s expected ecological
validity, since the probability of the recognized object having
the larger criterion value was not found to be reliably greater
in R+–U pairs than in mR–U pairs. Finally, data set 16 was
better described by a model imposing the restrictions r1=r2
and a1=a2. As can be seen in the Supplemental Material, data
set 16 corresponds to a condition in which speeded responses
were collected. It is plausible that the retrieval of additional
information from memory was impaired by this experimental
constraint, leading to the use of fast, familiarity-based recog-
nition judgments (e.g., Pachur & Hertwig, 2006).
General discussion
We tested the predictions of three different accounts about the
impact of subjective recognition experiences on RH use.
Overall, we found a clear pattern that was predicted by the
MSH and is inconsistent with both the invariance and the
inhibition accounts. RH use is more frequent when the recog-
nized object is judged as R+ than when judged asmR. TheMSH
predictions about RH use for different recognition experiences
rely on the assumption that objects judged as R+ are more likely
to have originated from a certainty state than objects judged as
mR. Despite the plausibility of this assumption, future efforts
should be placed on implementing a complete model that
associates choice predictions to latent memory states that are
themselves estimated from the data (Erdfelder et al., 2011;
Pachur et al., 2011). This, however, implies the possibility of
distinguishing whether an object (e.g., a city name) was expe-
rienced previously or not. One way to achieve this is by induc-
ing recognition experimentally (see Bröder & Eichler, 2006),
although it can be argued that this “artificial” recognition is
beyond the domain of the RH (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011).
In addition to the main hypotheses, we derived two other
predictions from the MSH framework. The first prediction
concerns a strategy that was not investigated before—namely,
choosing the object judged as “recognized with further
Table 3 Model-Selection Results: FIA indices for different versions of the r*-model applied to 16 data sets
Parameter Restrictions
Data Set baseline r1=r2 r1=r2
a1=a2
r1=r2
a1=a2
k=0
r1≤r2 r1≤r2
k=0
r1≥r2
a1≥a2
r1≥r2
a1=a2
r1≥r2
a1≥a2
k=0
1 34.80 37.13 83.09 118.34 39.01 74.25 33.41 80.09 68.65
2 37.29 81.21 95.15 224.39 83.38 212.63 35.92 50.57 165.17
3 36.17 50.02 60.99 171.04 52.02 162.07 34.79 46.47 144.84
4 34.46 54.29 53.68 255.12 56.28 257.72 35.95 33.18 237.39
5 41.08 52.36 61.89 240.86 54.72 233.69 39.68 49.94 218.66
6 36.84 65.42 155.66 270.67 67.49 182.49 35.45 126.41 150.45
7 30.90 31.21 34.04 73.67 32.73 72.36 29.50 33.05 69.14
8 30.03 30.25 27.61 69.10 31.78 73.26 28.65 26.74 70.14
9 25.85 26.41 53.08 60.61 27.52 35.05 24.48 51.89 32.02
10 26.20 46.46 46.50 70.48 47.68 71.66 24.79 25.55 48.78
11 24.40 46.34 48.46 68.23 47.45 67.21 23.02 25.85 42.79
12 30.37 40.81 49.58 72.69 42.38 65.48 28.98 38.48 52.09
13 30.79 46.14 48.35 80.25 47.55 79.45 29.43 32.36 61.32
14 32.81 35.64 32.44 56.79 37.35 61.70 31.47 28.98 55.82
15 33.55 36.69 36.18 72.52 38.28 74.62 32.19 32.38 68.52
16 35.46 34.27 31.27 34.09 36.08 38.89 34.08 31.79 36.90
Total 521.00 714.65 917.97 1,938.85 741.70 1,762.53 501.79 713.73 1,522.68
Note. FIA indices of the winningmodel for each data set are set in boldface type. FollowingHilbig, Erdfelder, Pohl (2010), all models have the restriction
b1=b4 and b3=b5. The baseline model had no further restrictions. Extending the set of candidate models by including models without these restrictions
does not change the model selection results
2 The preference for this particular restricted model did not change when
including equivalent candidate models that did not include the baseline
restrictions b1=b4 and b3=b5. Moreover, the FIA-based results were
corroborated by order-restricted significance tests on parameter restric-
tions (see the Supplemental Material).
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knowledge” (R+) in a heterogeneous R+–mR knowledge pair,
irrespective of the retrieved knowledge. The observed use of
this strategy suggests that participants are relying on a differ-
ence in memory states. The second prediction relates to the
recognition validities in the two recognition trees. We ob-
served that recognition validity was (in most data sets) higher
in R+–U than in mR–U recognition pairs. This shows that the
MSH framework reflects the environmental structure better
than does the invariance account. Both results reinforce the
importance of memory states in adaptive decision making
and, thus, the need to go beyond simple binary yes–no recog-
nition judgments.
In sum, we found strong support for theMSH by testing the
influence of recognition experiences on RH use. The inhibi-
tion account prediction that the availability of knowledge
reduces RH use was not supported, and only in one data set
(under time pressure conditions) did we find support for the
invariance account prediction that RH use should not differ
between recognition experiences. We believe that our work
shows the importance of focusing on underlying memory
processes when investigating memory-based probabilistic in-
ferences and strategies such as the RH.
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Abstract
The recognition heuristic (RH) theory predicts that, in comparative judgment tasks,
if one object is recognized and the other is not, the recognized one is chosen. The
memory-state heuristic (MSH) extends the RH by assuming that choices are not
affected by recognition judgments per se, but by the memory states underlying these
judgments (i.e., recognition certainty, uncertainty, or rejection certainty). Specifically,
the larger the discrepancy between memory states, the larger the probability of
choosing the object in the higher state. The typical RH paradigm does not allow
estimation of the underlying memory states because it is unknown whether the
objects were previously experienced or not. Therefore, we extended the paradigm by
repeating the recognition task twice. In line with high threshold models of
recognition, we assumed that inconsistent recognition judgments result from
uncertainty whereas consistent judgments most likely result from memory certainty.
In Experiment 1, we fitted two nested multinomial models to the data: an MSH
model that formalizes the relation between memory states and binary choices
explicitly and an approximate model that ignores the (unlikely) possibility of
consistent guesses. Both models provided converging results. As predicted, reliance
on recognition increased with the discrepancy in the underlying memory states. In
Experiment 2, we replicated these results and found support for choice consistency
predictions of the MSH. Additionally, recognition and choice latencies were in
agreement with the MSH in both experiments. Finally, we validated critical
parameters of our MSH model through a cross-validation method and a third
experiment.
Keywords: recognition heuristic; memory-state heuristic; threshold models;
multinomial processing tree models
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In everyday life, we continually draw inferences about the world, often with
partial knowledge, varying degrees of uncertainty, and limited time. For some of us,
like medical doctors or stock market investors, these types of inferences are an
integral part of our job, and often must be made under severe time constraints.
Therefore, it comes as no surprise that a lot of psychological research has focused on
how we arrive at judgments based on the integration of probabilistic cues and how
accurate those judgments are. Specifically, in the last decades many researchers were
interested in how people manage to make fast and frugal but yet good inferences in
typical everyday contexts. One example is the research dedicated to a very simple
judgment strategy, the recognition heuristic (RH; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999). For
pairwise comparisons, this heuristic can be described as follows:“if one of two objects
is recognized and the other is not, then infer that the recognized object has the
higher value with respect to the criterion” (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002, p. 76).
Despite the fact that the heuristic assumes that people ignore further cue knowledge
they might have, the RH can be very accurate. For example, imagine that a
non-expert in German soccer championships is wondering on which team to bet on
for the next Bundesliga year, Bayern Mu¨nchen or TSG Hoffenheim. Assuming this
person recognizes the former but not the latter team, she can (most likely correctly)
infer that Bayern Mu¨nchen will do better, simply by relying on recognition.
The RH is ecologically rational in the sense that it exploits the structure of
the environment by relying on a single cue - recognition - that correlates with the
choice criterion (performance of soccer teams in our example). Therefore, it is
domain-specific, as it only performs well in environments where recognition correlates
with the criterion (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999). Moreover, it applies only to
memory-based inferences, and not when information about other cues is readily
available. Also, it relies on natural recognition, acquired from experience, and not on
experimental recognition, manipulated in the laboratory (Gigerenzer & Goldstein,
2011).
A large body of research has investigated use of the RH and challenged its
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boundaries and limitations (for reviews see Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011; Pachur,
Todd, Gigerenzer, Schooler & Goldstein, 2011). Surprisingly, one prominent aspect
remains rather unexplored: the nature of the recognition process underlying the
application of the RH (see Pachur, 2011). Aside from a few exceptions (e.g.,
Erdfelder, Ku¨pper-Tetzel, & Mattern, 2011; Pachur & Hertwig, 2006; Pleskac, 2007;
Schooler & Hertwig, 2005; Schwikert & Curran, 2014), little attention was devoted to
trying to link models of recognition memory with the RH. Within these exceptions,
some have notably shown how the consideration of memory processes helps
understanding the RH better. For example, Schooler and Hertwig (2005) have shown
that a moderate level of forgetting benefits the RH by creating partial ignorance.
Pleskac (2007) has shown that as memory sensitivity (ability to distinguish novel
from experienced objects) gets worse the accuracy of the RH decreases. Schwikert
and Curran (2014) have used event-related potentials to distinguish the separate
contributions of familiarity and recollection. While these approaches have made
significant contributions, we believe there is still a major gap, namely, directly
modeling the recognition process along with the decision process, thereby estimating
the influence of recognition memory. We aim at addressing this gap by using a formal
model to explore the influence of underlying memory processes on RH-use.
Extending the recognition heuristic to the memory-state heuristic
When trying to link the recognition memory literature and the RH, it is
important to consider how recognition is understood in both (see Pachur, 2011). In
most recognition memory studies, participants first study a list of known words and
are later asked to discriminate the studied items from new (but also known) items.
Therefore, in this context, all items (new and old) will have some degree of
familiarity. In contrast, the typical paradigm in studies of the RH involves two tasks:
a comparison task, in which participants see pairs of objects and must infer which
one scores higher on a certain criterion (e.g. “Which city is more populous?”) and a
recognition task, where participants see all objects involved and must say which they
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recognize and which they do not (e.g. “Do you recognize this city?”). The judgments
from the recognition task allow the definition of three types of object pairs:
knowledge pairs (both objects are recognized), recognition pairs (one object is
recognized and the other is not), guessing pairs (neither of the objects is recognized).
The recognition pairs will be the ones of interest since they allow use of the RH. Note
that the recognition task in this case is somewhat different from the one in recognition
memory studies. While in a memory recognition test the material consists of known
objects for which an episodic judgment must be made, in the RH paradigm some
items will have been experienced before (outside the experimental setting) and others
not. Due to this difference, Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) made the simplifying
assumption that the RH acts on the binary output of the recognition process, that is,
an all-or-none distinction between the novel and the previously experienced, and that
the process itself can be ignored for the purpose of studying the heuristic. Moreover,
they asserted that “how often one has been exposed to something is (...) irrelevant
for the frugal recognition heuristic” (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 1999, p. 56). We argue
that the ecological rationality of ignoring differences in the degree of familiarity of
objects is quite questionable. If recognition is valid because exposure to objects in the
natural environment (via newspapers, TV programmes, etc) correlates with the
criterion, differences in the memory strength of recognized objects should be relevant.
This is the premise of the memory-state heuristic (MSH). The MSH can be
seen as a straightforward extension of the RH (Erdfelder et al., 2011). It incorporates
the assumption that memory strength is correlated with the criterion value, and
therefore, when comparing two objects, individuals will tend to choose the one
associated with a higher level of memory strength. This extension connects models of
recognition memory with the RH. Specifically, its predictions follow from the
two-high-threshold (2HT) model of recognition memory (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988),
which postulates that objects can be in one of three memory states: recognition
certainty, uncertainty, or rejection certainty. The three states are separated by two
thresholds, the recognition and the rejection threshold. If the memory strength
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associated with an object exceeds the recognition threshold, the object will enter the
recognition certainty state. If it lies between the recognition threshold and the
rejection threshold, the object will enter an uncertainty state, and the recognition
judgment is determined by guessing. Finally, if the memory strength falls below the
rejection threshold, the object enters the rejection certainty state in which it will
always receive a negative recognition judgment. The combination of these three
states leads to different combinations of recognition pairs, depending on the memory
states that underlie the recognized and the unrecognized object, respectively.
Regardless of the effective yes− no recognition judgment, given a decision criterion
that is strongly correlated with memory strength, the two core predictions of the
MSH are quite straightforward: First, if objects are in different memory states, there
should be a preference for the one in a higher state; and second, the larger the
discrepancy between memory states, the larger the probability of choosing the object
in the higher state. Thus, the MSH makes predictions beyond recognition pairs, since
these two “rules” can be applied also to knowledge pairs or guessing pairs, simply by
identifying the memory states that underlie each case.
Evidence supporting the memory-state heuristic
To test these predictions, Erdfelder et al. (2011) relied on the fact that
multinomial processing tree models like the 2HT model can be interpreted as
probabilistic serial processing models of cognition (Batchelder & Riefer, 1999). This
means that each branch of the model’s tree corresponds to a temporal sequence of
processing stages, and therefore the number of cognitive stages in each branch will
influence its total processing time (Erdfelder et al., 2011). This interpretation has
recently been supported by response time analyses of the 2HT model (Heck &
Erdfelder, in press). It follows that in the 2HT model, recognition and rejection
latencies originating from uncertainty will be stochastically larger than the ones
originating from certainty, since in the former there is an additional processing stage
of guessing. This allows direct response time predictions to be drawn. In this way,
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Erdfelder et al. (2011) were able to explain previous results that posed a challenge for
the RH. For example, it had been found that the RH adherence rate decreases with
increasing recognition latencies of the recognized object (e.g., Hertwig, Herzog,
Schooler, & Reimer, 2008; Newell & Fernandez, 2006). While posing a serious
challenge for the RH, this result is strictly predicted by the MSH, given the
assumptions outlined above.
Moreover, it was found that RH accordance rates (the amount of times the
recognized object is chosen in recognition pairs) are usually larger when recognition is
valid, that is, when recognition leads to a correct response (Hilbig & Pohl, 2008).
This was explained by assuming use of further knowledge. However, it can be
explained by the MSH without resorting to knowledge-use, since recognition should
be more valid for pairs of recognition and rejection certainty than for recognition
pairs involving uncertainty.
Another problematic result was observed by Hilbig and Pohl (2009) and
Castela, Kellen, Erdfelder, and Hilbig (2014). This refers to the phenomenon that the
RH adherence rate is higher for recognition pairs for which participants report having
further knowledge about the recognized object (R+) than in cases of mere recognition
(mR) when only the name of the object is recognized without further knowledge.
While the RH predicts the difference should not exist, the result can be explained by
assuming that the recognition cue can be overruled by further knowledge (e.g., Hilbig
& Pohl, 2008). However, the MSH would predict the same result, but by resting on
the assumption that R+ objects are more likely to have originated from the
recognition certainty state, while mR objects are more likely to have originated from
the uncertainty state. Using an extension of the r-model (Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl,
2010) which allows for an unbiased estimation of RH-use for both types of recognition
pairs (involving R+ or mR), Castela et al. (2014) found support for the MSH.
Specifically, it was shown that the differences between RH adherence for the two
types of pairs are due to higher reliance on recognition for pairs involving a R+
object, and not due to use of further knowledge.
A formal model of the Memory State Heuristic 8
A further result that can be similarly explained has been reported by
Schwikert and Curran (2014). They observed higher estimates of RH-use for
recognition pairs for which the recognized item was said to be recollected than
recognition pairs for which the recognized item was said to be only familiar.
Assuming that recollected items are more often in the memory certainty state than
familiar items, this result is clearly in line with the MSH.
Besides helping explain these previously challenging results, the MSH also led
to new qualitative predictions about response latencies that could be tested. These
concerned not only recognition and rejection latencies but also choice latencies, as a
function of the memory state of the objects in a pair (see Erdfelder et al., 2011 for a
detailed description of all predictions and results). Importantly, Erdfelder et al. have
shown that RH accordance rates increase with the decreasing recognition and
rejection latencies, in an additive manner. Moreover, they have shown that decision
latencies in recognition pairs increase with both recognition latency of the recognized
object and the rejection latency of the unrecognized object, these effects being, again,
additive.
The support found for the MSH’s predictions suggests its added value.
However, tests of the heuristic were limited since it is only a verbal model so far.
Implementing the MSH as a formal model would be ideal for testing it, but this is
challenging, since a crucial variable is missing in the data: whether an object was
experienced before by a participant or not. This information is missing because, as
outlined before, unlike in memory studies, in studies investigating the RH one deals
with natural recognition. Therefore, we simply lack knowledge about the actual
status of the recognition judgments of the participants. Specifically, we do not know
whether a “yes” recognition judgment is a hit or a false alarm, and whether a “no”
recognition response is a correct rejection or a miss. It follows that we cannot
estimate the probability of an object entering one of the three memory states using a
single yes− no recognition task.
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Measuring memory states through repeated recognition judgments
To overcome this incomplete data problem we wanted to find a way to
measure the memory states. Specifically, we were looking for an approach that allows
us to integrate all memory state combinations and their corresponding predictions
(regarding the preference for a given object) in a single formal model. Erdfelder et al.
(2011) relied on response times as a proxy for the memory state and thereby
successfully tested the MSH for recognition pairs. However, as already noted, this is a
very limited strategy because it relies on an approximation only and does not allow
formal testing. It is unclear what the cut-off point should be for a response time to
be classified as originating from uncertainty versus certainty, so while response times
can be used to test certain predictions, they do not allow the classification of pairs in
terms of underlying memory states.
Castela et al. (2014) came closer by including the distinction between
recognition with further knowledge (R+) and mere recognition (mR) in a formal
model, the r*-model. They used these two subjective experiences of recognition as a
proxy to the memory state, in the sense that objects classified as R+ are more likely
to come from certainty than objects classified as mR. While this is a step forward
from simply relying on response times and was very useful for critically testing the
RH, evidence accumulation models and the MSH (see Castela et al., 2014), the R+
versus mR distinction is a relatively poor estimate of memory states. First, it is a
subjective measure as it relies on participants understanding of what mR or R+
represents, and the idiosyncratic criteria they set for R+ responses. Second, they are
only informative about the memory state of recognized objects and therefore do not
provide a way to model all possible memory state combinations.
Finally, another option would be to use confidence ratings, which seem like a
quite appealing option. However, like the mR and R+ judgments, they are subjective
measures, depending on the participants understanding of and idiosyncratic way to
use the scale. Moreover, there is the question of how to map certain confidence
ratings to memory states. While in a standard recognition memory test it has been
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shown that the mapping can be done under minimal assumptions (see Bro¨der, Kellen,
Schu¨tz, and Rohrmeier, 2013), it is largely unclear how this could be achieved
without the knowledge of which items are old and which are new.
Given all the limitations described above, we were not satisfied with any of
the options listed. Therefore, we wanted to come up with a new measure that fits our
goals better. This led us to consistency of recognition judgments as a proxy for
memory certainty. This measure is associated with a simple extension of the RH
paradigm, only involving the addition of two extra recognition tests. Furthermore, it
allows for a better (although not perfect) identification of the memory states
underlying the recognition judgments. According to the 2HT, if an object is in a
certainty state and participants are properly instructed1, the judgment should be
consistent across repeated recognition tests. Therefore, it follows that inconsistent
judgments must arise from the uncertainty state. Consistent judgments, on the other
hand, will most likely arise from certainty states, although they can also result from
consistent guesses. By modeling the probability of both objects in a pair entering
certain memory states, we can estimate RH-use for all different memory state
combinations.
To estimate MSH-use for different memory state combinations, we rely on
the r-model that was originally developed for the standard RH paradigm with a
single recognition test (Hilbig et al., 2010). Like threshold models, the r-model
belongs to the class of multinomial processing tree models (Batchelder & Riefer,
1999; Erdfelder et al., 2009), that allow for a characterization of categorical data in
terms of underlying cognitive processes. The r-model (see Figure 1) consists of three
submodels that describe the three possible combinations of recognized and
1The assumption only holds if participants are properly instructed not to respond yes in subsequent
recognition tests because they recognize the item from the previous test. Therefore, instructions have
to be very clear, and additional measures to assess possible biases in the participants understanding
of the instructions should be considered. In the Methods Section we will describe how we dealt with
this problem.
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unrecognized objects into pairs (knowledge, guessing, and recognition pairs). The
three trees that represent the submodels lead to eight outcome categories, described
by four parameters: r, the probability of applying the RH; a, the probability of
recognition being a valid cue (recognition validity); b, the probability of valid
knowledge (knowledge validity); and g, the probability of a correct guess. The
knowledge and guessing trees are described by a single parameter each, accounting for
the accuracy of the comparative judgment for the object pair (b and g, respectively).
In the recognition tree, if the RH is applied (with probability r), the choice will be
correct with probability a if recognition is valid, and it will be incorrect with
probability 1− a. If the RH is not applied (1− r), accuracy will depend on the
validity of knowledge (or other judgment strategy taking place).
Extending the r-model to our repeated recognition judgments paradigm
involves essentially two steps. First, we need to account for the different memory
states associated with consistent versus inconsistent recognition judgments. As
clarified above, inconsistent judgments imply a memory uncertainty state. In
contrast, consistent recognition judgments may arise from either certainty or
uncertainty states. For consistent judgments, we model the probabilities that they
originate from certainty, and, with complementary probability, that they occurred
through consistent guessing. Specifically, h denotes the probability that consistent
“yes” judgments originate from recognition certainty whereas l denotes the
probability that consistent “no” judgments originate from rejection certainty. Then,
depending on the memory state combination, we can use the r-model to estimate
MSH-use for this specific combination. Applying the r-model to all possible
combinations of memory states is straightforward. When objects are in the same
state we use the knowledge tree of the r-model (if both objects are recognized with
certainty) or its guessing tree (if objects are in uncertainty or in rejection states). In
contrast, when objects are in different states we use the recognition tree of the
r-model, here implying MSH-use for different memory-states combinations. We will
refer to this extension of the r-model as the latent-states MSH model. This model is
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composed of six trees leading to 18 data categories (of which 12 are free to vary)2
that are described by 14 parameters. Obviously, this version of the model is not
identifiable, since it has negative degrees of freedom. Some basic restrictions that
render the model identifiable will be described in the Results Section. The six trees of
the model correspond to all pair combinations of the three possibilities for repeated
recognition judgments: (1) consistently recognized (repeated “yes” judgments); (2)
inconsistent judgments (any combination of inconsistent judgments); (3) consistently
rejected (repeated “no” judgments).
Figure 2 displays the six trees. To illustrate the logic of the model, let us
describe the first one, which corresponds to the tree for pairs of objects that were
both consistently recognized. We first model the probability that the consistent
recognition judgment for the first object is associated with recognition certainty.
With probability h the first object reaches the recognition certainty state, with
probability 1− h it is in the uncertainty state. Then, the same is modeled for the
second object. At this point, it is possible to determine which tree of the r-model will
be appropriate, depending on the memory states of both objects in the pair.
The remaining five trees are built according to the same logic (model
equations and a figure with the full model can be found in Appendix A). Aside from
the r-model parameters for different memory state combinations, the latent-states
MSH model has two parameters h and l that represent the probabilities of an object’s
consistent judgment being associated with the recognition or rejection threshold,
respectively. Regarding the r-model parameters, these capture similar processes as
the r-model does. However, now there are different sets of parameters that refer to
the combinations of memory states they represent. For clarity, when we refer to
specific parameters we will use an index that describes the type of pair, using the
subscript R for recognition certainty, U for uncertainty and N for rejection certainty.
Most importantly, now there are three r and three a parameters. This allows us to
2Because the category probabilities must sum up to one for each tree, only 12 of the 18 probabilities
are free to vary.
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test differences in MSH-use and memory-state validity between recognition pairs that
originate from different memory states. Specifically, we can test the MSH prediction
that both the validity and reliance on recognition should be highest when the
difference between the memory states of the two objects is highest, that is, when
objects are in the recognition certainty and the rejection certainty state, respectively.
In our MSH model, this translates into the predictions that rRN > rRU and
rRN > rUN for MSH-use. Analogously, we predict aRN > aRU and aRN > aUN for the
memory-state specific validities.
Experiment 1 was designed to test these four main hypotheses. In addition,
we were also interested in assessing whether an approximate version of the MSH
model would be adequate to capture the results and how this affects the accuracy of
the parameter estimates. In contrast to the latent-states MSH model introduced
above, the approximate model version assumes that consistent judgments always
originate from certainty states, thus ignoring the (unlikely) possibility of consistent
guesses.
Experiment 1
Materials and Procedure
The experiment was conducted using E-Prime 2.0. software (Psychology
Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). To test the latent-states MSH model, we extended
the most common paradigm in the study of the RH: the city-size paradigm. As
outlined above, the original paradigm incorporates two tasks, a recognition test and a
city-size comparison task. We extended this paradigm by including repeated
recognition judgments. Thus, the experiment consisted of three sessions, all spaced
by a one-week interval.3 In the first session, participants performed the city-size task
and then the recognition test. In the subsequent two sessions they repeated the
recognition test.
3We chose a one-week interval to ensure that sufficient time passed and therefore it is unlikely that
participants can remember the full list of items from the previous session(s).
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In the recognition tests, participants were instructed to indicate whether they
recognize the city name or not. The instructions clearly stated that by recognition we
meant having at least heard of an object before the experiment started, and not just
recognizing its name from a previous session. Besides the clarity in the instructions,
we took additional measures to avoid and control for a potential bias to respond yes
in the second and third recognition tests because of the familiarity of the object
associated with the previous session(s). First, we chose a large set of cities to
decrease the possibility of participants memorizing the full set. Moreover, we included
fillers and lures. Fillers were real city names but changed through the three sessions
to add heterogeneity between sessions. Lures were fictitious city names. Since these
were necessarily unknown to the participants, their recognition status in the second
and third session served as proxy for the bias to respond yes.
In all three recognition tests, participants were presented with 100 city
names. Eighty of those corresponded to a random sample drawn from the 150 largest
US cities. Additionally, 45 city names were drawn from the remaining set of US
cities. These items served as fillers, and 15 were presented at each session. Finally, we
included five4 lures, which were presented at all sessions. Each item was presented at
a time, and responses were self-paced. The order of item presentation was
randomized. A 500 ms interstimulus fixation-cross followed each response. Reaction
times were recorded along with the participants response.
For the city-size task, the 100 items were paired. Fillers and lures were
included to prevent making them recognizable as in any way different from the other
objects, but we made sure that target objects were always paired with other target
objects. Each target object was presented 6 times, resulting in 240 pairs that could
be used for the analysis. On each trial participants were presented with a pair (order
of pairs was randomized) and had to infer which of the two cities is more populous. A
500 ms interstimulus fixation-cross followed each response. Reaction times were
4We only included a small proportion of lures because we wanted to ensure that their presence
would not impact the overall proportion of recognized items.
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recorded.
Participants
Forty-four students were recruited from the University of Mannheim. Five
participants did not attend all required sessions and were therefore excluded from the
analysis. The 39 participants that completed the experiment (29 women) were
between 18 and 35 (M = 22; SD = 4.09) years old. Participation was monetarily
compensated at the end of the last session.
Results
As already mentioned, to minimize the likelihood that there is a yes bias in
the second and third recognition tests despite the unambiguous instructions, we
included fillers and lures in the set of cities. In all three recognition tests, recognition
of lures was generally very low and there were no significant differences between
sessions (M1 = .05, SD1 = .13, M2 = .08, SD2 = .18, and M3 = .06, SD3 = .13, in
Phases 1 to 3, respectively; F (2, 76) = .44, p = .65). Moreover, the mean proportion
of recognized objects was stable between sessions (M1 = .50, SD1 = .13, M2 = .50,
SD2 = .16, and M3 = .50, SD3 = .14; F (2, 76) = .10, p = .91). Taken together, these
results indicate there was no considerable yes bias.
Model-based Analysis
Model-based analyses were done with MPTinR (Singmann & Kellen, 2013) in
R (R Core Team, 2015), using maximum likelihood parameter estimation and model
evaluation based on both the likelihood-ratio goodness-of-fit statistic G2 and the
Fisher Information Approximation (FIA) model selection measure that takes model
complexity into account (see, e.g., Heck, Moshagen, & Erdfelder, 2014).5 Some of the
hypotheses we wish to test involve inequality restrictions (e.g., rRN ≥ rRU or
5When comparing two models in terms of FIA, a difference larger than 1.1 represents substantial
evidence in favor of the model with smaller FIA (e.g., Kellen, Klauer, & Bro¨der, 2013). Moreover, for
all comparisons in terms of FIA, we ensured the sample-size was above the lower-bound recommended
by Heck et al. (2014).
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parameters at the boundary of the parameter space (e.g., h = 1). For these cases, the
sampling distribution of the likelihood-ratio test statistic ∆G2 under the null
hypothesis does not follow a standard χ2 distribution with the appropriate degrees of
freedom, but a mixture of χ2 distributions (see Iverson, 2006). For simplicity,
whenever we test this type of restrictions we will do so by using a double bootstrap
procedure (see van de Schoot, Hoijtink, & Dekovic, 2010). For example, if we wanted
to test h = 1, the procedure goes as follows: 1) a non-parametric bootstrap sample is
obtained from our data; 2) we fit the model imposing the null hypothesis h = 1 to
that sample; 3) a parametric bootstrap sample is obtained from the estimated
parameters; 4) both models under test (model with h = 1 restriction and model with
no restriction on the h parameter) are fitted to that sample and the difference in fit is
calculated; 5) steps 1 to 4 are repeated many times (in our case, 1000 times). We
then compute the p-value by assessing how many times the difference in fit obtained
with the bootstrapped samples is equal or more extreme than the one observed with
our original data set. Note that, for tests of inequality restrictions, this is a two-step
process. First, we test a model imposing the inequality restriction (e.g., rRN ≥ rRU)
against a model imposing no restriction on these parameters. Second, we test the
model imposing the inequality restriction (e.g., rRN ≥ rRU) against a model imposing
an equality restriction on those parameters (e.g., rRN = rRU). If the inequality
restriction (e.g., rRN > rRU) is the most suitable parameter restriction, the first test
should fail to reach statistical significance while the second test should lead to
statistically significant results. For tests involving the double bootstrap method, we
will report the ∆G2 we obtain with our data, and the double bootstrap p-value
computed by comparing it to the ∆G2 in our bootstrap samples. For clarity, we will
denote misfits and p-values obtained through this method with ∆G2 and p.
We started by determining the frequencies for each data category of the
model. As explained before, objects for which the recognition judgments were
consistently yes or no were assumed as most likely originating from recognition and
rejection certainty, respectively, whereas objects for which the recognition judgment
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varied were assumed to originate from the uncertainty state. The first of the three
recognition judgments per object was always used as the binary recognition answer
(“yes” or “no”) required by the model-based analysis. The mean proportion of
consistent recognition judgments (of target items) across sessions was .75 (.47 of
which were consistent “no” judgments).
We fitted the latent-states MSH model with three sets of a priori restrictions,
(1) aUU = .5, (2) b = bRN = bRU , and (3) g = bUN = .5. The first restriction concerns
parameter aUU , that is, the memory-state validity in pairs where both objects are in
the uncertainty state. Following the logic outlined above, when two unrecognized
objects are in the same state we model the choices through a guessing process.
However, the combination of two objects in the uncertainty memory state can occur
for cases where the data categories distinguish between recognized (there was a “yes”
judgment in the first session) and unrecognized (there was a “no” judgment in the
first session) objects. In order to model a pathway to those categories while assuming
there should be no preference for one or the other, we implemented a recognition-use
tree with a rUU parameter fixed to zero. When rUU is fixed to zero, the branch
becomes mathematically equivalent to just having a guessing parameter if the aUU
parameter is fixed to .5, hence the restriction. The restriction set (2) follows from the
original r-model (Hilbig et al., 2010): The probability of a correct judgment based on
information other than recognition is invariant whenever at least one of the objects is
recognized. As Hilbig et al. (2010) corroborated this assumption empirically, we
decided to stick to it in order to render the model as parsimonious as possible.
Finally, the last set of restrictions (3) implies that when no object is recognized there
is no valid information available and participants should guess, leading to
performance approximately at chance level.
All these restriction patterns are reasonable on a priori grounds. In fact, as
expected, the baseline model incorporating these restrictions performed very well in
describing the data (G2(3) = 3.21, p = .36, FIA = 28.87). Additionally, we tested
whether we can further simplify our model by imposing an equality restriction on the
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probabilities of consistent recognition judgments originating from certainty states,
that is h = l. As show in Appendix B, the constraint h = l holds if and only if
g3
(1−g)3 =
p(111)
p(000)
, where g denotes the guessing probability for a “yes” recognition
judgment in the memory uncertainty state, p(111) represents the probability of three
“yes” judgments and p(000) represents the probability of three “no” judgments in the
three repeated recognition tests. In other words, the h = l restriction entails the
assumption that people adjust their guessing probabilities such that they mirror the
proportions of presumably old and presumably new items in the recognition test.
Hence, the higher the proportion of items consistently judged “old” relative to the
proportion of items consistently judged “new”, the higher the probability of guessing
“yes”. This behavior corresponds to what is known as probability matching, a
strategy that is well documented in many domains (Bayen & Kuhlmann, 2011;
Gaissmaier & Schooler, 2008; Koehler & James, 2009; Shanks, Tunney, & McCarthy,
2002; Spaniol & Bayen, 2002). When we add the equality restriction corresponding to
this assumption, model misfit increases only slightly and non-significantly
(∆G2(1) = .63, p = .43). Moreover, the model selection criterion FIA decreases,
although not in a substantial amount (∆ FIA = .40). This indicates that the
latent-states MSH model combined with the h = l restriction provides a better
balance between model fit and parsimony than a model that allows them to differ.
Therefore, we added this restriction to our baseline model.
As can be seen in Figure 3 and Table 1, the pattern of the r and a parameter
estimates is consistent with our hypotheses. If two objects are in recognition and
rejection certainty states, estimated reliance on recognition is highest (rˆRN = .88).
When one object is in the uncertainty state, reliance on memory-state differences
decreases (rˆRU = .55, rˆUN = .46). By implication, when we add the inequality
restrictions rRN ≥ rRU and rRN ≥ rUN to the model, model misfit does not increase
(∆G2 = 0, p = 1) and FIA decreases (∆FIA = 1.18). Moreover, when we compare a
model including the inequality restrictions with a model including the equality
restrictions rRN = rRU = rUN , model misfit increases drastically (∆G2 = 94.43, p = 0)
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and so does FIA (∆ FIA = 42.64). Importantly, both restrictions lead to a significant
increase in misfit (rRN = rRU : ∆G2 = 55.68, p = 0 and rRN = rRU :
∆G2 = 90.58, p = 0), indicating that none of the equality restrictions is compatible
with the data. In summary, the results strongly support the MSH hypothesis that
reliance on memory states is highest when the discrepancy between memory states of
objects under comparison is largest. While we did not have a hypothesis regarding a
difference between rRU and rUN , it is worth noting that rRU is estimated to be
significantly larger than rUN (∆G
2(1) = 7.14, p < .01, ∆ FIA = .87). This will be
addressed in the Discussion Section.
We also see the predicted pattern in the estimated memory-state validities.
When we add the inequality restrictions aRN ≥ aRU and aRN ≥ aUN to the model,
model misfit does not increase (∆G2 = 0, p = 1) and FIA decreases (∆ FIA = 1.14).
In contrast, when we compare a model including the inequality restrictions with a
model imposing the equality restrictions aRN = aRU and aRN = aUN , model misfit
increases significantly (∆G2 = 96.10, p = 0) and FIA also increases (∆ FIA = 42.06).
Again, both restrictions lead to a significant increase in misfit (aRN = aRU :
∆G2 = 36.35, p = 0 and aRN = aUN : ∆G2 = 96.06, p = 0), indicating that none of the
restrictions is compatible with the data. Resembling the pattern we observed for the
r parameters, we also observe a significant difference between aRU and aUN
(∆G2(1) = 16.87, p < .001, ∆ FIA = 4.99), a result that will also be addressed in the
Discussion Section.
Approximate MSH model
In addition to our main hypotheses we wanted to test an approximate version
of our latent-states MSH model. The approximate model relies on the simplifying
assumption that repeated recognition judgments indicate memory states perfectly
and can be directly used to measure them. Specifically, just as inconsistent
recognition judgments necessarily indicate memory uncertainty, consistent judgments
are assumed to always indicate memory certainty in the approximate model. The
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idea behind this model is that it could nicely complement the latent-states version.
While the latent-states MSH model has the advantage of directly measuring the
probabilities h and l that consistent judgments originate from recognition or rejection
certainty states and therefore does not rely on further assumptions, it has the
disadvantage that the extra parameters make it more vulnerable to sampling error,
resulting in larger standard errors of the parameter estimates. In contrast, the
approximate version, by having less parameters, will provide higher stability (i.e.,
smaller standard errors) of the parameter estimates, and therefore may be more
adequate for hypotheses testing, despite the fact that it is based on an assumption
that only holds approximately.
Since the approximate model corresponds to a nested version of the
latent-states model, testing it simply requires fixing both certainty state probabilities
h and l to 1. When we add this restriction h = l = 1 to the model, model misfit does
not increase significantly (∆G2 = .66, p = .19), although the decrease in FIA is not
conclusive by itself (∆ FIA = 0.09). This indicates that the approximate model can
adequately describe the data, and is suitable for testing our hypotheses. With this
version of the model, the pattern in the r and a parameters does not change (see
Figure 3), and the results perfectly converge with the results from the latent-states
model.6
Test of latency predictions
As outlined above, so far the MSH had only been tested through latency
predictions drawn from a serial processing interpretation of the 2HT model (see
Erdfelder et al., 2011, p.13). According to this interpretation, when an object’s
memory strength exceeds one of the high thresholds to either recognition or a
rejection certainty state, a fast judgment can be made. However, if the memory
strength lies between the two thresholds, a second process (i.e., guessing) is required.
6The replication of all results with the approximate version of the model can be found in Appendix
C
A formal model of the Memory State Heuristic 21
Therefore, it follows that the recognition latency distributions for responses
originating from the uncertainty state should be stochastically larger than recognition
latencies for responses originating from certainty states (Erdfelder et al., 2011; Heck
& Erdfelder, in press).
Since we have shown that consistency versus inconsistency of repeated
recognition judgment patterns is a valid proxy for memory states, we were able to
test several latency predictions7 that can be derived from the MSH more directly
than was possible before. Specifically,
(a) both recognition and rejection latencies in the first session should be shorter for
consistent recognition and rejection patterns (indicating recognition and
rejection certainty), respectively, compared to those associated with inconsistent
patterns (indicating recognition uncertainty);
(b) choice latencies should differ as a function of the distance between memory
states of the objects in a pair. More precisely, choice latency should decrease
with increasing distance between states.
To test prediction (a), we looked at the response latencies in the first
recognition test as a function of whether they correspond to consistent or inconsistent
repeated recognition judgments (see Figure 4, left-side, for visualization of the effect
with untransformed response times). We then fitted a linear mixed model8 to predict
latency in the first recognition test with recognition status (yes/no) and consistency
(consistent/inconsistent) as fixed effects and participant as a random effect. In line
with our hypotheses, rather than testing for the main effects and the interaction of
7In all these and further analysis involving response times we use log-transformed response times
to reduce skewness (the results do not change when we use untransformed response times). The mean
of individual response times is used.
8The model was estimated using the lmer function of the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolkner
& Walker, 2015) in R (R Core Team, 2015) and p-values were obtained by using the lmerTest package
(Kuznetsova, Brockhoff & Christensen, 2016) which uses Satterthwaites approximations.
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the two fixed factors, we compared the mean latencies as a function of consistency
within recognition and rejection cases (simple main effects analyses). As predicted,
both recognition and rejection latencies were significantly higher for inconsistent
cases than for consistent cases (∆M = 0.24, SE = 0.05, t(114) = 4.51, p < .001 and
∆M = 0.18, SE = 0.05, t(114) = 3.43, p < .001; for recognition and rejection cases,
respectively).
Prediction (b) involves looking at choice latencies for different types of pairs
(see Figure 4, right-side, for visualization of the effects with untransformed response
times). Therefore, we used the repeated recognition judgments to categorize pairs as
a function of the distance between the states. There were three categories: maximal
distance between states (recognition certainty and rejection certainty); adjacent
memory states (recognition certainty and uncertainty and uncertainty and rejection
certainty); and same memory state (both objects in recognition certainty, both in
rejection certainty and both in uncertainty). We then calculated the individual mean
choice latencies for each participant and type of pair (see Figure 4) and fitted a linear
mixed model predicting choice latency with type of pair (maximal, adjacent or same)
as a fixed factor and participant as a random factor. As predicted, the results
indicate that choices are faster for maximal pairs than for adjacent pairs
(∆M = 0.11, SE = 0.02, t(76) = 6.30, p < .001) and faster for adjacent pairs than for
same pairs (∆M = 0.07, SE = 0.02, t(76) = 4.09, p < .001).
Additionally, another interesting hypothesis is suggested by our model-based
results. We found that reliance on recognition is higher for pairs of objects in
recognition certainty and uncertainty states than for pairs of objects in uncertainty
and rejection certainty states, and the same pattern occurred for the memory-state
validity parameters. Therefore, we also tested if, in line with the parameter
estimates, choices were faster for the former type of pairs. This was indeed the case
(∆M = 0.09, t(38) = 4.14, p < .001). Thus, choices between objects in adjacent
memory states are not equally fast. They are fastest for pairs in recognition certainty
and uncertainty states.
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Discussion
In Experiment 1, we introduced an extension to the city-size paradigm based
on repeated recognition judgments. This extended paradigm allowed us to test core
predictions of the MSH through a formal model. Our results support the formal MSH
model and suggest that patterns of repeated recognition judgments provide excellent
indicators for the latent memory states underlying participants’ recognition
judgments. We tested two nested versions of our MPT model, namely the
latent-states MSH model and the approximate MSH model. They are both useful and
informative, and complement each other nicely. The latent-states MSH model allows
us to test the MSH core predictions without relying on the simplifying assumption of
the approximate MSH model that consistent recognition patterns are always
associated with certainty memory states. By directly modeling the probabilities that
objects with consistent recognition judgments originated from certainty states, the
latent-states MSH model takes the possibility of consistent guesses into account and
thus provides purer estimates of the processes relevant during paired comparison
choices than the approximate MSH model. However, as outlined above, this
advantage comes at a cost: As a consequence of the extra parameters h and l, the
latent-states MSH model is more vulnerable to sampling error, resulting in larger
standard errors of the parameter estimates. In contrast, the simplifications implied
by the approximate model result in a higher stability (i.e., smaller standard errors) of
the parameter estimates, making this parsimonious version of the model more
adequate for hypothesis testing, provided that the approximation inherent to this
model is at least roughly in line with the data. Therefore, by finding convergent
results with both models, we can adequately test our hypotheses while asserting the
quality of the repeated recognition judgments as a proxy for the memory states.
Indeed, both models fitted our data well, and results based on both models are
consistent with the MSH core predictions, suggesting that noncompensatory reliance
on recognition in inferential decision making depends on the underlying memory
states and not on the recognition judgments per se. The high degree of convergence
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between the latent-states and the approximate model is due to the fact that the
certainty parameters h and l are estimated to be close to 1 in the former model,
suggesting that consistency versus inconsistency across three recognition judgments is
an almost perfect empirical indicator of certainty versus uncertainty memory states,
respectively.
Besides corroboration of our hypotheses, we found a result that is worth
discussing: MSH-use is higher for pairs of an object in recognition certainty and an
object in uncertainty than for pairs of an object in uncertainty and an object in
rejection certainty. While not explicitly predicted by the MSH, this could be
reasonably accommodated through an extension of the theory. In fact, the result is
perfectly compatible with the MSH, since it does not contradict any of its core
predictions. So far, the MSH (in line with the 2HT model) assumed a simple ordinal
relationship between the states, but was silent about the distance between them.
However, it is reasonable to question whether this distance is the same between
different types of adjacent states. Accordingly, we found that memory-state validity
mirrors the pattern in MSH-use. Therefore, at least in this dimension, it seems like
the distance between states is different: Rejection certainty appears to be quite close
to uncertainty, whereas recognition certainty appears to be clearly distinct from
uncertainty. Correspondingly, we also observed that choices are faster for recognition
certainty and uncertainty pairs than for uncertainty and rejection certainty pairs. It
follows that the difference in the rRU and rUN parameters is in line with several other
aspects of our data. This motivates a reconsideration of a plain ordinal assumption
about how the three memory states relate, that could be explored in future studies.
Finally, we used consistency versus inconsistency of recognition judgments as
an indicator for underlying memory states to test latency predictions that follow from
the MSH and found support for them. Specifically, we found that (a) both
recognition and rejection latencies are shorter when they originate from a certainty
state than when they originate from uncertainty and that (b) choice latencies differ
between pairs of different memory states in a way consistent with the MSH.
A formal model of the Memory State Heuristic 25
Experiment 2
To complement Experiment 1, Experiment 2 was designed around two main
goals: (1) replicating the findings of Experiment 1, thereby lending further support to
the MSH and our models; (2) testing MSH predictions about choice consistency. To
fulfill the first goal, we again relied on the repeated recognition judgments paradigm.
Additionally, to address our second goal, we further extended the procedure so that
the city-size task was also repeated across sessions. This means that participants
attended the lab three times, and in each of the three sessions they performed the
recognition test and the city-size task. The advantage of repeating the city-size task
is that we have a measure of choice consistency in addition, which allows us to test
another prediction of the MSH. Specifically, the MSH predicts that consistency
should be higher for pairs of objects in different certainty states. Because reliance on
the heuristic will be highest for these cases, the likelihood of consistency should also
be higher. For pairs of objects in adjacent memory states, in contrast, the heuristic is
not applied as often, and therefore consistency should be lower. Finally, consistency
should be lowest for pairs of objects in the same state, for which the heuristic cannot
be applied. In addition to the distance between the memory states of objects in a
pair, one could also argue that the specific memory-state combinations matters
within the adjacent and same state cases, due to state-specific differences in
availability of further knowledge. Specifically, for the cases of adjacent memory
states, consistency should be higher for recognition certainty and uncertainty pairs
than for uncertainty and rejection certainty pairs, since in the former available
knowledge about the recognized object could lead to inferences that foster consistent
choices across time. Analogously, regarding same state cases, consistency should be
highest for pairs of two objects in recognition certainty since, again, retrieval of
further knowledge could lead to consistent choices. In contrast, it should be lower for
pairs of two objects in uncertainty and two objects in rejection certainty, since,
especially in the latter cases, choices rely on guessing in the first place.
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Materials and Procedure
This experiment was conducted using OpenSesame (Mathoˆt, Schreij, &
Theeuwes, 2012). The procedure was very similar to Experiment 1, the main
difference being that not only the recognition test but also the city-size comparison
task was repeated across sessions. To ensure a full replication, the material was
identical to Experiment 1. The pairs for the second and third session were the same
as the pairs used in the first session of Experiment 1, with the exception that the 80
pairs that contain fillers and lures included the fillers corresponding to that session.
Participants
Thirty-nine students were recruited from the University of Mannheim. Four
participants did not attend all required sessions and therefore were not included in
the analysis. Two additional participants were removed because they recognized none
or all of the objects in the second and third session, respectively. The 33 participants
(25 women) that were included in the analysis are aged between 17 and 26
(M = 20.82;SD = 1.89). Participants were monetarily compensated at the end of the
last session.
Results
We took the same precautions as in Experiment 1 to prevent a yes bias in
the second and third recognition test. In all three recognition tests, recognition of
lures was generally low, but there were significant differences between sessions
(M1 = .01, SD1 = .05,M2 = .10, SD2 = .10, and M3 = .08, SD3 = .19, in Phases 1 to
3, respectively; F (2, 64) = 3.15, p = .05). Therefore, we excluded four participants
that recognized more than half of the lures in the second or third session. Excluding
these participants successfully eliminated the effect of session in proportion of
recognized lures (M1 = .01, SD1 = .05,M2 = .03, SD2 = .09, and
M3 = .04, SD3 = .10, in Phases 1 to 3, respectively; F (2, 56) = 1.19, p = .31). The
mean proportion of recognized objects was stable between sessions
(M1 = .57, SD1 = .11,M2 = .58, SD2 = .18, and
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M3 = .56, SD3 = .17;F (2, 64) = .43, p = .65).
Model-based analysis
As in Experiment 1, we determined the frequencies of each data category by
considering the consistency of the recognition judgments and using the recognition
judgment from the first recognition test to determine the recognition status of each
object. The mean proportion of consistent recognition judgments across sessions was
.78 (of which .43 were no judgments). Again, we first fitted the latent-states MSH
model with the following baseline restrictions: aUU = .5, b = bRN = bRU , g = bUN = .5.
This baseline model performed well in describing the data (G2(3) = 2.84, p = .42, FIA
= 27.44). Also, adding an equality restriction in the parameters h = l did not
increase misfit significantly and slightly decreased FIA (∆G2(1) = 0.60, p = .44,∆FIA
= .25). Therefore, we again relied on this more parsimonious version of the model.
As clearly shown in Figure 3, we observed the same pattern as in Experiment
1 (see also Table 1). When both objects are in certainty states (recognition and
rejection) estimated reliance on recognition is highest (rˆRN = .86). When one object
is in the uncertainty state reliance on recognition decreases (rˆRU = .63, rˆUN = .56).
When we add the inequality restrictions rRN ≥ rRU and rRN ≥ rUN to the model,
model misfit does not increase (∆G2 = 0, p = 1) and FIA decreases (∆ FIA = 1.16).
When we compare a model including the inequality restrictions with a model
including the equality restrictions rRN = rRU and rRN = rUN , both model misfit and
FIA increase significantly (∆G2 = 29.25, p = 0,∆FIA = 10.34). Both restrictions lead
to a significant increase in misfit (rRN = rRU : ∆G2 = 12.03, p = 0 and rRN = rRU :
∆G2 = 26.49, p = 0), indicating that none of the equality restrictions is compatible
with the data. In summary, replicating Experiment 1, the results from Experiment 2
support the MSH hypothesis that reliance on recognition is highest when the distance
between memory states of the objects under comparison increases. Again, we observe
that rRU is significantly higher than rUN (∆G
2(1) = 4.38, p = .04,∆FIA = 0.36).
Additionally, we see the predicted pattern in estimated memory-state
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validities. When we add the inequality restrictions aRN ≥ aRU and aRN ≥ aUN to the
model, model misfit does not increase (∆G2 = 0, p = 1) and FIA decreases (∆ FIA =
1.13). In contrast, when we compare a model including the inequality restrictions
with a model based on an equality restrictions aRN = aRU and aRN = aUN , model
misfit increases significantly (∆G2 = 59.55, p = 0) and FIA also increases (∆ FIA =
23.12). Both restrictions led to an increase in misfit, indicating that none of them is
compatible with the data (aRN = aRU : ∆G2 = 7.51, p < .01; aRN = aUN :
∆G2 = 50.65, p = 0). Again, we additionally observe a significant difference between
aRU and aUN (∆G
2(1) = 29.63, p < .001,∆FIA = 11.53) that mirrors the effect
evident in the r parameters.
Approximate MSH model
In Experiment 2, h and l were estimated as 1 in the baseline latent-states
model. Therefore, imposing the restriction h = l = 1 leads to no increase in model
misfit (∆G2 = 0, p = 1). This further validates the adequacy of our proxy and the
approximate model as a parsimonious measurement tool.
Test of latency predictions
To check full replicability of the results of Experiment 1, we tested the same
latency predictions in Experiment 2. Specifically, we predicted that,
(a) both recognition and rejection latencies in the first recognition judgment should
be shorter for consistent recognition and rejection patterns, respectively,
compared to those for inconsistent patterns;
(b) choice latencies should differ as a function of the distance between memory
states of the objects in a pair. More precisely, choice latency should decrease
with increasing distance between states;
(c) choice latencies should be faster for recognition certainty and uncertainty pairs
than for uncertainty and rejection certainty pairs.
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To test prediction (a) we looked at the response latencies of the first
recognition test as a function of whether they correspond to consistent or inconsistent
repeated recognition judgments (see Figure 4). We then fitted a linear mixed model
to predict latency in the first recognition task with recognition status (yes/no) and
consistency (consistent/inconsistent) as fixed effects and participant as a random
effect. Again, we tested the simple main effects of consistency within the two levels of
recognition status. As predicted, both recognition and rejection latencies,
respectively, were significantly higher for inconsistent cases than for consistent cases
(∆M = 0.31, SE = 0.04, t(83.25) = 7.23, p < .001 and
∆M = 0.15, SE = 0.04, t(83.03) = 3.45, p < .01).
To test prediction (b), we again used the repeated recognition judgments to
assign pairs to memory state combinations, and calculated the individual median
choice latencies for each participant and type of pair. We fitted a linear mixed model
predicting choice latency with type of pair (maximal, adjacent or same) as a fixed
factor and participant as random factor. As predicted, the results indicate that
choices are faster for maximal pairs than for adjacent pairs
(∆M = 0.10, SE = 0.19, t(64) = 5.28, p < .001) and faster for adjacent pairs than for
same pairs (∆M = 0.07, SE = 0.02, t(64) = 3.54, p < .001, respectively).
Prediction (c), that choice latencies are faster for recognition certainty and
uncertainty pairs than for uncertainty and rejection certainty pairs, was also
supported by our results (∆M = 0.11, t(28) = 4.08, p < .001).
Choice consistency
In addition to the replication of Experiment 1, the second goal of this
Experiment was to analyze the consistency in choices throughout the three sessions.
According to the MSH, consistency in choices should relate to the distance between
states: it should be highest if both objects in a pair are in different certainty states
(maximal distance), less likely if one object is in the uncertainty state (adjacent
states), and least likely when both objects are in the same state. Naturally, whenever
A formal model of the Memory State Heuristic 30
the MSH is not used, knowledge may also induce consistency. Therefore, for adjacent
states, we expect that recognition certainty and uncertainty pairs will be associated
with more consistency than uncertainty and rejection certainty pairs. Regarding same
state pairs, we expect highest consistency for pairs when both objects are recognized
with certainty. Pairs of objects in uncertainty or in rejection certainty states should
be associated with less consistency.
To evaluate our predictions, we first coded consistency as a binary variable:
for each pair and participant, choosing the same object in the three sessions versus
making a different choice at least once. The mean proportion of consistent choices
across participants was .65. We fitted a mixed effects logistic regression predicting
consistency with type of pair (memory-state combination) as a fixed effect and
participant as a random effect. As summarized in Table 2 (see also Figure 5), the
results were in line with our predictions. The maximal distance pairs were associated
with the highest consistency and adjacent states pairs were associated with higher
consistency than same state pairs. Additionally, within adjacent states, recognition
certainty and uncertainty pairs were associated with higher consistency than
uncertainty and rejection certainty. Finally, within same state pairs, pairs of two
objects in recognition certainty were also associated with higher consistency than
pairs of two objects in uncertainty or in rejection certainty, although there is no
significant difference between the last two.
Discussion
Experiment 2 had two goals: replicating Experiment 1 and assessing the
MSH predictions concerning choice consistency. We fully replicated the results of
Experiment 1, thereby finding additional support for MSH-use. We found that
reliance on recognition is highest when the distance between the memory states is
also high, and that this pattern is mirrored by the memory-states validity parameters.
Furthermore, we again found that reliance on memory state information is higher for
pairs of objects in recognition certainty and uncertainty than pairs of objects in
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uncertainty and rejection certainty. The replication of this result adds support to the
idea that the distance between these combinations of memory states might not be
equivalent. Moreover, we also successfully replicated the validation of latency
predictions of the MSH by using our proxy for memory states.
Regarding the second goal, we have tested yet another prediction of the MSH
relating choice consistency. We have shown that, as predicted, consistency is higher
for cases where the distance between states is maximal, and therefore the MSH is
often used; and that consistency decreases with this distance, being smaller for pairs
of objects in adjacent states, and lowest when objects are in the same state.
Moreover, choices are more consistent when it is more likely that further knowledge is
available.
Validation Studies
In this paper we have introduced a new paradigm and measurement model.
Both the paradigm and the MSH model are extensions of the RH paradigm and the
r-model. Thus, in many ways, our model involves similar processes as the r-model
does. Although the r-model has been validated previously (see Hilbig et al, 2010), we
aimed (1) to establish the validity of the new parameters we introduce in the MSH
model, h and l, and (2) to demonstrate that, just like the r parameter of the r-model,
our three r parameters mirror manipulations of MSH validities for different memory
state combinations.
Validation of the h and l parameters
The parameters h and l represent probabilities that consistent recognition
judgments originated from a certainty state (recognition certainty or rejection
certainty), such that the complementary probabilities (1− h and 1− l) represent the
probability that consistency originated from guessing. In other words, these
parameters prevent the requirement that consistency of recognition judgments is a
perfect indicator of memory states (as the approximate MSH model assumes). While
these parameters do not represent psychological processes per se, it is nevertheless
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important to demonstrate that they reflect what they are supposed to measure. One
clear prediction regarding these parameters is that the larger the number of sessions
we include, the higher the probability that consistency of recognition judgments
across these sessions is associated with memory certainty. If we increase the number
of repetitions of recognition judgments, the probability of consistent judgments will
be progressively less likely to be associated with an uncertainty state. Following this
logic, we wanted to compare a case where recognition judgments are only repeated
once (two sessions cases, 2x) with the case we used in our experiments, where the
recognition judgments are repeated twice (three sessions cases, 3x). Our prediction is
that h and l estimates are smaller in the 2x case than in the 3x case. Henceforth we
will only refer to h, since both parameters have an equality restriction and therefore
always have the same value. Thus, in a nutshell, we predict h2x < h3x.
First, we used our data of Experiment 1 and 2 to estimate h for both cases,
by only considering the first two sessions for the 2x case. We found that the estimates
of h follow the predicted pattern (Experiment 1, h2x = .84 and h3x = .92; Experiment
2, h2x = .85 and h3x = 1). Unfortunately, standard statistical analysis would not be
appropriate to test whether these differences are significant, since the data in the 2x
and the 3x case are statistically dependent. To overcome this problem, we opted for
using a Monte Carlo cross-validation method. We split our original data into two
datasets by randomly assigning half of our data points to the 2x case, and the other
half to the 3x case. We then fitted the latent-states MSH model to both datasets.
This process was repeated 1000 times, so we can asses how often we observe the
predicted pattern h2x < h3x. Besides the baseline predictions, we included equality
restrictions in the r parameters between the two cases. This means that all r
parameters were restricted to be equal between the 2x and 3x cases
(rRN2x = rRN3x, rRU2x = rRU3x and rUN2x = rUN3x). These restrictions are justified to
ensure that the model will not adjust the r parameters to accommodate the
differences between the cases, but only if they are shown to be reasonable. Therefore,
before assessing the pattern in the h parameters we wanted to assess the impact of
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these restrictions. We first performed a compromise power-analysis with G*power
(Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, Buchner, 2007) to calculate the optimal critical ∆G2 value
(for a χ2(3) test detecting small deviations from the null, w = .1, and ensuring that
type 1 and type 2 error probabilities are equal). The optimum critical value is 28.2
for the data of Experiment 1, and 24.4 for the data of Experiment 2. In all 1000
iterations, ∆G2(3) never exceeded the corresponding critical value in Experiment 1,
and only 0.1% of the times for Experiment 2. In fact, had we used the standard α
level of .05, the increase in misfit due to the constraints rRN2x = rRN3x, rRU2x = rRU3x
and rUN2x = rUN3x would be significant in 5% of the samples for Experiment 1 and
7% for Experiment 2, a result that almost perfectly matches the expectation when
the constraints hold in both experiments. In light of these results, we decided to
assess our hypothesis concerning h2x and h3x under these restrictions. We observe the
expected pattern, h2x < h3x, in 99% of the cases for Experiment 1 and 96% for
Experiment 2. We tested the increase in misfit caused by adding the h2x ≤ h3x
restriction. The addition of this restriction resulted in no increase in misfit in any of
the 1000 iterations, for both experiments. When comparing a model including an
inequality restriction, h2x ≤ h3x, with a model with an equality restriction, h2x = h3x,
we observe this leads to a significant increase in misfit in 71% of the cases for
Experiment 1 and 52% for Experiment 2. Thus, the overall pattern of results is quite
consistent and in line with our interpretation of the model parameters h and l.
Experiment 3: Validation of the r parameters
As mentioned before, the r parameters in our model are borrowed from the
r-model, which has been validated. However, given the more complex nature of our
model, showing that all our three r parameters reflect manipulations of the degree of
reliance on MSH-use should add additionally confidence to our results. Therefore, we
conducted an experiment that mimics the second experiment in Hilbig et al. (2010;
Data Set 7). In brief, we present one group of participants with a domain where
memory strength is a valid cue, and the other with a domain where it is not. In line
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with Hilbig et al. (2010; see also Pohl, 2006, Experiment 1) we hypothesized that
MSH-use should decrease for the latter case. Within our model, this would translate
into the following three hypotheses: (1) rRN1 > rRN2 ,(2) rRU1 > rRU2 ,(3)
rUN1 > rUN2, where 1 denotes the condition with a valid domain, and 2 denotes the
condition with a non-valid domain.
Materials and Procedure
We followed the same procedure as in Experiment 1 but with different
materials. The target items consisted of the 30 largest Italian cities. Additionally, we
randomly selected 30 more Italian city names by drawing from the 31st largest to the
70th largest Italian cities. These served as fillers, and 10 were presented at each
session. Finally, we used 5 very small (less than 600 inhabitants) Italian comunes as
lures. In the first session, participants in both groups first had a recognition test with
all 45 cities. The cities were paired so that target items are only paired with other
target items, while fillers and lures are paired together. Each target city appeared 16
times, creating 240 target pairs. Additionally, each filler and lure was repeated 4
times, resulting in 30 additional pairs. For the comparison task, participants were
randomly assigned either to a control condition where they had to judge which of the
cities is more populous (domain where recognition is valid) or to an experimental
condition where they had to judge which city is higher above sea level (domain where
recognition is not valid). Performance on the comparison task was monetarily
incentivized.
Participants
We initially recruited 54 participants from the University of Mannheim, but
unfortunately, 9 participants did not return to the second and/or third session. Of
these 45 participants, 6 of them recognized all cities in one or more of the sessions,
and therefore had to be removed before the analysis. Of the remaining 39
participants, 23 (12 women; aged between 19 and 41, M = 24, SD = 5.98) had been
assigned to the city-size group, while 16 (9 women; aged between 18 and 35, M =
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21.31, SD = 4.00) were in the height-above-sea-level group. At the end of the third
session, participants were compensated with money or course credit, and had an
additional monetary bonus which was a function of their performance in the
comparison task.
Results
In all three recognition tests, recognition of lures was generally low, and there
were no significant differences between sessions
(M1 = .09, SD1 = .17,M2 = .12, SD2 = .23, and M3 = .08, SD3 = .14, in Phases 1 to
3, respectively; F (2, 88) = 0.79, p = .46). The mean proportion of recognized objects
was also stable across sessions (M1 = .67, SD1 = .18,M2 = .69, SD2 = .21, and
M3 = .68, SD3 = .22;F (2, 88) = 0.56, p = .57). This is in line with the assumption
that participants followed our instructions for the repeated recognition tests.
Model-based Analysis
We first fit the latent-states MSH model to the data of both conditions. The
model performed well with the baseline restrictions,
aUU = .5, b = bRN = bRU , g = bUN = .5, for both conditions analyzed simultaneously
(G2(6) = 8.15, p = .23, FIA = 50.95). Once more, adding the equality restriction
h = l in each of the two conditions led to no significant increase in misfit and FIA
(∆G2(2) = 1.35, p = .51,∆FIA = .32). Thus, replicating Experiments 1 and 2, the
probabilities of originating from recognition and rejection certainty states,
respectively, do not differ between consistent yes and consistent no recognition
judgments.
A first test of validity concerns the parameter h = l. Since the object domain
(i.e., Italian cities) and material does not differ between conditions and participants
were randomly assigned to conditions, the h = l parameter must not differ between
the city-size (C) and height (H) conditions. To test this straightforward prediction,
we added the restriction hC = lC = hH = lH . As predicted, this restriction led to no
significant increase in misfit and slightly reduced FIA (∆G2(1) = 0.57, p = .32,∆FIA
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= .21). In light of these results, all additional tests of our hypotheses are based on
the baseline model assuming hC = lC = hH = lH . All parameter estimates (and
corresponding standard errors) for this baseline model can be found in Table 1.
Second, as a manipulation check, we wanted to make sure that the
memory-state validity is higher in the city-size group for all three types of recognition
pairs. As can be seen in Table 1, this is the case for all three memory-state validity
parameter estimates. Therefore, we compared the baseline model with a model
imposing the inequality restrictions, aRN,C ≥ aRN,H , aRU,C ≥ aRU,H and
aUN,C ≥ aUN,H . This leads to no significant increase in misfit or FIA
(∆G2 = 0, p = 1,∆FIA = 2.02). In contrast, comparing the inequality restricted
model with one imposing equality restrictions between conditions in the a
parameters, aRN,C = aRN,H , aRU,C = aRU,H and aUN,C = aUN,H , leads to a significant
increase in misfit and FIA (∆G2 = 194.29, p = 0,∆FIA = 89.92). Importantly, all
three restrictions separately led to a significant increase in misfit (aRN,C = aRN,H :
∆G2 = 32.53, p = 0; aRU,C = aRU,H : ∆G2 = 43.34, p = 0; aUN,C = aUN,H :
∆G2 = 19.08, p = 0), indicating that none of them is compatible with the data.
Third, since our manipulation worked as predicted, we then tested our main
hypotheses. As can be seen in Table 1, all three r parameter estimates are larger in
the city-size group than in the heigth-above-sea-level group. Therefore, we compared
the baseline model with a model imposing the following inequality restrictions,
rRN,C ≥ rRN,H , rRU,C ≥ rRU,H and rUN,C ≥ rUN,H . This led to no increase in misfit
and a decrease in FIA (∆G2 = 0, p = 1,∆FIA = 2.07). Furthermore, in line with our
hypotheses, comparing the inequality restricted model with a model imposing equality
restrictions, rRN,C = rRN,H , rRU,C = rRU,H and rUN,C = rUN,H , resulted in a significant
increase in misfit and FIA (∆G2 = 242.38, p = 0,∆FIA = 116.08). Importantly, all
three restrictions separately led to a significant increase in misfit(rRN,C = rRN,H :
∆G2 = 54.48, p = 0; rRU,C = rRU,H : ∆G2 = 87.66, p = 0; rUN,C = rUN,H :
∆G2 = 10.01, p = 0), indicating that none of them is compatible with the data. In
sum, the results clearly support our hypothesis, showing that, like RH-use (Hilbig et
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al., 2010), MSH-use adaptively adjusts to the memory-state validity.
General Discussion
In this paper, we aimed at testing a formal model of the MSH with a new
paradigm especially suited to acquiring better estimates of the memory states
underlying binary recognition judgments. In two experiments, our model-based
analyses consistently revealed that, as predicted, reliance on memory states increases
with the discrepancy in the underlying states. Moreover, the same pattern was
observed in memory-state validity, supporting the ecological validity of the MSH.
Our two nested MSH models constitute the first attempt at formalizing the
MSH. With these models, we could independently estimate reliance on recognition for
pairs of all different combinations of memory states, allowing a direct test of the core
predictions of the MSH. Consistent with previous work (Castela et al., 2014;
Erdfelder et al., 2011) we found strong support for the idea that underlying memory
states, and not recognition judgments per se, influence reliance on recognition as a
single cue in inferential judgments. Importantly, these core predictions of the MSH
rely on the assumption that memory strength, and not recognition judgments,
correlates with the criterion value in the first place. It follows that memory-state
validity should also be higher for recognition pairs of two objects in certainty memory
states. We have also successfully tested this prediction, which underlines the fact that
following the MSH is an ecologically rational and well-adapted choice strategy.
Furthermore, we successfully validated critical parameters of our model.
Specifically, we first focused on the two filter parameters of the latent-states MSH
model, h and l. These parameters should estimate the probability that consistency in
recognition judgments is associated with a recognition or rejection certainty state,
respectively. To ensure they correctly serve that purpose, we tested the
straightforward prediction that increasing the number of repetitions of the
recognition test should lead to higher estimates of h and l. This prediction is based
on the 2HT: If an object is in a certainty state, the recognition judgment can only be
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yes for the case of recognition certainty and no for the case of rejection certainty; if
an object is in the state of uncertainty, the recognition judgment will be based on a
guessing process, and can vary. It directly follows that the probability of consistent
judgments originating from uncertainty decreases when the number of repetitions
increases. We compared the case of one repetition with the cases of two repetitions,
and found the predicted pattern: the estimates of h and l are smaller in the former
case. In this way, we validated the filter parameters.
In addition, we also wanted to validate the three r parameters. While the r
parameter has been validated in the context of the r-model, since we have three
different ones to account for all types of recognition cases, it is important to show
they all respond to manipulations that should affect MSH-use. Therefore, we
compared MSH-use between two conditions with different memory-state validities.
Specifically, we predicted that when memory-state validity is very low, MSH-use for
all types of recognition pairs should decrease. This same manipulation has been used
to validate the r parameters of the r-model (Hilbig et al., 2010), and it should also
affect our r parameters. Accordingly, we have shown that all three r parameters are
significantly smaller in a condition with low memory-state validity compared to a
condition with higher memory-state validity.
Our experiments also revealed a consistent pattern that initially had not been
predicted: MSH-use is higher for pairs of objects in recognition certainty and objects
in uncertainty states than for pairs of objects in uncertainty and rejection certainty
states. As discussed before, we found this pattern in Experiment 1 and 2 and also
observed corresponding results for the memory-state validities and choice latencies in
both experiments. Additionally, the pattern in MSH-use and memory-state validity is
present for both groups in Experiment 3 (MSH-use: ∆G2(1) = 14.33, p < .001,∆FIA
= 2.72; memory-state validity: ∆G2(1) = 24.88, p < .001,∆FIA = 6.53). Taken
together, these results should motivate a reconsideration of a simple ordinal view of
the three states. This could be pursued in future studies where specific hypotheses
would guide a clear test of its source.
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Besides all tests of hypotheses, we also conducted comparative model-based
analyses to find the best version of our model. In this process, we found a reasonable
set of restrictions. One important restriction is in the h and l parameters. When they
are both constrained to be equal to 1, our latent-states model becomes the
approximate MSH model, by incorporating the assumption that the memory state is
perfectly captured by consistency versus inconsistency in recognition judgments. As
becomes clear by inspecting Figure 3, the pattern of results does not change given the
model. However, there are differences that, while quite predictable, are still
interesting to discuss. While the latent-states MSH model is the superior model in
terms of how it captures the processes without further assumptions, the question
remains of whether it is the best measurement tool. Despite its inherent
misspecification, the parsimonious approximate MSH model does a great job at
capturing the pattern of results, and it does not suffer from estimation uncertainty as
much as the latent-states model does. This becomes clear by looking at the standard
errors of the parameter estimates (see Figure 3). We find that we have the best of
two worlds by having both models. Since the results converge, we can surpass the
limitations of the approximate model - showing that the pattern of results does not
depend on using consistency versus inconsistency of recognition judgments as perfect
indicators of memory states. At the same time, we can also surpass the limitations of
the latent-states model - ensuring that our results hold even when we test our
hypotheses with parameter estimates that are less uncertain.
In addition to the model-based analyses, we used repeated recognition
judgments to test latency predictions of the MSH. Assumptions about recognition
latency differences between memory states had previously been used to test the MSH
(see Erdfelder et al., 2011), but had not been validated so far. With our proxy
measure we had an opportunity to validate them using an independent and arguably
better indicator of memory states. Based on the data from both experiments, we were
able to show that recognition and rejection latencies are generally faster for objects in
certainty states (indicated by consistent recognition judgments) than for objects in
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the uncertainty state (indicated by inconsistent recognition judgments). Also, we
have shown that choices tend to be faster with increasing distance between states.
Finally, since in Experiment 2 we repeated both the recognition test and the
inference task, we were able to test the MSH predictions regarding choice consistency,
most importantly, that when the distance between memory states of an object pair is
maximal, choices are most consistent. Consistency should be lower when objects are
in adjacent memory states (and MSH-use is lower), and lowest when they are in the
same state, since for this case the heuristic cannot be applied. This is exactly the
pattern we observed, lending further support to the MSH and showing its vast
predictive potential. Moreover, when we look at the different cases within the
adjacent states and same state categories, we observe that choices are more consistent
when further knowledge is likely to be available, and less consistent in cases where
plain guessing is involved.
We have discussed earlier why we chose the consistency of recognition
judgments as our proxy due to its advantages over other options. But naturally, it
also has limitations. Perhaps the most evident one is the paradigm. The fact that it
requires three separate recognition tasks forces a costly procedure, where participants
must be asked to return to the lab for two subsequent sessions. In our case, we have
opted for a one-week interval between sessions, since we thought this would provide
sufficient time to avoid perfect memory of previous judgments. One evident way to
simplify the procedure would be to have all recognition testes in a single session,
separated by some distractor tasks. It remains an empirical question whether this
would compromise the procedure, and while we think it would lead to a higher
number of consistent judgments, it is hard to argue either against or for it without
appropriate testing.
Another way to simplify the procedure would be to reduce the number of
sessions to two. Given the quality of the proxy with three sessions, we believe it
would be sufficient to repeat the judgments once without severe contamination, even
if using only the approximate MSH model. But most importantly, we would like to
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clarify that we developed this paradigm and new model in order to test the MSH, and
we do not wish to suggest that this should be the new standard paradigm for
studying the RH. While we strongly recommend that the recognition processes are
taken into consideration for drawing new predictions, we do not wish to promote the
use of our paradigm as a standard tool. Ideally, we hope our work can inspire the
development of even better methods that involve a less costly paradigm and take us
one more step forward.
Another aspect worth addressing is how our estimates of MSH-use compare
to previous findings of RH-use that ignore differences in underlying memory states.
By working with the latent MSH model, we isolated the ideal preconditions for
reliance on recognition, that is, the subset of recognition cases where both objects are
in different certainty states (i.e., recognition versus rejection certainty). Following the
rationale of the MSH, this should lead to comparably higher estimates of reliance on
recognition than found before. Indeed, we observed that, for two objects in opposing
certainty states, reliance on recognition was .86 and .88 on average (for Experiment 1
and 2, respectively). This is considerably larger than the usual estimates of RH-use
previously found with the r-model for similar judgment domains (see Table 1 of
Hilbig et al., 2010 for an overview), and even higher than the level of RH-use
observed in an experiment where participants were explicitly instructed to use the
RH as often as possible (rˆ = .82, cf. Hilbig et al., 2010, Experiment 6). This suggests
that estimating reliance on recognition by only considering binary recognition
judgments leads to a gross underestimation of the use of memory strength in
inferential decision making when conditions for using it are ideal. When defined in
terms of memory states, we see that recognition information is actually used more
often, in line with the ecological validity of memory states. Accordingly, Castela et al.
(2014) found similarly high estimates of RH-use between .69 and .98 (.77 on average),
but only for recognition cases for which there was further knowledge about the
recognized object (arguably associated with the recognition certainty state). For
recognition cases where there was mere recognition only, RH-use was much lower
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(between .45 and .70, .57 on average; see Table 2 of Castela et al., 2014 for an
overview of the estimates of RH-use for both types of recognition cases).
The high estimates for parameter rRN bring up the question whether the
hypothesis rRN = 1 is compatible with our data. This would imply that further
knowledge is entirely ignored when one object is certainly recognized and the other is
certainly rejected, much in line with a deterministic interpretation of RH use under
ideal conditions (cf., Hilbig et al., 2010). We opted to test this hypothesis based on
the approximate MSH model because (a) this model is compatible with the data of
both experiments and (b) it provides the more powerful test due to smaller standard
errors of rˆ. More precisely, we tested H0 : rRN = .99 rather than H0 : rRN = 1. This
slightly weaker null model is more reasonable because the latter restriction would
predict zero frequencies for some categories of the model. A single observation in one
of these cells would thus result in infinite misfit, rendering a rejection of this model
trivial. Notably, for both experiments the hypothesis rRN ≥ .99 leads to severe
increase in both misfit and FIA (∆G2(1) = 783.09, p < .001,∆FIA = 389.36, and
∆G2(1) = 388.75, p < .001,∆FIA = 191.47, for Experiment 1 and 2, respectively)9.
These results are clear-cut and conceptually replicate corresponding results of Castela
et al. (2014). In sum, while our model-based results show that people rely on the
MSH quite often when the conditions for successful applications of this strategy are
ideal, we still see that this is not the only strategy in play, even under ideal conditions.
Finally, we would like to point out that there are alternatives to the MSH
model proposed in the current paper, some of which have already been discussed in
the relevant literature. The present model is probably most similar to the r*-model
previously proposed by Castela et al. (2014). Compared to the latter model, however,
the MSH model has two major advantages: it does not assume perfect empirical
indicators for the latent memory states and it accommodates all three memory states
(recognition certainty, uncertainty, and rejection certainty) underlying recognized and
9A similar, although less extreme, pattern of results is found when testing rRN = 1 based on the
latent-states MSH model.
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unrecognized objects, while the r*-model only approximates the recognition certainty
state and the uncertainty state for recognized objects. Moreover, rather than
conceptualizing memory strength (or activation, cf. Schooler & Hertwig, 2005) as a
discrete variable with three states it is of course also possible to conceive it as a
continuous variable. This would be consistent with signal detection theory which, like
the 2HT model, is a prominent model in the recognition memory literature (see
Kellen & Klauer, in press; Pleskac, 2007) but also with the ACT-R approach (see
Schooler & Hertwig, 2005). However, we aimed at formalizing a model of
recognition-based inference that is closest to the original idea of the RH (Goldstein &
Gigerenzer, 2002), with the single exception that it takes the possibility of memory
uncertainty into account. We believe that the MSH model allows for such a
generalization of the RH in a more parsimonious way than approaches based on the
notion of continuous memory strength. In fact, the MSH-model proposed here
contains the original RH-model as a special case that occurs when the probability of
memory uncertainty is zero.
In sum, by formalizing the MSH and finding support for its main predictions,
the current work takes a new step in bridging the gap between theories of recognition
memory and the RH theory. Furthermore, we have shown the potential of our
memory states proxy measure (consistent versus inconsistent recognition judgments)
to validate previous predictions of the MSH regarding recognition and choice latencies
and to derive and test new predictions regarding choice consistency. We believe our
vast set of results shows the benefits of extending the RH to the MSH and having a
formal model of the latter, allowing us to test several predictions and better
understand the processes involved in reliance on recognition for probabilistic
inferences.
A formal model of the Memory State Heuristic 44
References
Batchelder, W. H., & Riefer, D. M. (1999). Theoretical and empirical review of
multinomial process tree modeling. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review , 6 (1), 57–
86.
Bates, D., Ma¨chler, M., Bolker, B., & Walker, S. (2015). Fitting linear mixed-
effects models using lme4. Journal of Statistical Software, 67 (1), 1–48. doi:
10.18637/jss.v067.i01
Bayen, U. J., & Kuhlmann, B. G. (2011). Influences of source–item contingency and
schematic knowledge on source monitoring: Tests of the probability-matching
account. Journal of Memory and Language, 64 (1), 1–17.
Bro¨der, A., Kellen, D., Schu¨tz, J., & Rohrmeier, C. (2013). Validating a two-high-
threshold measurement model for confidence rating data in recognition. Memory ,
21 (8), 916–944.
Castela, M., Kellen, D., Erdfelder, E., & Hilbig, B. E. (2014). The impact of subjective
recognition experiences on recognition heuristic use: A multinomial processing
tree approach. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review , 21 (5), 1131–1138.
Erdfelder, E., Auer, T.-S., Hilbig, B. E., Aßfalg, A., Moshagen, M., & Nadarevic, L.
(2009). Multinomial processing tree models. Zeitschrift fu¨r Psychologie/Journal
of Psychology , 217 (3), 108–124.
Erdfelder, E., Ku¨pper-Tetzel, C. E., & Mattern, S. D. (2011). Threshold models of
recognition and the recognition heuristic. Judgment and Decision Making , 6 (1),
7–22.
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*power 3: A flexi-
ble statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical
sciences. Behavior Research Methods , 39 (2), 175–191.
Gaissmaier, W., & Schooler, L. J. (2008). The smart potential behind probability
matching. Cognition, 109 (3), 416–422.
Gigerenzer, G., & Goldstein, D. G. (2011). The recognition heuristic: A decade of
A formal model of the Memory State Heuristic 45
research. Judgment and Decision Making , 6 (1), 100–121.
Goldstein, D. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (1999). The recognition heuristic: How ignorance
makes us smart. In G. Gigerenzer, P. M. Todd, & the ABC Research Group
(Eds.), Simple heuristics that makes us smart. Oxford University Press.
Goldstein, D. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2002). Models of ecological rationality: The
recognition heuristic. Psychological Review , 109 (1), 75–90.
Heck, D., & Erdfelder, E. (in press). Extending multinomial processing tree models
to measure the relative speed of cognitive processes. Psychonomic Bulletin &
Review .
Heck, D. W., Moshagen, M., & Erdfelder, E. (2014). Model selection by minimum
description length: Lower-bound sample sizes for the Fisher Information Approx-
imation. Journal of Mathematical Psychology , 60 , 29–34.
Hertwig, R., Herzog, S. M., Schooler, L. J., & Reimer, T. (2008). Fluency heuristic: A
model of how the mind exploits a by-product of information retrieval. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 34 (5), 1191–1206.
Hilbig, B. E., Erdfelder, E., & Pohl, R. F. (2010). One-reason decision making unveiled:
A measurement model of the recognition heuristic. Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 36 (1), 123–134.
Hilbig, B. E., & Pohl, R. F. (2008). Recognizing users of the recognition heuristic.
Experimental Psychology , 55 (6), 394–401.
Hilbig, B. E., & Pohl, R. F. (2009). Ignorance-versus evidence-based decision making:
A decision time analysis of the recognition heuristic. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 35 (5), 1296–1305.
Iverson, G. J. (2006). An essay on inequalities and order-restricted inference. Journal
of Mathematical Psychology , 50 (3), 215–219.
Kellen, D., & Klauer, K. C. (in press). Elementary signal detection and threshold
theory. In E.-J. Wagenmakers (Ed.), Stevens handbook of experimental psychology
and cognitive neuroscience, fourth edition (vol. V). New York: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc.
A formal model of the Memory State Heuristic 46
Kellen, D., Klauer, K. C., & Bro¨der, A. (2013). Recognition memory models and
binary-response ROCs: A comparison by minimum description length. Psycho-
nomic Bulletin & Review , 20 (4), 693–719.
Koehler, D. J., & James, G. (2009). Probability matching in choice under uncertainty:
Intuition versus deliberation. Cognition, 113 (1), 123–127.
Kuznetsova, A., Bruun Brockhoff, P., & Haubo Bojesen Christensen, R. (2016).
lmertest: Tests in linear mixed effects models [Computer software manual]. Re-
trieved from https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=lmerTest (R package
version 2.0-30)
Matoˆt, S., Schreij, D., & Theeuwes, J. (2012). Opensesame: An open-source, graphical
experimental bulder for the social sciences. Behavior Research Methods , 44 (2),
314–324.
Newell, B. R., & Fernandez, D. (2006). On the binary quality of recognition and
the inconsequentiality of further knowledge: Two critical tests of the recognition
heuristic. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making , 19 (4), 333–346.
Pachur, T. (2011). The limited value of precise tests of the recognition heuristic.
Judgment and Decision Making , 6 (5), 413–422.
Pachur, T., & Hertwig, R. (2006). On the psychology of the recognition heuristic:
Retrieval primacy as a key determinant of its use. Journal of Experimental Psy-
chology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 32 (5), 983–1002.
Pachur, T., Todd, P. M., Gigerenzer, G., Schooler, L. J., & Goldstein, D. G. (2011).
The recognition heuristic: A review of theory and tests. Frontiers in Psychology ,
2 (147), 1–14.
Pleskac, T. J. (2007). A signal detection analysis of the recognition heuristic. Psycho-
nomic Bulletin & Review , 14 (3), 379–391.
Pohl, R. F. (2006). Empirical tests of the recognition heuristic. Journal of Behavioral
Decision Making , 19 (3), 251–271.
R Core Team. (2015). R: A language and environment for statistical com-
puting [Computer software manual]. Vienna, Austria. Retrieved from
A formal model of the Memory State Heuristic 47
https://www.R-project.org/
Schooler, L. J., & Hertwig, R. (2005). How forgetting aids heuristic inference. Psycho-
logical Review , 112 (3), 610–628.
Schwikert, S. R., & Curran, T. (2014). Familiarity and recollection in heuristic decision
making. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General , 143 (6), 2341–2365.
Shanks, D. R., Tunney, R. J., & McCarthy, J. D. (2002). A re-examination of probabil-
ity matching and rational choice. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making , 15 (3),
233–250.
Singmann, H., & Kellen, D. (2013). MPTinR: Analysis of multinomial processing tree
models in R. Behavior Research Methods , 45 (2), 560–575.
Snodgrass, J. G., & Corwin, J. (1988). Pragmatics of measuring recognition memory:
Applications to dementia and amnesia. Journal of Experimental Psychology:
General , 117 (1), 34–50.
Spaniol, J., & Bayen, U. J. (2002). When is schematic knowledge used in source moni-
toring? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition,
28 (4), 631.
Van De Schoot, R., Hoijtink, H., & Dekovic´, M. (2010). Testing inequality constrained
hypotheses in sem models. Structural Equation Modeling , 17 (3), 443–463.
A formal model of the Memory State Heuristic 48
Table 1: Latent-states MSH parameter estimates (and bootstrapped standard errors)
of Experiment 1, Experiment 2 and Experiment 3.
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3: city-size Experiment 3: height
aUU .50 (-) .50 (-) .50 (-) .50 (-)
aRN .80 (.02) .76 (.02) .82 (.02) .57 (.03)
aRU .69 (.02) .70 (.03) .84 (.04) .64 (.03)
aUN .61 (.01) .60 (.02) .70 (03) .51 (.03)
rRN .88 (.06) .86 (.05) 1 (.10) .26 (.06)
rRU .55 (.05) .63 (.08) .74 (.13) .02 (.05)
rUN .46 (.04) .56 (.06) .54 (.07) .27 (.07)
b .65 (.01) .64 (.02) .74 (.02) .57 (.01)
bRN .65 (.01) .64 (.02) .74 (.02) .57 (.01)
bRU .65 (.01) .64 (.02) .74 (.02) .57 (.01)
bUN .50 (-) .50 (-) .50 (-) .50 (-)
g .50 (-) .50 (-) .50 (-) .50 (-)
h .92 (.06) 1 (.08) .76 (.07) .76 (.07)
l .92 (.06) 1 (.08) .76 (.07) .76 (.07)
Note: Parameters aUU , bUN , and g are fixed to .50. Additionally, parameters b, bRN ,
and bRU are restricted to be equal, as well as parameters h and l. In Experiment 3,
parameters h and l are additionally restricted to be equal between the city-size and
height condition.
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Table 2: Summary of mixed effects logistic regression showing how the combination of
memory states within a pair predicts choice consistency in Experiment 2.
Predictor Coefficient SE Wald Z p
Intercept 0.41 0.10 4.11 < .001
Maximal vs. all others 0.27 0.01 21.29 < .001
Adjacent vs. Same 0.14 0.01 10.25 < .001
REC-UNC vs.UNC-REJ 0.28 0.05 6.07 < .001
REC-REC vs. UNC-UNC and REJ-REJ 0.27 0.03 8.93 < .001
UNC-UNC vs. REJ-REJ 0.13 0.07 1.81 .07
Note: REC - recognition certainty; UNC - uncertainty; REJ - rejection certainty.
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Figure 1: Graphical representation of the r-model: Parameter r denotes the proba-
bility of applying the recognition heuristic as originally proposed, that is, by ignoring
any knowledge beyond recognition. a = recognition validity (probability of the rec-
ognized object representing the correct choice in a recognition case); b = probability
of valid knowledge; g = probability of a correct guess; rec. = recognized; unrec. =
unrecognized.
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Figure 2: Abstract representation of the latent-states MSH model, denoting how the
filter parameters determine the memory-state combination under comparison and, con-
sequently, the appropriate decision process. h, probability that consistent recognition
judgments originate from recognition certainty; l, probability that consistent rejec-
tion judgments originate from rejection certainty; 111, consistently recognized objects;
000, consistently rejected objects; REC, recognition certainty; UNC, uncertainty; REJ,
rejection certainty. The full model is presented in Appendix A.
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Figure 3: Estimates of the three r and a parameters for Experiment 1 and 2. Solid
lines represent the estimates from the latent-states MSH model while dashed lines rep-
resent estimates from the approximate MSH model. Error bars represent bootstrapped
standard errors of the parameter estimates.
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Figure 4: Left-side plots show means of individual median recognition (REC) and re-
jection (REJ) latencies from the first session, separately for consistent and inconsistent
repeated recognition judgments in Experiment 1 and 2. Right-side plots represent
means of individual median choice latencies in the first session for pairs where the
distance between the states is maximal (recognition certainty and rejection certainty);
for pairs where objects are in adjacent memory-states (recognition certainty and un-
certainty; rejection certainty and uncertainty); and for pairs in the same state (both
objects in recognition certainty, both in rejection certainty and both in uncertainty)
for Experiment 1 and 2. Error bars represent standard errors.
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Figure 5: Mean proportion of consistent jugments (across the three sessions) for each
type of pair. Error bars represent standard errors.
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APPENDIX A
Model equations (.eqn format) and full model figure of latent - states MSH model
1 1 h * h * b
1 2 h * h * (1 - b)
1 1 h * (1 - h) * rRU * aRU
1 2 h * (1 - h) * rRU * (1 - aRU )
1 1 h * (1 - h) * (1 - rRU ) * bRU * aRU
1 1 h * (1 - h) * (1 - rRU ) * bRU * (1 - aRU )
1 2 h * (1 - h) * (1 - rRU ) * (1 - bRU ) * aRU
1 2 h * (1 - h) * (1 - rRU ) * (1 - bRU ) * (1 - aRU )
1 1 (1 - h) * h * rRU * aRU
1 2 (1 - h) * h * rRU * (1 - aRU )
1 1 (1 - h) * h * (1 - rRU ) * bRU * aRU
1 1 (1 - h) * h * (1 - rRU ) * bRU * (1 - aRU )
1 2 (1 - h) * h * (1 - rRU ) * (1 - bRU ) * aRU
1 2 (1 - h) * h * (1 - rRU ) * (1 - bRU ) * (1 - aRU )
1 1 (1 - h) * (1 - h) * g
1 2 (1 - h) * (1 - h) * (1 - g)
2 3 g
2 4 (1 - g)
3 5 l * l * g
3 6 l * l * (1 - g)
3 5 l * (1 - l) * rUN * aUN
3 6 l * (1 - l) * rUN * (1 - aUN )
3 5 l * (1 - l) * (1 - rUN ) * bUN * aUN
3 5 l * (1 - l) * (1 - rUN ) * bUN * (1 - aUN )
3 6 l * (1 - l) * (1 - rUN ) * (1 - bUN ) * aUN
3 6 l * (1 - l) * (1 - rUN ) * (1 - bUN ) * (1 - aUN )
3 5 (1 - l) * l * rUN * aUN
3 6 (1 - l) * l * rUN * (1 - aUN )
3 5 (1 - l) * l * (1 - rUN ) * bUN * aUN
3 5 (1 - l) * l * (1 - rUN ) * bUN * (1 - aUN )
3 6 (1 - l) * l * (1 - rUN ) * (1 - bUN ) * aUN
3 6 (1 - l) * l * (1 - rUN ) * (1 - bUN ) * (1 - aUN )
3 5 (1 - l) * (1 - l) * g
3 6 (1 - l) * (1 - l) * (1 - g)
4 7 h * l * rRN * aRN
4 8 h * l * rRN * (1 - aRN )
4 7 h * l * (1 - rRN ) * bRN * aRN
4 9 h * l * (1 - rRN ) * bRN * (1 - aRN )
4 10 h * l * (1 - rRN ) * (1 - bRN ) * aRN
4 8 h * l * (1 - rRN ) * (1 - bRN ) * (1 - aRN )
4 7 h * (1 - l) * rRU * aRU
4 8 h * (1 - l) * rRU * (1 - aRU )
4 7 h * (1 - l) * (1 - rRU ) * bRU * aRU
4 9 h * (1 - l) * (1 - rRU ) * bRU * (1 - aRU )
4 10 h * (1 - l) * (1 - rRU ) * (1 - bRU ) * aRU
4 8 h * (1 - l) * (1 - rRU ) * (1 - bRU ) * (1 - aRU )
4 7 (1 - h) * l * rUN * aUN
4 8 (1 - h) * l * rUN * (1 - aUN )
4 7 (1 - h) * l * (1 - rUN ) * bUN * aUN
4 9 (1 - h) * l * (1 - rUN ) * bUN * (1 - aUN )
4 10 (1 - h) * l * (1 - rUN ) * (1 - bUN ) * aUN
4 8 (1 - h) * l * (1 - rUN ) * (1 - bUN ) * (1 - aUN )
4 7 (1 - h) * (1 - l) * rUU * aUU
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4 8 (1 - h) * (1 - l) * rUU * (1 - aUU )
4 7 (1 - h) * (1 - l) * (1 - rUU ) * g * aUU
4 9 (1 - h) * (1 - l) * (1 - rUU ) * g * (1 - aUU )
4 10 (1 - h) * (1 - l) *(1 - rUU ) * (1 - g) * aUU
4 8 (1 - h) * (1 - l) * (1 - rUU ) *(1 - g) * (1 - aUU )
5 11 h * rRU * aRU
5 12 h * rRU * (1 - aRU )
5 11 h * (1 - rRU ) * bRU * aRU
5 13 h * (1 - rRU ) * bRU * (1 - aRU )
5 14 h * (1 - rRU ) * (1 - bRU ) * aRU
5 12 h * (1 - rRU ) * (1 - bRU ) * (1 - aRU )
5 11 (1 - h) * rUU * aUU
5 12 (1 - h) * rUU * (1 - aUU )
5 11 (1 - h) * (1 - rUU ) * g * aUU
5 13 (1 - h) * (1 - rUU ) * g * (1 - aUU )
5 14 (1 - h) * (1 - rUU ) * (1 - g) * aUU
5 12 (1 - h) * (1 - rUU ) * (1 - g) * (1 - aUU )
6 15 l * rUN * aUN
6 16 l * rUN * (1 - aUN )
6 15 l * (1 - rUN ) * bUN * aUN
6 17 l * (1 - rUN ) * bUN * (1 - aUN )
6 18 l * (1 - rUN ) * (1 - bUN ) * aUN
6 16 l * (1 - rUN ) * (1 - bUN ) * (1 - aUN )
6 15 (1 - l) * rUU * aUU
6 16 (1 - l) * rUU * (1 - aUU )
6 15 (1 - l) * (1 - rUU ) * g * aUU
6 17 (1 - l) * (1- rUU ) * g * (1 - aUU )
6 18 (1 - l) * (1 - rUU ) * (1 - g) * aUU
6 16 (1 - l) * (1 - rUU ) * (1 - g) * (1 - aUU )
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APPENDIX B
Necessary and sufficient conditions for h = l
Since h represents the probability of a consistent “yes” judgment (111) originating from
recognition certainty (REC) and l the probability of a consistent “no” judgment (000)
originating from rejection certainty (REJ), it follows that
h = Pr(REC|111) (1a)
l = Pr(REJ |000). (1b)
Additonally, this also implies that, for the uncertainty memory state (UNC)
1− h = Pr(UNC|111) (2a)
1− l = Pr(UNC|000). (2b)
It follows from Bayes’ theorem that
Pr(UNC|111) = Pr(111|UNC)Pr(UNC)
Pr(111)
(3a)
Pr(UNC|000) = Pr(000|UNC)Pr(UNC)
Pr(000)
. (3b)
Since we know from the 2HT model that, assuming independent recognition judgments,
Pr(111|UNC) = g3 and Pr(000|UNC) = (1− g)3, it follows that
Pr(UNC|111) = g3Pr(UNC)
Pr(111)
(4a)
Pr(UNC|000) = (1− g)3Pr(UNC)
Pr(000)
. (4b)
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After dividing Equation (4a) by Equation (4b) we see that the equality h = l ⇔
P (UNC|111) = P (UNC|000) holds if and only if
g3
(1− g)3 =
Pr(111)
Pr(000)
. (5)
Hence, g monotonically increases with Pr(111)
Pr(000)
.
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APPENDIX C
Approximate Model
The baseline model with the restrictions b = bRN = bRU and g = bUN = .5 fit quite
well (Experiment 1: G2(5) = 4.50, p = .48, FIA = 28.37; Experiment 2: G2(5) = 3.44,
p = .63, FIA = 26.91). When adding the inequality restrictions rRN ≥ rRU and
rRN ≥ rUN , model misfit did not increase and FIA decreased (Experiment 1: ∆G2 = 0,
p = 1, ∆FIA = 1.20; Experiment 2: ∆G2 = 0, p = 1, ∆FIA = 1.19). When we
compared the inequality with an equality restriction rRN = rRU = rRN , model misfit
increased significantly and so did FIA (Experiment 1: ∆G
2
= 260.78, p = 0 , ∆FIA
= 125.53; Experiment 2: ∆G
2
= 128.75, p = 0, ∆FIA = 59.79), indicating that the
equality restriction is not compatible with the data. According to the G2 goodness-of-
fit statistic, the difference between rRU and rUN was also replicated, but the differences
in FIA are too small to allow a preference for any of the two models (Experiment 1:
∆G2(1) = 6.73, p < .01, ∆FIA = .50; Experiment 2: ∆G2(1) = 4.38, p = .04, ∆FIA
= −.53).
Regarding the a parameter, adding the inequality restrictions aRN ≥ aRU and
aRN ≥ rUN did not increase model misfit and decreased FIA (Experiment 1: ∆G2 = 0,
p = 1, ∆FIA = 1.12; Experiment 2: ∆G2 = 0, p = 1, ∆FIA = 1.12). When we
compared the inequality with the equality restriction aRN = aRU = aRN , we observed
a significant increase in model misfit and FIA (Experiment 1: ∆G
2
= 135.47, p = 0 ,
∆FIA = 61.53; Experiment 2: ∆G
2
= 78.71, p = 0, ∆FIA = 33.46). The difference
between aRU and aUN was replicated with the approximate model, since imposing
the equality restriction aRU = aUN led to a significant increase in model misfit and
in FIA (Experiment 1: ∆G2(1) = 16.67, p < .001, ∆FIA = 4.77; Experiment 2:
∆G2(1) = 29.63, p < .001, ∆FIA = 11.40).
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APPENDIX D
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Exp 1 1041 549 377 356 611 641 1901 503 77 120 977 384 177 205 635 391 173 242
Exp 2 1023 589 183 167 347 363 1307 390 38 73 932 333 109 134 464 296 92 120
Exp 3: size 1537 511 78 69 263 240 1061 266 38 87 608 148 87 89 209 100 58 71
Exp 3: heigth 672 506 73 73 215 192 377 257 192 215 239 126 152 182 112 110 73 74
Note: Aggreagated response frequencies for all experiments, separately for each of the
18 response categories.
